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     From the time of the early church to the present century, Christian assumptions 
about and theological responses to sport have been problematic. In the present 
century, evangelicals in North America lack a developed theological ethic about how 
Christians should regard modern sport--the practices, purposes, and values. What 
little theology there is, is an uninformed folk theology of muscular Christianity in 
which the primary means of evaluating sport is in terms of its instrumental utility 
with no recognition of goods that might be internal to sport. In this thesis, I formulate 
a modest Christian ethic for sport as a way toward reimagining sport in the Christian 
life as an embodied, penultimate good.  
     I have chosen Augustine, John Paul II, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer as the three 
primary interlocutors with whom to shape a theological discourse about and 
construct for modern sport. Together, they assist in exploring fundamental 
convictions of the Christian tradition and determining what bearing these should 
have on Christian moral reflection and deliberation on this cultural activity.  
     In chapter one, Augustine‘s ethic is organized around three integral motifs: God 
and happiness, ordered and disordered loves, and the use and enjoyment of goods.  
By beginning here, a Christian ethic addresses the charges against Augustine‘s 
idealism set in the historical context of ancient Rome where the Christian tradition 
first engaged sport extra-biblically. These motifs lay the groundwork for how a 
Christian might relate to sport.  
   xi
     In chapter two, I examine an exemplary modern attempt—by the American 
philosopher Paul Weiss—to give a moral and philosophical account of sport. Weiss 
develops a philosophy of sport around themes derived from classical Greek 
literature, including bodily excellence, anthropology, and teleology. Weiss‘s Greek 
ideals and philosophical categories function as heuristic tools because many issues of 
modern sport are connected in a variety of ways to these ancient Greek ideals. Weiss 
forms a bridge historically and philosophically to thicken our description of modern 
sport, to refine this thesis‘s analysis of some important categories native to modern 
sport, and to focus on what this phenomenon entails for a Christian ethic today. 
     In chapter three, I engage with John Paul II's complex and rich account of the 
internal moral and theological goods of sport. John Paul II's personalism provides a 
much stronger basis for analyzing the goods intrinsic to sport than does Weiss--one 
that is, moreover, consistent with (while building on) the Augustinian foundation laid 
in chapter one. I demonstrate that in John Paul II's theology of sport, sportive actions 
find a significant analogue in the Christian doctrine of creation in relation to the body 
of the athlete, in which perspective sport may be seen as sign and gift shared with 
other embodied sportspersons. I propose that sport is an ontic-embodied good and 
gift that is only properly conceptualized in a Christian ethic, an ethic in which the 
pursuit of excellence is an objective that fulfils the dignity and worth of the whole 
human person. By contrast, Paul Weiss' philosophy of sport instrumentalizes 
embodied pursuits, such as sport.  
     In chapter four, Dietrich Bonhoeffer‘s Christological basis for Christian ethics 
serves to repair the persistent problem of dualism—two-sphere thinking—for modern 
muscular Christianity. Bonhoeffer‘s comprehensive vision of reality places Christ at 
   xii
the center of life and existence so that the question of the good becomes the 
realization of the reality of God in Christ. Therefore, a Christian ethic does not 
justify how the reality of God in Christ relates to sportive culture by appealing either 
to the sacred or secular, but justification is in Christ, since He has drawn and holds it 
all together.   
     In chapter five, I continue with the problem of modern muscular Christianity in 
order to constructively reimagine how to relate the reality of Christ as the ultimate to 
sportive reality, the penultimate. This eschatological paradigm further organizes the 
final chapter in two important ways. First, the logic of sport is often governed by 
alien ends and loves. Augustine‘s ethic refines this problem as a matter of how the 
practice of sport can educate our desires according to competing teloi. Second, I 
elucidate the importance of St. Paul‘s sport metaphor (1 Cor 9:24-27) as another 
angle for interpreting and ethically engaging the complex lived experience of sport 
itself. This sport metaphor functions eschatologically to integrate sport and the 
Christian life and to ennoble this activity as a practice for moral and spiritual 
formation.  
 





                                                      
When I was a young man I used to go to sacrilegious shows and entertainments. 
I watched the antics of madmen; I listened to singing boys; I thoroughly enjoyed 
the most degrading spectacles [games] put on in honour of gods and goddesses . 
. . .
1
 (St. Augustine) 
 
I had promised that it would be for God‘s honor and glory, whether we won or 
lost. Of course the glory was better for God and me since we won, because the 
victory gave me a greater platform from which to speak.
2




The Context and Problem 
 
     These two quotations represent the core of the research problem I will examine in 
this thesis. From the time of the early church to evangelicals in the twenty-first 
century in North America, Christian assumptions about and ensuing theological 
responses to sport have been problematic. There are clearly important differences 
existing between Roman sports and modern sports. However, it is my contention that 
theological and moral confusion among contemporary Christians concerns the moral 
significance of sport.  
     On the one hand, Augustine argued that popular sport in ancient Rome was a form 
of life that aroused immoral dispositions, led to vices, and was implicated in the 
idolatrous worship of the pagan gods. Augustine is concerned with God‘s glory and 
honor, which is not to be confused with the glory of the earthly city. On the other 
                                                 
1
 Augustine, City of God, 2.4. 
2
 Shirl J. Hoffman, ―The Sanctification of Sport: Can the Mind of Christ Coexist with the Killer 
Instinct?‖ Christianity Today, 4 April 1986, 20. Originally, quoted in Michael Roberts, Fans! How We 
Go Crazy over Sports (Washington: New Republic, 1976): 117-118. 
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hand, Roger Staubach, quarterback for the world champion Dallas Cowboys, 
assumes God‘s glory and honor are present in and through sport to the point that 
winning augments God‘s glory because it affords Christianity greater ―gospel‖ 
relevance when associated with a value most esteemed by the earthly city.  
Staubach‘s view depicts an almost unquestioned alliance today between the Christian 
faith and sport. In the past, such an alliance would have been highly suspect. But 
Higgs claims that this alliance ―has become symbiotic, with the church offering 
blessings on sports and sports bringing welcomed attention to the church.‖
3
 Sport is a 
venue supplied with cultural capital, vying for investors and space even from the 
church or organized religion. Although sociologists over the last thirty years have 
conducted valuable research with regard to the nature of this relationship between 
religion and sport, this thesis considers a different angle of the problem. There is no 
developed theological ethic about how a Christian should regard modern sport--the 
practices, purposes, and values.  
     This gap in knowledge occasioned Gregory Baum and John Coleman, in their 
edited socio-theological book, to claim that ―. . . one looks almost in vain for any 
more serious spiritual and theological assessment of this important topic [sport].‖
4
 
Certainly, this does not mean that there is not any theoretical reflection on sport 
because sport ethics emerged in the 1970s as its own field of applied ethics (and is 
now a burgeoning discipline). However, the nature of this problem for this thesis 
turns on the lack of serious Christian reflection about the moral interests central to 
                                                 
3
 Robert Higgs, God in the Stadium: Sports and Religion in America (Lexington, KY: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 1995), 21. Higgs‘s analysis concerns the incompatibility between sport and 
religion. In his introduction, he offers a disclaimer that his book is not a theological or historical 
analysis of sport and religion. I return to Higgs‘s thesis with Shirl Hoffman in chapter four.  
4
 Gregory Baum and John Coleman, eds., Sport (Edinburgh, Scotland: T & T Clark, 1989), 4.  
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this social practice. For example, what norms and purposes shape Christian reflection 
and deliberation concerning the ludic, agonistic, and aretaic elements of modern 
sport? What difference should religious commitments make for how a Christian sees 
and relates to the officials, opponent, spectators, rules, physical body, and so on? 
How do we properly value and relate this penultimate good to the ultimate good? 
These kinds of questions help us to attend to and frame this research problem.   
     In From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Modern Sports, Allen Guttmann 
incisively comments about the practical significance of this problem for Christians 
today: 
For most contemporary athletes, even for those who ask for divine assistance in 
the game, the contest is a secular event. The Sermon on the Mount does not 





If the problem begins with this lacuna in theological reflection, then it is instantiated 
with practitioners who dissociate the ethical direction of their faith from their sport 
involvement. This problem, which is not peculiar to sport, undermines genuine 
integration insofar as Christians fail to conform daily living to Christian doctrine and 
beliefs. In other words, the praxis side of this problem manifests a deep confusion on 
how Christian moral reflection should bear on sport. Let us examine the historical 
context that proves this confusion and heightens the need for this thesis.   
     Guttmann argues that, whereas ancient sport had a particular religious character 
and purpose, modern sport is characterized by secularization, egalitarianism, 
                                                 
5
 Allen Guttmann, From Ritual to Record (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 25. After 
almost thirty years, Guttmann‘s thesis stands; however, a few criticisms have refined his account. For 
example, his analysis scrutinizes the traditional sports versus the ―post-modern‖ sports (i.e. 
snowboarding, surfing, etc.) and therefore some of his characteristics appear absent in these sports. In 
fact, what many of the contestants most enjoy are features that differentiate their sport from these 
traditional kinds of sports. Yet, even these X sports after a while get assimilated into the business of 
sport, resembling the traditional sports.  
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specialization, rationalization, bureaucratization, quantification, and the quest for 
records.
6
 Because the bond between the sacred and secular has been severed, 
―modern sports are activities partly pursued for their own sake, partly for other ends 
which are equally secular.‖
7
 Guttmann contends that the secularization of sport is 
something that began in the late Roman Empire when the pagan association lost its 
grip under the influence of Christianization of the Empire. However, this dissolution 
resulted in a secularization of sport without any developed vision for how to think 
Christianly about sport. That is, how should Christians account for this sphere of 
interaction? This left the Christian tradition suspicious of this social practice, as was 
the case especially for Protestants from the seventeenth through the nineteenth 
century, precipitated by the Puritans. Most notably, the Puritans resisted the sporting 
activities that King James I published in The King‟s Book of Sports.
8
 Where the 
Puritans were able to endorse certain activities that were recreational in scope, 
according to Leland Ryken, their endorsement was theoretical in nature. For in 
practice, the Puritans‘ legalistic ethic—exacerbated by the immorality of certain 
sports and sport competition on Sundays—precluded them from valuing sport as a 
good for its own sake. Because all activities were valued by whether they could be 
put to use for God‘s good purposes the Puritans contributed to a ―utilitarian play 
                                                 
6
 Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, 16. 
7
 Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, 26.  
8
 Jim Mathisen ―Sport,‖ in Handbook of Religion and Social Institutions, ed. Helen R. Ebaugh (New 
York: Springer, 2006), 288; cf. Donald L. Deardorff II, Sports: A Reference Guide and Critical 
Commentary, 1980-1999 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 178-91; Joseph L. Price, ed., From 
Season to Season: Sports as American Religion (Macon, GA: 2001), 3-38; Jay Coakley, Sports in 
Society: Issues and Controversies, 8
th
 ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 526-563. William J. 
Baker, Sports in the Western World (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988).  
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ethic.‖
9
 For the Christian, non-work meant an opportunity for deepening his piety 
and leisure; it was a reward for and rest from hard work. So ―usefulness and 
innocence‖ were the virtues extolled if participating, and vigilance was cultivated 
toward any activities that might profligate time well-spent.
10
 Furthermore, during this 
time, there was ―the slow development of an empirical, experimental, mathematical 
Weltanschauung‖ that emerged from the ―new science‖ of the Enlightenment and 
that fostered a rationalism that informed modern society.
11
 When conjoined to the 
prevailing sport ethos, the dominant, accepted, Protestant use-value ethic toward 
sport was ―transformed by a modern worldview and resulted in a highly rationalized 
approach to pursuing sport.‖
12
 In turn, this use-value ethic prepared the way for an 
achievement-oriented ethos toward modern sport characterized by such features as 
quantification, a quest for records, and specialization. What effect did this have on 
religion and sport for today? Mathisen concludes, 
Herein lays a significant irony of the Puritans‘ influence as it has played out in 
North American sport—indeed in much of capitalistic culture—over the past 
four centuries. Sport is valuable mainly if valuable for something, whether 
earning a scholarship, making a living, or simply staying in proper physical 
condition. So rather than leaving modern Americans with any sense of sport‘s 
theological or religious significance, the Puritan legacy remains largely one of 




                                                 
9
 Leland Ryken, Worldly Saints: The Puritans As They Really Were (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986), 
190-91; cited in Jim Mathisen, ―Sport,‖ 288.  
10
 John A. Lucas and Ronald A. Smith, Saga of American Sport (Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1978), 
59. 
11
 Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, 85. 
12
 Mathisen, ―Sport,‖ 289; Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, 85-89. 
13
 James Mathisen, ―A Brief History of Christianity and Sport,‖ in The Image of God in the Human 
Body: Essays on Christianity and Sports, eds. Donald Deardorff II and John White (Lewiston, NY: 
The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), 19; cf. Steven J. Overman, The Influence of the Protestant Ethic on 
Sport and Recreation (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997).  
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     If any doubts remained about the relationship between Christianity and sport, the 
Muscular Christian movement challenged it in practice. Toward the latter half of the 
nineteenth century—originating in England with Thomas Arnold, Rugby School 
headmaster, who influenced novelists Thomas Hughes and Charles Kingsley—a kind 
of renaissance occurred with the revival of the classical ideal, mens sana in corpore 
sano. Juvenal first coined the phrase in his Tenth Satires (10.56) as part of his answer 
to what humans should pray for in regard to the good life.
14
 Higgs regards the 
adoption of this ideal as the Hellenistic phase of sport in the nineteenth century, 
―with the endless references to the Greeks, usually by educators or military 
apologists‖ toward the value of sport.
15
 This ideal was syncretized and formulated 
into a doctrine that became known as ―muscular Christianity‖ and was eventually 
exported to America. Basic to this movement‘s beliefs was the idea that sports 
strengthens and develops a Christian man‘s character and body. As a precursor to 
today‘s ideal that sports builds character, ―muscular Christianity‖ proposed that 
godliness and manliness together were a solution to the ―poison of effeminacy‖ that 
was weakening the Anglican Church.
16
 In America, this movement justified sport 
participation for a number of different groups, mitigating religion‘s former aversion 
to sport:
17
 1) schools adapted the ideals that sport builds character to encourage 
morale; 2) groups like the YMCA utilized this moral ethos as the backbone for their 
                                                 
14
 Though Juvenal may be the first to coin the phrase, it was not formally adopted for sports until the 
19
th
 century. See David Young, ―Mens Sana in Corpore Sano? Body and Mind in Ancient Greece,‖ 
International Journal of the History of Sport 22, no. 1 (January 2005): 22-41. 
15
 Higgs, God in the Stadium, 309.  
16
 David Newsome, Godliness and Good Learning: Four Studies on a Victorian Ideal (London: 
Cassell, 1961), 207; cf. Clifford Putney, Muscular Christianity: Manhood and Sports in Protestant 
America 1880-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).  
17
 Mathisen, ―Sport,‖ 289-95. 
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urban reform to young men, along with Fundamentalists (early 1940s) who engaged 
in sport in order to give cultural credence and win souls; and 3) later other 
organizations (i.e., FCA, YFC, AIA) and church sport ministries in the twentieth 
century were established with the presupposition that sports was a critical means for 
evangelizing the world because of this attraction to sport and its relationship to 
religion and good character. In the 1970s, Frank Deford, a popular sport columnist, 
christened this movement ―Sportianity,‖ an off-spin of Muscular Christianity. What 
has unfolded from this historically complex progression of Christianity and sport is 
an institutional relationship between sport and religion, especially among North 
American evangelical Christians. However, what has been missing is an adequate 
theology;
18
 that is, there is relatively no theological rationale or redemptive critique 
of sport. What little theology there is, is an uninformed, folk-style amalgamation of 
sport, biblical metaphors, athletic anecdotes or quotes, and pop psychology like what 
is represented in the quote by Roger Staubach.
19
  
Purpose of Thesis 
Theological Ethic for Sport 
     The purpose of the thesis is to develop a theologico-ethical construct in the 
Christian tradition for sport. As the subtitle of my thesis indicates, I intend to offer a 
theological ethic for sport. The grammatical use of ―for‖ as a coordinating 
conjunction means that I endeavor to join dogma belonging to theology, as described 
and understood by revelation and tradition, to sport. By joining the two together, I 
                                                 
18
 Tony Ladd and James A. Mathisen, Muscular Christianity: Evangelical Protestants and the 
Development of American Sport (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1999), 224. 
19
 Ladd and Mathisen, Muscular Christianity, 219-223.  
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am deliberately focusing the material content of theological reflection on sport. Since 
this has been neglected by evangelicals in North America, then, the task of theology 
warrants this, and thus, it aims to establish important theological connections to sport 
in order to repair this theological lacuna on sport. This kind of theological reflection 
is what Miroslav Volf refers to as traditional reflection since it operates explicitly 
from the basic doctrines of the Christian faith for a particular secular reality which in 
Volf‘s case concerned the subject matter of work.
20
 Volf insists that this mode of 
reflection is essential in order to arrive at the moral norms for a worker‘s actions. 
Following Oliver O‘Donovan‘s measured analysis of the two kinds of thought 
pertaining to Christian moral reasoning,
21
 my theological reasoning is less about 
moral deliberation on the level of rules and particular moral judgments concerning 
sportive actions, and thus, more about reflection on the level of moral principles and 
basic theological convictions.
22
 Consequently, concerning the scope of the thesis, a 
theological ethic for sport means that my theoretical investigation about sport begins 
primarily with theoretical or propositional elements from Christian thought; 
theological reflection is grounded in God‘s purposes as disclosed by revelation.
23
 As 
O‘Donovan notes, reflection is ―turning back‖ on the purposedness of reality. 
                                                 
20
 Miroslav Volf, Work in the Spirit: Toward a Theology of Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 69-76. Cf. Darrell Cosden, A Theology of Work: Work and the New Creation (Carlisle: 
Paternoster, 2004), 3-10. In Volf‘s work, he seeks to go beyond the traditional reflection by 
considering the broader theological framework in order to repair some of the shortcomings of the 
traditional approach.  
21
 See Oliver O‘Donovan, ―Christian Moral Reasoning,‖ in New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and 
Pastoral Theology, eds. David J. Atkinson and others (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1995), 
122-127.   
22
 See Glen H. Stassen and David P. Gushee, Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in Contemporary 
Context (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 99-124; cf. James Gustafson, ―Context vs. 
Principle: A Misplaced Debate in Christian Ethics,‖ Harvard Theological Review 58 (1965): 171-202. 
23
 Oliver O‘Donovan, ―Christian Moral Reasoning,‖ 122-127. When I refer to revelation, this does not 
mean only from the scriptures but other sources which help in our understanding of God‘s purposes.  
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Reflection ―attends to what is shown us of God‘s purpose in creation and 
redemption, on the one hand, and to the order of the world, in the light of God‘s 
purposes, on the other.‖
24
 Hence, my task is to consider the theological convictions 
and principles with regard or respect to sport; this is a theological ethic for sport. 
Although I do not offer any extended treatment of specific moral matters germane to 
sport or formulate any moral policies or rules specific to modern sport, I do follow at 
various points the theological trajectory of my theological bases and principles with 
respect to certain moral issues in sport.  
     In summary, my emphasis on a theology for sport is for the following reasons. 
First, the neglect in North America warrants special attention to this topic especially 
by Christian theologians. As intimated above, theology concerns itself with God and 
created reality, namely human reality in this case. Second, sport as a cultural activity 
is not only ubiquitous in the modern world, but as I argue in chapter three with John 
Paul II, sport remains as long as human persons remain;
25
 sport as play is a basic 
good constitutive of our humanity. Third, my accent on ―for‖ is as much for 
rhetorical reasons because of the lacuna, and yet, I also want to redress the fact that 
where muscular Christians attempt to do theology it is often guilty of 
accommodation. Or, as Mathisen argues, muscular Christianity‘s commitment to 
evangelism by whatever means brought with it little interest ―in conceptualizing an a 
priori theological basis for their [sport ministry] activity.‖
26
 This little interest alters 
the gospel essentially and loses contact with Christian revelation and tradition. I will 
                                                 
24
 Oliver O‘Donovan, ―Christian Moral Reasoning,‖ 122-123. 
 
25
 For a similar point, though in relation to work as a function of who we are as human beings, see 
Volf, Work in the Spirit, 74-75. 
26
 Ladd and Mathisen, Muscular Christianity, 224.  
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say more about this in chapters one and four. Therefore, this problem of 
accommodation requires that the thesis give epistemic priority to revelation so that a 
dogmatic perspective is fundamental to this method in order for theology to properly 
interpret and evaluate sport.  
     The scope and purpose of this thesis, however, does not commit my theological 
task to one direction, i.e., only from revelation to the culture of sport, especially since 
some of my conversation partners and insights lie outside of Christian theology, and 
since sport itself is a practice embedded in God‘s wider moral order that 
communicates and reveals moral truths, albeit fragmentary ones.
27
 Consequently, 
although my theological method begins from the sources or authorities germane to 
Christian confession or wisdom, I recognize that theological reflection does not only 
speak and relate to contemporary situations. Since this is an integrative dialogue 
between belief and practice,
28
 then the voice of wisdom disciplines the theological 
task to observe and listen to the situation or empirical reality itself because Christian 
theology is immersed in a created reality and history fraught with complexities, 
contingencies and ambiguities.
29
 This integrative dialogue means that theological 
reflection does not simply apply norms to situations. Rather, the situation informs 
moral reflection about certain facts or state of affairs which are necessary for 
considering and appraising a moral event or experience. Furthermore, this implies 
                                                 
27
 Oliver O‘Donovan, ―Christian Moral Reasoning,‖ 123-124; cf. Oliver O‘Donovan, Resurrection 
and Moral Order, 2
nd
 ed. (Leicester: Apollos, 1994), 16-21. In other words, I am not advocating an 
applicationist strategy which merely identifies key theological truths from my own tradition and 
sources and then sets out to apply these truths to the beliefs and values of sport culture (See Gordon 
Lynch, Understanding Theology and Popular Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 100-110.). 
Furthermore, the commitment to contextuality requires an appropriate concern given to the 
relationship between theology and culture.  
28
 See Robert J. Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1985). 
29
 David F. Ford, Christian Wisdom: Desiring God and Learning in Love (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 4. 
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that the theological task critically attends to the questions which emerge from the 
reality of sport culture while at the same time the task demands that Christian 
revelation interrogates and reframes the moral problems themselves.
30
 In fact, this 
dialectic between revelation and culture only affirms, in general, that culture has a 
theological dimension, since it is grounded in God‘s created order—the penultimate 
context—and God‘s unremitting commitment to this world as the Creator and 
sustainer. The doctrines of creation, providence, and Christ as incarnate, judge and 
redeemer, to name a few, corroborate this theological dimension. And yet, because of 
the tension between the revelational and cultural pole, I equally regard, especially in 
chapters one, four and five, the relativizing authority of Christian revelation (the 
gospel) as the ultimate norm for interpreting such cultural activities as sport.  
     This final point of revelation and culture bears an important theological 
assumption, namely the relationship between faith and reason, when thinking about 
sources for doing theological ethics. For the thesis, I assume that religious faith is 
primary--a first principle of sorts--and thus, theological knowledge is what I intend to 
primarily work from for developing my argument. Hence, this is a theology for sport. 
More precisely, the primacy of faith operates in the Christian tradition as ―faith 
seeking understanding.‖ In the classical Christian tradition, Credo ut intelligam,
31
 (―I 
believe in order to understand‖) indicates a method for doing theology which trusts 
                                                 
30
 For an extended treatment of this relationship between revelation and culture and public theology, 
see Tim Gorringe, Furthering Humanity: A Theology of Culture (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004); 
Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997) and 
David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New 
York: Crossroad, 1981).  
31
 More precisely, this attitude toward faith and reason, which comes from Augustine and Anselm, 
begins with revelation as an authority which faith apprehends and reason dialectically serves in order 
to understand what we assent to and trust in (See Anselm, Proslogion). Cf. Karl Barth, Evangelical 
Theology: An Introduction (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963), 43-47, 96-105.  
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in the authority of divine revelation and then ventures to discover the theological 
implications of Christian dogma for such practical matters as sport. Therefore, 
Christian faith or belief raises questions specific to living on earth, and thus, for this 
thesis, Christian faith daringly inquires and wonders about sport as a cultural activity 
and the distinctive problems and possibilities associated with sportive goods in this 
world that God has made. For this reason concerning the primacy of faith, Christian 
theology and ethics shape the direction our thinking should take as we approach the 
moral field of sport. Moreover, this faith inquiry is a constructive task which means 
it goes beyond the mere replication of the faith of our forebears.
32
 I elaborate on this 
constructive aspect below since it follows in the wake of genitive theologies (a 
theology of some subject matter).  
     I will show in the thesis that theologians and practitioners have tended in much of 
Christian history to denigrate sport as a sphere of great moral ambiguity. The aim of 
the thesis is to offer a repair of this longstanding ethical problematization of sport—
that can be seen in the early fathers and especially in Augustine right through to 
contemporary evangelicals in North America. My method of repair of this traditional 
denigration of sport entails thinking about sport by reflecting on and examining key 
theological themes (i.e., God, humanity, creation, Christ, disordered loves, gift, 
embodiment, and excellence). These themes provide the background beliefs or basic 
convictions and theological principles which function as norms and values for 
reflecting on sport. Therefore, the structure of my ethic works from certain 
theological and philosophical presuppositions as given in Christian thought because 
                                                 
32
 Daniel L. Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 1-18. If this is a constructive task, then this entails that reason functions as 
an aid to conceptual clarity and to imagine the theological trajectory of my theological (basic) 
convictions for sport. 
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my task is to think toward a theological ethic for sport. In other words, theological 




Theological Ethic of Sport 
     If my scope is a theology for sport, then how does this compare to the broader 
concept that Volf and other Catholic theologians refer to as a genitive theology or 
theology of some secular reality. A theology of ―X‖ (e.g., theology of business, 
theology of medicine) has become a common designator in the theological literature 
today because former traditional reflection narrowly construed such empirical 
realities, and thus forgetting a broader horizon of theological reflection on work, 
economics, etc.
34
 On the one hand, my own theological method assumes this more 
comprehensive exploration of the phenomenon of sport because of the theological 
neglect of muscular Christianity in North America. To give an example, in chapters 
one and two, I propose how a Christian theological framework situates sport in the 
wider context of God‘s purposes with creation, and thus, this framework establishes 
an order to how we love or value sport, casting light on the ultimate meaning of 
sport. I argue more fully below in chapter one that sport is not a neutral horizon since 
the medium of sport has assumptions, categories and principles which can ultimately 
conflict with revelation. In chapter three, I discuss how a theology for sport is 
supplemented with a theological anthropology, namely John Paul II‘s personalism, 
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 O‘Donovan, ―Christian Moral Reasoning, 122-127. 
34
 Volf, Work in the Spirit, 74-75. I do not intend to cover the history of this theological methodology, 
i.e., genitive theology, though it is intimately connected to the convening of the Second Vatican 
Council and earlier approaches of French theologians after World War II (Lothar Roos, On a 
Theology and Ethics of Work, Communio 11 (1984), 102-106.). I do explicitly resume with this 
method in chapter three since John Paul II‘s method is consonant with a genitive theology. 
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which construes sport according to human dignity, gift and excellence. Finally, in 
chapters four and five, I offer a Christological basis and eschatological understanding 
of sport in order to ground theological reflection on sport in the gospel itself and the 
new order which Christ-reality inaugurates and interpenetrates in such penultimate 
activities as sport. I explain the logic of my chapters in more detail below.  
     On the other hand, I am not attempting on the magnitude of Volf and others, who 
focus on work, to offer or develop a comprehensive theology of sport. Hence, as a 
theologian, my academic trek is in the direction of obtaining a theological ethic to 
assuage that grave defect in evangelical theology in North America. I limit myself to 
the specific theological themes above while recognizing that my effort invites other 
sojourners to attend to other theological themes in order to fill out and complete a 
theology of sport. What is my main claim and how does it organize the thesis as a 
whole? 
Specific Thesis Proposal and Organization: Sport is an Embodied, Penultimate Good 
      Since my general purpose is to go beyond the folk theology and vague outlines 
present in much of the interaction between theology and sport, then my specific 
proposal is to formulate a modest theological account for sport as a way toward 
reimagining sport in the Christian life as an embodied, penultimate good. Therefore, 
my claim is that for Christian ethics, sport is an embodied, penultimate good. What 
do I mean by this claim? How do I address and expound broadly on this claim in 
each of my chapters? What is the rationale for my chapters? 
     I argue that embodiment focuses on the fact that we are physical sensual 
creatures. I argue with Augustine that the Christian account of the goodness of 
creation posits God‘s acceptance of embodied activities like sport. The doctrine of 
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creation equally affirms that our materiality as revealed in the doctrine of creation is 
not only good, but that sport itself as a mode of social life is tacitly and intimately 
associated with creaturely embodiment. Sport reminds us that whatever it means to 
be a human it is tied to materiality—biological characteristics such as strength, 
health, body composition, motor skills, and flexibility. As argued below, 
embodiment is significant for a variety of reasons. First, anti-body tendencies have 
been prevalent at different times in the church which means that sport involvement 
was suspect. If true, then an anti-materiality stance contests the central claim of this 
thesis, and thus, it requires theological justification and explanation of the basic 
convictions which ground my claim concerning embodiment. Second, the call of the 
Christian gospel exacts a premium on responsibly embodying the faith as Christ‘s 
disciples. So, it is not simply assenting to our physicality as mere human beings in 
sport, but Christ incarnate and resurrected reorients the church to consider Who is 
Christ for us in sport? I take up this specific inquiry in chapters four and five. Third, 
to witness the embodied powers and achievements associated with sportive contests 
is to acknowledge human greatness, on the one hand. On the other hand, as set forth 
in chapters one, two and three, Christian revelation construes these talents and 
powers as gifts. If gifts, this indicates that what is done or performed in sport is not 
wholly the athletes‘ doing or making, and thus, gifts witness to God—the maker and 
giver of materiality. This leads to sport as a penultimate good.  
     Fundamental to this thesis is an axiology which asserts that any created good such 
as embodiment is intelligible because of God‘s goodness and being, and in particular 
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as revealed in the Word made flesh in Jesus Christ.
35
 In chapter one, I establish a 
teleological framework for understanding how a created good such as embodiment 
and a cultural good such as sport ought to be properly referred to their true end and 
pursued in the light of God as the ultimate good. This teleology, of course, presents a 
ranking which relativizes sport to a penultimate good, and yet, this ranking gives 
objective value to embodied practices such as sport because of the ordered reality 
given to this world by God in which sport participates and operates. That means the 
moral norms that a Christian ethic discerns concerning sport must be in agreement 
with the created order.  
     If Christian ethics begins moral reflection on key theological themes as the basis 
for how we think about God‘s purposes for sport, then my theological discourse 
retrieves three primary interlocutors from the Christian tradition for this thesis. 
Augustine, John Paul II, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer serve to establish my theological 
constructs for thinking about sport as an embodied, penultimate good. Together, they 
assist me as I explore fundamental convictions of the Christian tradition and what 
bearing these should have on how Christians think about and inhabit this cultural 
activity. They provide the vocabulary for reimagining how the Christian faith relates 
to sport as an embodied, penultimate good. All three work from a set of theological 
assumptions and an ethical imagination that opens the Christian tradition to think 
about a number of themes and aspects specific to sport itself, i.e., play, excellence, 
embodiment, gifts, human beings, loves, penultimate and ultimate. By enlisting the 
wisdom of the living Christian tradition, I believe it will help to offer an initial, 
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 I argue with Bonhoeffer in chapters four and five from the doctrine of Christ that Christ-reality is 
the interplay of Christ incarnate, crucified and resurrected. 
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certainly provisional, way forward on thinking theologically and ethically about this 
neglected area.   
     By starting with Augustine in chapter one, I am building upon his theological 
foundation as a constructive work for how to move forward in regard to sport as an 
embodied good, our loves or attraction to sport, and how to relate this human activity 
to God. Augustine‘s ethic is organized around three integral motifs: God and 
happiness, ordered and disordered loves, and the use and enjoyment of goods. By 
beginning here, a Christian ethic addresses the charges against Augustine‘s idealism 
set in the historical context of ancient Rome, where the Christian tradition first 
engaged sport extra-biblically. Furthermore, this starting point presents idealism and 
its corollary, the use-value problem of modern muscular Christianity, as an 
intramural issue; thus, in order to repair it, we must first begin ―in house‖ to establish 
whether these charges identified with a Christian ethic are legitimate or not. Oddly 
enough, this use-value ethic was precipitated by Augustine‘s own Roman context. 
The Romans neglected the internal goods of sport, which the Greeks more clearly 
appreciated, thus severing it from both its internal justification and its sacred 
relationship. Therefore, Augustine comes first both to historically situate these two 
problems for the Christian tradition and to disentangle the theoretical problem from 
the more pragmatic concerns of modern muscular Christianity.  
     This main charge of idealism makes my main claim about sport as an embodied, 
penultimate good contestable for two reasons. First, the Christian tradition has 
struggled with embodied existence in general, so my main claim has not been a 
regulative or normative claim for how Christians have historically and theologically 
construed sport. Consequently, this misunderstanding toward sport has resulted in 
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methods of theological reasoning (i.e., idealism, dualism, and pragmatic 
utilitarianism) that undermine a Christian axiology and metaphysics. Augustine‘s 
moral vision, as I will argue, specifically overcomes this charge of idealism, for he 
organizes his ethic around an ultimate end or highest good, and thus he assesses and 
values the nature of such sportive goods or characteristics as penultimate means and 
goods. I will demonstrate that this ultimate and penultimate distinction properly 
values, rather than devalues, embodied goods such as sport because, if God is a good 
creator, then all created and cultural goods depend on God for being and goodness. 
Moreover, this distinction not only establishes a metaphysic about created goods that 
also serves as a foundation in this thesis to repair the use-value ethic that dominates 
modern muscular Christianity, but also it correctly orders how we ought to relate to 
sport; norms express or respond to values. If sport is properly valued and loved, it 
reflects aspects of God‘s goodness; if it is not loved correctly, it reflects a disordered 
love belonging to the earthly city. Therefore, this thesis retrieves Augustine‘s moral 
construct of the good life in order to lay the groundwork to establish a Christian 
valuation of goods of this earth, namely, sport as an embodied, penultimate good, 
and to correctly relate this cultural activity toward the highest good, God. 
     Second, because of Augustine‘s negative moral judgment concerning sport--
which I address and repair--a space was created with no moral vision for how to 
theologically think about and inhabit sport. Augustine‘s strong censure virtually 
made it morally impermissible to participate in sport. This space was exacerbated 
over time both with a secular justification, predominant in ancient Rome, that shifted 
the rationale from a religious justification to such things as human achievement, 
records, and specialization, and with the Christian church‘s withdrawal and 
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disengagement, especially in the early twentieth century in North America. Hence, 
this calls for the constructive nature of my thesis to offer and build a theological ethic 
for sport.  
     This theological task equally entails a relationship with other disciplines and 
thinkers. Dialoguing with others helps the Christian tradition to consider more 
clearly its own convictions and assumptions; it brings to light matters and categories 
that might be ignored or assumed but that require deeper moral reflection and 
theological analysis. In saying this, I do not mean that this is an apologetic task that 
assumes uncritically other epistemic starting points and then requires the Christian 
tradition to meet the approved canons of reason and language of other commitments. 
On the contrary, I simply point out that, though there are important (if not radical) 
differences, Christian ethics ―must relate itself in some fashion to the range of ethical 
discourse represented by the various philosophical and descriptive disciplines.‖
36
 It is 
not as if only Christians indwell the sport story since others bring their own 
reflection and deliberation to this empirical reality. Christian theologians historically 
worked out their positions in response to alternative basic convictions and visions of 
reality. In fact, this point concerning my thesis follows, in many ways, what 
Augustine, John Paul II, and Bonhoeffer did very well, even if differently, in their 
respective historical contexts.  
     In chapter 2, I will employ the rhetorical strategy of capturing an alternative 
explanation by entering Paul Weiss‘s account of sport as an embodied pursuit of 
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 Edward L. Long, Jr., A Survey of Christian Ethics (New York: Oxford, 1967), 29. These remaining 
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other disciplines.  
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excellence.
37
 Weiss, an American philosopher, serves both as a guide to this thesis 
and as a helpful transition from Augustine to modern sport. Weiss builds a bridge 
historically from ancient Greece, where the justification of sport was not dominated 
by its use-value, since sport was conceived as an opportunity for realizing excellence 
(arete) through embodied means, and where sport officially began as organized 
competition. How we understand sport today is related to ancient Greece. If my 
starting point with Augustine was to establish the initial lines of theological 
reasoning for sport as an embodied good, then my point of contact with Weiss is to 
send some very sport-specific questions into and from the past that Augustine simply 
did not entertain.
38
 Thus, I will more concretely and philosophically consider other 
goods specific to sport. Weiss‘s Greek ideals and philosophical categories function 
as heuristic tools for evaluating important moral matters that a theological discourse 
about sports must consider. In order to go beyond Augustine and offer a theological 
ethic for sport, I must resist creating some kind of non-historical account of sport by 
dogmatically applying Augustine to sport. Weiss develops a philosophy of sport 
around a few important historical themes (i.e., bodily excellence, anthropology, and 
teleology) that have endured through the ages of sport. When compared to a 
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both with Augustine and Paul Weiss is an attempt to ―carve a channel‖ from the past to today and 
back. This is not unlike Augustine‘s own return to the sources in order to scrutinize and inquire about 
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Christian ethic, for example, these themes lay bare Weiss‘s own judgments and 
claims for interpreting sport. Weiss becomes an important foil that enhances the 
contribution that a Christian ethic brings to sport. Therefore, Weiss comes second not 
only for historical reasons, but also to compare and contrast a Christian ethic with an 
actual philosopher of sport who inspects closely the nature of sport and some of its 
main ideals from ancient Greece to today. This contrast pays dividends, for it sets up 
some central moral matters specific to the claim that sport is an embodied, 
penultimate good, which I respond to with John Paul II.  
     John Paul II follows Paul Weiss because he answers for a Christian ethic a 
number of problems associated with an ethic of excellence. By comparing and 
contrasting John Paul II and Weiss in chapters two and three, I force a Christian ethic 
to clearly consider both its own core convictions about sport as an embodied pursuit 
of excellence and how other theological matters, namely, gift, human persons, and 
dignity, relate to ethical considerations. This contrast lays bare important aspects of a 
Christian theological framework that without a foil might lie unexpressed, 
unacknowledged, or indiscriminate. Therefore, I follow the trajectory of sport from 
Augustine as an ontic-embodied good and develop it specific to John Paul II‘s sport 
ethic. For a Christian ethic, sport as an ontic-embodied good is important in lieu of 
others like Paul Weiss, whose eschatology instrumentalizes embodied pursuits such 
as sport.  
     If sport is an ontic-embodied good, I argue that any account that singles out one 
particular good, such as bodily excellence or play, as the primary good neglects who 
we are as full human beings. John Paul II‘s personalism, a theology of the human 
person and action, has a Christian ethic reckon sportive action in terms of human 
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dignity and excellence. In this thesis, John Paul II‘s personalism causes a Christian 
ethic to attend throughout to the value of an athlete, a sportsperson, for this value 
then gives rise to the moral requirements and relates to the ends (excellences), habits, 
and actions that either affirm or retard this personalistic value. Moreover, if this 
value is true about human persons, then I argue that sport as an embodied, 
penultimate good must consider and defend the meaning of the body, not as a mere 
object of nature for human power and athletic achievement, but as a primordial 
wonder, which as a gift and sign must be received and respected as integral to human 
dignity. For a Christian ethic, the sportive contest is established and oriented equally, 
if not primarily, around gift and love, not around the self-mastery of the body as a 
task. Hence, our admiration and appreciation of sports does not stop with the athlete 
herself, but points beyond to God, since God makes and gives the very sportive 
talents and gifts embodied in this cultural activity.
39
  
      In the fourth chapter, my intention is to continue the constructive nature of this 
thesis by considering the significance of Bonhoeffer‘s Christological basis for sport 
and, thus, how it contributes to a theological ethic for sport. A Christocentric focus 
was present in John Paul II‘s moral vision; however, Bonhoeffer‘s distinctive 
emphasis and theological method allow for nuance and tap another important 
interlocutor of the Christian tradition. For a Christian ethic, this distinction puts 
Christ front and center for moral reflection on sport in general. In particular, 
Bonhoeffer‘s ethical vision brings to light one, if not the primary, theological 
problem of dualism that underpins the failure of modern muscular Christianity and 
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that threatens the main claim of this thesis on how Christians should regard sport as 
an embodied, penultimate good. The problem of dualism for this thesis takes 
multiple forms: anthropological, metaphysical, religious, and eschatological. If and 
when dualism is held, it principally thins the goodness of material or embodied 
reality; thus, it devalues both the player and the sport experience as a practice itself. 
Each of these implications of dualism configures ways of being human that I argue 
are theologically inimical with respect to the gospel itself and to the form of Christ in 
the sportive world.  
     As with John Paul II in regards to Weiss‘s account of sport, I capture the tragic 
flaw of modern muscular Christianity by entering its story or account of sport, and I 
argue that a Christian ethic envisions sport as a penultimate good belonging to the 
natural life. With Bonhoeffer, I tell a specific vision of the gospel as the ultimate that 
takes other rival stories captive, which means that Bonhoeffer‘s Christ-reality 
overcomes the problem of dualism endemic to these other accounts. Instead of sport 
and the reality of God standing one next to the other, they are related to Christ; 
therefore, Bonhoeffer‘s ethical vision values and locates sport in the reality of Christ. 
Furthermore, Bonhoeffer‘s Christ-reality drives me to consider Shirl Hoffman‘s 
alternative account of how Christians should relate to sport since he himself also tries 
to reimagine sport—on account of the problems of modern muscular Christianity—
by justifying sport‘s sacredness to put it back together; he appeals to its intrinsic 
religious or hierarchical spiritual value. I will argue that Bonhoeffer‘s Christological 
basis embeds the question of what is good for any matter in a wholly other reality, 
that is, the reality of Christ as incarnate, judge, and redeemer. This reality redescribes 
all of reality; therefore, Christians in sport are to participate in this concrete form 
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because it reveals that Christ is the center of life and existence. Thus, whether it is 
Shirl Hoffman‘s socio-theological account or modern muscular Christianity, both of 
them neglect Christ as the center, thus leaving sport as a divided reality, i.e., dualism, 
all over again. It is in Christ that a Christian ethic perceives and discovers the deeper 
realities of embodied, penultimate activities such as sport. If modern muscular 
Christianity lacks an integrated a priori theological basis for sport, I conclude that 
Bonhoeffer‘s Christ-reality is that unifying basis. 
    In chapter five, my theological discourse focuses on an eschatological and/or 
teleological paradigm for understanding how sport is an embodied, penultimate 
good. Chapter five brings all three of my interlocutors together to concentrate at 
length on the moral matter of how to relate Christianity and sport. Because this has 
been a problem in general that I address principally throughout my thesis, my final 
chapter extends the discussion to judge carefully three specific aspects entailed in the 
main claim of my thesis: sport is an embodied, penultimate good 
     To begin, I argue that not only does Bonhoeffer‘s event of justification as the 
ultimate require a Christian ethic to interpret sport as an embodied, penultimate 
practice, but justification also judges and pardons a sportsperson‘s theological or 
moral identity in the power of the cross. Sportspersons themselves who contest in 
this embodied, penultimate good are confronted by the gospel. Instead of sport 
functioning as a tribunal to determine the worth and value of sportspersons, which 
leads to numerous theological and moral pathologies, sportspersons are deemed 
accepted; thus, sport is not an activity that bears the burden of justification. 
Consequently, because of the power of the resurrection (another aspect of Christ-
reality), justification frees a Christian athlete to freely and responsibly enjoy and 
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redirect this penultimate activity toward being human and being good for the sake of 
the ultimate. Thus, I repair this problem of integration with Bonhoeffer‘s ultimate 
and penultimate duality so a Christian sportsperson is free to enact the gospel in this 
cultural activity. 
     Next, I turn to Augustine to examine the context and narrative of sport and how it 
shapes our loves toward different ends. These alternative teloi threaten to cut or close 
off this penultimate good from realizing its true, intended end. With Augustine, I 
extend my moral reflection on perhaps the most debilitating moral matter in modern 
sport, i.e., the inordinate loves of politics and money, which subvert and damage 
sport as an embodied, penultimate good. In particular, I examine these inordinate 
loves in terms of the moral problem of idolatry. As I argue in chapter two with 
Weiss‘s proposal, people are attracted to and value sport, which, for the Christian 
tradition, is another way of saying that their loves move or pull them toward the 
plurality of goods that course in and through sport. Within the matrix of modern 
sport, we find desires that we should cultivate in regards to the ultimate, while at the 
same time, we should also be cultivating appropriate dissatisfactions toward 
misdirected longings since they forsake the value of sport itself and dehumanize 
sportspersons along the way. Thus, with Augustine‘s basic structure of love, I 
conclude that a Christian ethic should resist this idolatrous exchange so that sport as 
an embodied, penultimate good is lovingly related to and enjoyed in God.  
     Finally, I argue that John Paul II complements the above eschatological or 
teleological paradigm with his use of St. Paul‘s sport metaphor in 1 Corinthians 9:24-
27 as a moral paradigm for how we integrate our faith in sport. I conclude that this is 
important for this thesis for two reasons. First, a proper interpretation of this sport 
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metaphor corrects the problem with how modern muscular Christianity is guilty of 
folk theologizing when they interpret St. Paul‘s sporting metaphors. Second, my use 
of this athletic image gives further warrant for how to think theologically about sport 
as a human value--an embodied, penultimate good--and to inhabit morally and 
spiritually the practice of sport itself.  
     I will now consider at length how Augustine‘s thought orders how a Christian 
ethic initially conceives of sport as an embodied, penultimate good. Thus, I will 
argue that Augustine‘s moral vision offers basic convictions with respect to who God 
and humans are which is essential to my purpose of constructing a theological ethic 
for sport.  





RE-ENVISIONING AUGUSTINE‘S GOOD LIFE: A THEOLOGICAL 
CONSTRUCT FOR SPORT 
     Augustine is chosen for reflecting on the kinds of moral problems pertaining to 
our humanity, our loves, and the goods (moral and non-moral) as dramatized in the 
narrative of sport. If we are to use Augustine‘s moral vision as an initial construct to 
help us identify the questions, beliefs, and values expressed in modern sport, we 
must first consider several concepts. First, I will create a brief working understanding 
of the concept of sport. Second, I will situate Augustine‘s view of play and games in 
its historical context, which will enable the reader to identify some of the problems 
Augustine had with sport. Third, I will show that Augustine‘s ethic is organized 
around three integral motifs: God and happiness, ordered and disordered loves, and 
the use and enjoyment of goods. These motifs establish a framework for how a 
Christian ethic relates to sport, and its trajectory directs this thesis with respect to 
John Paul II and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 
     In order to understand the nature of the moral problems in modern sport, the 
Christian tradition must first revisit ancient Rome and witness the first recorded 
Christian engagement with sport. Ancient Rome probably has much in common with 
modern sport, because as Guttmann and Higgs contend, the religious cultic elements 
associated with Greek sports were next to absent, and the Romans utilized the games 
for multiple purposes that parallel many of our extrinsic purposes for sport today 
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(i.e., commerce, entertainment, and political).
1
 Thus, we must understand the 
similarities to and unravel the interconnections between ancient Roman sport and 
modern sport. For example, one particular problem regards how the institutional 
goals for a contest often corrupt the intrinsic goods of sport. In ancient Rome, this 
problem was present in that the games were sponsored by the emperors (versus big 
business today), patrons with goals that were at variance with the sport‘s own 
internal goals. This particular example in modern sport is addressed in the final 
chapter of this thesis. Undoubtedly, there are differences between Roman sport and 
modern sport as well. Where such differences are apparent, these differences will 
qualify the argument. 
     Some critics (discussed below) hold the church fathers, namely Tertullian and 
Augustine, theologically responsible for the suspicion and the low regard that 
Christians have often held toward sport. For the critics, the use-value assessment of 
sport exhibited by the Puritans began with the church‘s engagement with Roman 
sport. From the existing attempts to relate Christianity and sport, modern muscular 
Christianity has predominantly chosen to appraise sport‘s moral worth according to 
its pragmatic utility. This use-value ethic as a moral problem is to be blamed not only 
on muscular Christian practitioners but also theoretically on Augustine and the 
church fathers. If some of Christians‘ attitudes toward sport evolved from this initial 
engagement, it behooves us to examine their origin—an origin, perhaps, that 
demonstrates some critical tools worthy for us to analyze today. Furthermore, as 
indicated in the introduction, commencing with Augustine both situates this enduring 
use-value problem for the Christian tradition in history and disentangles the 
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theoretical problem from modern muscular Christianity.
2
 The use-value problem 
relates both to modern muscular Christianity and to Augustine. This starting point 
presents this main problem as an intramural issue; therefore, to repair it, we must 
first begin ―in house‖ to establish whether these charges toward a Christian ethic are 
legitimate. 
     Sport as a moral practice consists of a multitude of means and strategies in a 
variety of contexts performed in the light of different ends both internal and external 
to sport. To understand sport, we must understand what constitutes sport--what 
makes it different from other human endeavors or practices? Though I provide some 
particular markers which help to characterize something as a sport, I am well aware 
that a search for an exact definition or the essence of sport is difficult to come by.
3
 
Thus, I intend to demarcate the general characteristics of sport so as to create a 
shared understanding. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to address all of the 
characteristics of sport; however, I do further define, interpret, and critique certain 
elements as they pertain to each of my interlocutors‘ distinctive ethoses. 
     Sport practices as an embodied human activity usually involve play (ludic 
element), physical prowess, physical activity, physical recreation, exercise, 
competition (agonistic element), aesthetics, structures (constitutive, proscriptive and 
sportsmanship rules), unpredictability, and orientation towards a goal (aretaic 
                                                 
2
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knowledge is necessary to provide the content for our rational decisions about how to live and act in 
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3
 Randolph Feezell, Sport, Play and Ethical Reflection (Champaign, IL: Illinois University, 2006), 9-
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element).
4
 Kretchmar explains that this bodily activity is primarily concerned with 
two things: (1) a test that poses the perceived tension of whether the participant can 
solve the problem or test using the associated skill set (for example, swimmers use 
dives, flips, and strokes), and (2) a contest in which a contestant introduces a kind of 
opposition, a difference by degree, that enriches the test because of the inherent 
uncertainty and dramatic resolutions of the entire competition.
5
 Furthermore, the 
move from spontaneous play to sport consists of more training and exercise, greater 
employment of physical skills and exertion, more obstacles in pursuing a plurality of 
goals and objectives that are both internal and external to a particular sport, and the 
necessity of competition. If these characteristics are all relative to the formal logic of 
sport itself, it is also important to realize that sport is inextricably embedded in a 
wider network of beliefs and values that originate from its sociocultural and 
institutional context.
6
 I say more about this below.    
     Augustine‘s moral vision specifically fits,
7
 for he organizes his ethic around an 
ultimate end or highest good and thus assesses and values the nature of such sportive 
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5
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V. Meier (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1988), 223-229. 
6
 Johan Steenbergen and Jan Tamboer, ―Ethics and the Double Character of Sport: An Attempt to 
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Parry (London: E & FN Spon, 1998), 35-53. 
7
 When I indicate that there is a fit between Augustine‘s moral vision and the general concept and 
practice of sport, what I mean is that whatever social practice we might examine it backs up into a 
wider order—overall shape of the good—which Augustine‘s ultimate end theologically addresses.  
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goods or characteristics as penultimate means and goods. That is, the Christian 
tradition, as represented by Augustine, uniquely configures all secular (temporal) 
activities in the light of God. Moreover, Augustine‘s moral vision attends to the 
breach initiated in ancient Rome that exists between sport and the sacred. If sport is 
properly valued and loved, it reflects aspects of God‘s goodness; if it is not loved 
correctly, it reflects a disordered love belonging to the earthly city. Hence, this is 
why Augustine opposed the pagan direction of sport. Augustine‘s moral theology 
sets up these kinds of dramatic contrasts as a grand story of two cities with two kinds 
of loves moving in two different directions. Sport as a sphere of this earthly life is an 
admixture of these two categories. These representative categories are durable 
qualities constituting humankind, sharing similarities with every time and in every 
context. For the Christian tradition, moral problems and human concerns plumb the 
recesses of the human heart in our various life situations. Therefore, this thesis 
retrieves Augustine‘s moral construct of the good life in order to critique the 
disordered loves and misuses of the ―sporting‖ goods in this part of the earthly city 
and to correctly relate this cultural activity toward the highest good, God. I deal with 
the latter more specifically in chapter five. However, before I retrieve Augustine‘s 
moral framework as the basis for this thesis, we must address a major objection 
toward Augustine.   
     In his book Gods and Games, David Miller says that the idealism that Augustine 
and other church fathers, such as St. Ambrose and St. Chrysostom, inherited from 
early philosophers (i.e., Plato and Aristotle) is the ―theological death-knell‖ because 
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the serious priorities of the Kingdom subordinate the goods of play.
8
 That is, the 
patristic ethical vision strangled such earthly joys as humor and play. Similarly, 
Robert K. Johnston, in The Christian at Play, focuses his criticism on this 
overbearing teleology that aborts intrinsic goods like play: 
From the time of Augustine down to the present era, Christians have often been 
suspicious of play. For Augustine, conversion to Christianity meant a conversion 
from a life of play. To him, even eating was sinful if done in a spirit of pleasure 
[Confessions 10.31.]. The only enjoyment Augustine allowed for was the 
enjoyment of God. In varying degrees, such an assessment of play has plagued 
Christianity down to the present…It is safer to spend one‘s time in ―serious‖ 
activity than to enter into ―frivolity.‖
9
 
In sum, idealism vitiates this human activity by separating the seriousness of play 
from the nonseriousness dimension (dialectic). This separation causes the weightier 
issues of seriousness to strip play of its freedom and spontaneity--the nonseriousness 
of play. In other words, the formal characteristics of sport are instrumentalized, thus 
making it more useful than useless (autotelic). Hannah Arendt describes this problem 
as the ―superiority of contemplation over activity of any kind,‖ which for medieval 
Christianity, adapted from Plato and Aristotle, meant ―to be free from entanglement 
in worldly affairs.‖
 10
 Consequently, bodily activity (specific to the realm of play and 
sport) is afforded a dignity that is restricted to how ―it serves the needs and wants of 
contemplation in a living body.‖
11
 This is a valid criticism for us to consider. 
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Play and Games for Augustine and in Ancient Rome 
 
     The main purpose of this section is not to offer an apologetic, but to understand 
what Augustine says and how his ideas might clarify some of the issues that a 
theologico-ethical perspective on sport should initially consider.   
     In Confessions, in Books I through IX in general, Augustine recounts his spiritual 
pilgrimage. In Book I in particular, Augustine references play in the context of his 
childhood as he criticizes his education. Augustine describes how his love of play 
kept him at times from his studies, which resulted in punishment from his instructors. 
He writes,   
But we loved to play, and punishments were imposed on us by those who were 
engaged in adult games. For the ‗amusement of adults is called business‘. But 
when boys play such games they are punished by adults, and no one feels sorry 
either for children or for the adults or indeed for both of them. Perhaps some 
refined arbiter of things might approve of my being beaten. As a boy I played 
ball-games, and that play slowed down the speed at which I learnt letters with 
which, as an adult, I might play a less creditable game. The schoolmaster who 
caned me was behaving no better than I when, after being refuted by a fellow-
teacher in some pedantic question, he was more tormented by jealousy and envy 




What does this tell us about his notion of play? Play is an activity in which we 
engage from childhood throughout adulthood. Both Augustine and his teachers play. 
It is a shared activity that is enjoyed in its own time and space. Augustine recognizes 
the hypocrisy of his punishment: as a child, he is disciplined for what the adults who 
punish him also enjoy. That is, the play that appears to be a natural (even 
spontaneous) disposition to both young and old is accepted rather euphemistically by 
adults as a game, a kind of ―business.‖ What changes is not that we play, but rather 
how and what we play. A fair reading at least opens the possibility that, for 
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Augustine, play is an enduring activity for humans, perhaps even an inherent social 
activity. Yet, the dilemma for us as readers is that Augustine‘s goal is complicated. 
On the one hand, he wants to demonstrate that sin as concupiscence epitomized his 
life from infancy to childhood and beyond.
13
 On the other hand, he recounts this 
story not to solicit more judgment, but to evoke sympathy.
14
 A charitable reading 
might even admit that he actually confirms play indirectly, but that he did not enjoy 
much of a chance to relish this activity. However, if we grant that Augustine writes 
to affirm play, why does he then classify play as a morally blameworthy form of 
disobedience?       
     Play is blameworthy not because Augustine censures it in toto, nor because play 
structurally is evil; both ideas are contrary to Augustine‘s ontology and ethics (see 
below). But if he chooses play as an act of willful disobedience in order to evade his 
studies, Augustine admits that his choice is sin. Augustine confesses his disobedience 
for not doing what he ought to do because he knows he should respect his elders and 
parents (1.10.16); however, to view play itself as the basis of his moral wrongdoing 
is to misinterpret this passage. The context warrants an interpretation that discerns 
that Augustine used this illustration in retrospect as a Christian to critique his 
educational system. He also points out the unhealthy moral effects of the racy 
literature he was taught in his language classes, but his criticism does not mean he 
condemned the reading of literature. 
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     If it is true both that play in itself is not wrong and that Augustine‘s account is a 
form of social criticism, James O‘ Donnell‘s interpretation can provide further 
illumination. Instead of confining the wrong to play, O‘Donnell broadens our 
perspective by drawing our attention to other aspects of this dysfunctional setting 
that relate to corporeal punishment. He observes that   
The right of the teachers to punish this sin, on the other hand, is brought severely 
into question. The system in which young Augustine was being brought up was 
profoundly disordered and ungodly; it was not for his failure to participate in 
that system as such that he was worthy of punishment, but for other reasons.
15
 
     The severity of Augustine‘s punishments as a schoolboy is based on the strict 
standards of his teachers. For Augustine, this is an inhuman discipline based on the 
tradition of his education.
16
 When we understand the discipline thus, we also see that 
Augustine‘s teachers evaluated each activity to see whether it met the educational 
goal of learning. Play was a diversion from studying; therefore, they justified their 
discipline as necessary to turn their pupils from idleness to learning. Play appeared to 
be misplaced when juxtaposed with Augustine‘s school context. In his context, 
playing was not ethically defensible. Certainly, from our perspective, we see that 
play was a problem in this system of pedagogy because his teachers were spoilsports. 
They ignored the lusory attitude of games except when they themselves played, and 
they discounted the end or goal of play. Jürgen Moltmann penetratingly observes that 
today‘s driven labor market abuses and misuses play; similarly, Augustine‘s teachers 
tried to construe all play in relation to education.
17
 Yet we still see a marked 
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difference between the two: today, play is at worst a diversion, but then, it was at 
best an idle waste of time. John M. Quinn adds to our understanding of this passage 
and the concomitant educational philosophy accordingly:  
Assiduous study leading to skill in the linguistic arts would ensure worldly 
success, consisting of ―bubble reputation,‖ honor due to high social status and 




     Augustine further demonstrates this predilection to play for both young and old 
when he raises questions (toward the end) regarding features of play that eventuate in 
the sentiments of jealousy and bitterness (Book 1.9.15). Without going into a full 
explanation, we can make some preliminary comments. A sentiment like jealousy 
reveals an attitude or way of seeing an activity ―where the ‗view‘ touches one or 
more of our concerns.‖
19
 In this case, when I harbor jealousy in play, I view my play-
mate as gaining something like respect or victory, concerns that I wish to receive 
instead. In the City of God, Augustine interprets this attitude as a kind of disordered 
love that symbolically belongs to the earthly city. In Book XV, he poses Cain as the 
archetype of those who seek to gain earthly goods, such as respect, through earthly 
activities (for my analogy) like play.
20
 Also, in Confessions (Book 1.10.16), 
Augustine refers to the pride of victory—a love of one‘s own accomplishments, and 
elsewhere he indicates that this species of pride or lust means ―loving our private 
interest more than you (God)
21
—the grounds for his disobedience. That is, the pride 
of victory, as associated with a worldly ambition, became his concern when he 
played games.          
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     Augustine further develops this theme while interpreting the Roman games at 
large in Books I-V of the City of God. Like Tertullian, Augustine sees all aspects of 
the Shows (games, circus, and theatre) as consecrated to the false Roman gods and 
thus originating in idolatry, which is antithetical to Christianity. In the City of God 
(5.13), Augustine addresses this love of praise as a vainglorious desire for glory-
honor-power, which he uses repeatedly throughout his argument to identify denizens 
of the earthly city.
22
 As for the example (above) from Confessions, jealousy does not 
fit the love or delight of simply playing, which is the nature of this activity. That is, 
jealousy distorts the standard characteristic of enjoyment that should result from 
play. Suppose, for example, that I play with the primary goal of obtaining extrinsic 
goods, such as respect or reputation. If through loss or poor play I fail to obtain this 
distorted goal, I foster feelings of jealousy because I perceive that others have gained 
what I strongly desired but failed to obtain. Below, I will explore the nature of desire 
as it determinatively shapes the moral life for Augustine. In the Christian tradition, 
what is at stake in any activity is how it relates-- properly or improperly--to the 
highest good. As I will argue, sport as a form of play is such a good as to require the 
norming shape of the ordo amoris.   
     To further understand Augustine‘s thoughts regarding play and game, we must 
understand Augustine‘s historical context and his classical antecedents. Guttmann 
and Lindsay observe that, in general, the Romans strongly linked physical fitness to 
an ulterior end—for example, physical activities for the sake of such practical 
matters as labor and education or military matters of warfare. Such associations were 
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especially common in the early Republic.
23
 In fact, although Roman sports were 
multifaceted (which precludes oversimplification), Lindsay concludes that the 
Roman moralists do not esteem the Greek ideals: ―The Greek principle of a 
harmonious development of the body, and a striving for bodily beauty and grace, was 
considered effeminate by the Romans.‖
24
 That is, ―the early Romans did not 
enthusiastically embrace the most famous aspects of Greek athletic—the formal 
athletic competitions and the highly trained athletes.‖
25
 As mentioned before, this 
attitude originally came about because, for the Romans, usefulness was strictly tied 
to the ends of pragmatics and warfare. Thus, understanding how the Romans 
idealized their activities enables us to understand how similar ideals were used to 
assess the merit of any activity, especially play, for Augustine in his childhood 
context.   
     Augustine‘s classical antecedents, Tacitus (55-117 A.D.), Plutarch (46-120 A.D.) 
and Cicero (106-43 B.C.) commented directly on sports. Tacitus warned that the 
Greek influence on sports would contribute to an inordinate amount of time spent in 
the gymnasia, thus leading to sloth and ―dishonourable amours.‖
26
 Plutarch leveled 
an even harsher criticism against the Greek ideal in sport: ―They [the Romans] are of 
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the opinion that the gymnasium and the palaestra are more to blame than anything 
else for the slavishness and effeminacy of the Greeks…and it was these which 
produced restless idleness in the cities, immorality and the ruin of young men‘s 
physique with naps, strolls, rhythmic exercises and exact diets.‖
27
 Tacitus‘ and 
Plutarch‘s admonitions reflect the disdain for sport that was typical among elite 
authors because they equated sporting activities with a host of vices that enervate the 
skills for becoming excellent.  
     Perhaps the writer who influenced Augustine most profoundly—a writer who 
served as an incontrovertible source for Hellenistic philosophy and for those who 
received a Roman education—was Marcus Tullius Cicero. Augustine tells of 
awakening to a burning desire for wisdom after reading Cicero‘s Hortensius (Book 
3.4). Cicero
28
 interprets athletic activity according to his theoretical considerations 
concerning what it means to be human, what the good life is, and how sport functions 
as a form of physically active play. In his moral reflection, Cicero grants reason 
primacy as the moral organ we use to discern whether an action (like sport) is in 
accordance with the order or purpose of nature—that is, natural law. He writes, ―It is 
therefore, at all events manifest that we are designed so by nature for activity.‖
29
 
Because this purposefulness is inherent, play (athletic activity) is a natural impulse 
for a child to use for developing and educating ―the body, the mind and promoting 
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health and fitness.‖
30
 Cicero valued sport instrumentally as a physical activity that 
was a healthy means—a wholesome effect—for acquiring knowledge. Cicero‘s 
explanation is not too dissimilar to that in Plato‘s Republic (410 B-C, 521, D-E, 535 
D), he adumbrates for educators the preliminary value of music and gymnastics, 
noting that these twin activities develop the soul and body, respectively.
31
 Thus we 
see that Cicero judges sport as good or bad depending on whether it is done in 
accordance with nature and that he views sport contests in ancient Rome (when 
corrupt) as symptoms of actions done contrary to nature.   
     It is worth noting that, under influence from the Greeks, ancient Rome 
transitioned from a negative analysis to a more positive analysis. This paradigm shift 
occurred as philosophers gained a greater interest in sport ―as Roman minds began to 
appreciate the more liberal forms of exercise‖.
32
 Eberhard Mähl‘s influential work, 
Gymnastik und Athletik im Denken der Römer, Heuremata 2, recognizes both the 
criticisms and the later commendations, for the Romans did come to appreciate 
physical activity for different reasons.
33
 Cicero declares, 
Children of a somewhat more advanced age delight in games involving 
considerable exertion, from which not even fear of punishment can restrain 
them. And this passion for activity grows as they grow older.
34
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In Confessions, Augustine‘s comments about his childhood experience with play 
reflect Cicero‘s insight—an insight that Plato also shares as he discerns play to be 
part of the active nature of young boys.
35
 This understanding minimally reinforces 
the possibility that Augustine would not have rejected play so long as it was done in 
accordance with how God made us. Hence, Fielding concludes that, in Cicero‘s 
mind, this given (natural) desire was good for children because of its purpose in 
bettering and developing the child.
36
   
     When reflecting further on sport for adults, Cicero weakens his recommendation 
for play—what was natural for children in their development—because the pleasures 
that abound as a person matures hinder the morally superior virtues. According to 
Cicero, the power of pleasure—a sensual power that apparently exerts greater force 
when a person reaches maturity—dulls natural desires such as that for physical 
exercise; thus, pleasure moves a person away from what is morally desirable.
37
 
Pleasure for pleasure‘s sake is forbidden because it usurps priority over what Cicero 
deemed as constituting our natural order for fulfillment as humans. In other words, 
like Plato‘s moral psychology, Cicero‘s moral reasoning sees reason as necessary to 
govern the appetitive desire for pleasure in order for human beings to act in a way 
consistent with the dictates of nature. Cicero writes, 
That moral goodness which we look for in a lofty, high-minded spirit is secured, 
of course, by moral, not by physical strength. And yet the body must be trained 
and so disciplined that it can obey the dictates of judgment and reason in 
attending to business and in enduring toil.
38
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     With this moral framework as a guide, Cicero‘s criticism of the Roman games 
becomes clearer. Cicero witnesses the Roman games as a form of entertainment in 
which pleasure overrides the dictates of reason. Spectators derive no significant 
benefit from such an experience when they lose other, more important values 
associated with sport (i.e., developing and maintaining the body). That loss is a waste 
of time, oil, and effort (for the contestants).
39
 Cicero incisively condemns the 




     Similarly, Seneca protests about troubling moral effects after witnessing these 
spectacles, for he finds himself ―more greedy, more ambitious, more voluptuous, 
even more cruel and inhuman.‖
41
 This degradation of character is what happens to a 
society with individuals who possess low moral character ―when this pursuit of 
pleasure becomes divorced from the desire for the good and results in a view that 
pleasure is the sole object of existence.‖
42
 That is, an activity that is oriented merely 
toward pleasing the mobs is an indictment on all of Roman society, for the games 
were instituted by the emperor, and people from all levels of society attended these 
games.
43
 Cicero laments to a friend, 
But what pleasure can it possibly be to a man of culture when either a puny 
human being is mangled by a most powerful beast, or a splendid beast is 
transfixed with a hunting-spear?
44
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Furthermore, Cicero sees this symptom—the misuse of leisure and sport—as one of 
the fruits of ―the loss of ethical virtues by the society of Rome…and for this reason 
Roman sport serves as a paradigm of the decline, from his [Cicero‘s] viewpoint, of 
Roman values.‖
 45
 Cicero‘s attack of the games was not uncommon, for other writers 
in antiquity (i.e., Juvenal, Seneca, etc.) satirically attacked the shows.
46
 In fact, 
according to Guttmann, the Roman games (other than relatively minor references to 
physical exercise, boxing, wrestling, and the pankration) are most remembered for 
their races and gladiatorial games, both spectator sports.
47
 This Rome, with all its 
opulence and degradation, became the setting for the early Christian church. As a 
new religion, Christianity spread and interacted in an empire that often blamed it for 
its own problems and subjected them to torture and death in the arenas where sport 
was the spectacle. Let us now turn briefly to consider the context of the early church. 
     By the time of the church fathers, we witness early Christians practicing their 
faith in an explicitly pagan context in which Christian writers reflected on how they 
should live in this world. One in particular, Tertullian, was a church father with 
whose arguments Augustine was familiar as a part of the tradition. Addressing both 
baptismal candidates and the baptized, Tertullian in De Spectaculis (The Shows)
48
 
surveys and confronts the propriety of certain activities in public life—the 
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spectacles—namely, theatre, circus, games, and stadium.
49
 The thrust of this polemic 
is more broadly tackled in his thesis, from On Idolatry, where he opens,  
The principal crime of the human race, the highest guilt charged upon the world, 
the whole procuring cause of judgment, is idolatry. For, although each single 
fault retains its own proper feature, although it is destined to judgment under its 





The Shows, which was written prior to On Idolatry as an ethical-disciplinary treatise, 
assumes that idolatry is the chief culprit for the moral degradation that the games 
manifest. Tertullian determines ―that these things are not consistent with true religion 
and true obedience to the true God.‖
51
 Tertullian was not alone in his religious 
aversion to the games; Jewish monotheism had also resisted athletic festivals because 
the festivals‘ religious roots honored the Greek gods, and in Roman times, they 
bestowed worship upon the emperor. This threat of pagan worship occasioned 
resistance to the Tyre games in the second century (BC), and a violent reaction 
disturbed the games at Jerusalem where Herod the Great was the principal patron.
52
    
     Scholars today argue that the more organized, mass activities of sport (such as the 
gladiatorial games) served a number of other purposes, many of which did symbolize 
both the power of the emperor and of Rome. According to Auguet and others, even 
the cruelty and violence of the games were aimed at serving a number of socio-
cultural ends: political, penal (i.e., a deterrent to crime or wrongdoing since the 
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games were the fate of those who disobeyed the law), social (heroic and noble 
examples of Roman virtue), and entertaining entertainment (a way to appease the 
masses, especially in the absence of war).
53
 Despite the fact that these socio-cultural 
ends provide a rationale for the cruelty and violence, we must not overlook that 
violence used as a form of entertainment, ―spectator sports,‖ clearly differentiated 
Roman sports from Greek sports. Undoubtedly, this element was found toward the 
decline of Greece, but it is the calculated use and allure of violence that characterizes 
Roman sports. Guttmann explains that, ―More typical for Roman tastes than races or 
the discus [Greek aspects of sport] were the gladiatorial combats…It is common 
knowledge that gladiatorial spectacles reached bestiality enormity by imperial 
times.‖
54
 Moreover, Don Kyle corroborates, ―The major focus of Roman sport was 
the truly Roman type of diversion found in the circus and arena, a legacy from the 
Etruscans with their preoccupation with death.‖
55
   
     With the skill and artistry of a trained rhetorician, Tertullian caustically refutes 
the games because for believers to attend these spectacles inescapably subjects them 
to created goods perverted by the Devil and corrupt men;
56
 to an unrighteous 
assembly which Scripture forbids (Ps.1.1);
57
 to games having their origin in pagan 
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rulers, superstition and false deities;
58
 to worldly lusts;
59
 to excited passions that 
spiritually are contrary to the fruit of the Holy Spirit;
60
 to hearing and seeing 
shameful, profane, blasphemous, and violent deeds and words judged by God;
61
 to 
temptations and experiences of demon possession;
62
 and to witnessing Christians 
persecuted, thrown to the lions.
63
 In short, Tertullian argues that the games are 
intrinsically idolatrous and antithetical to the Christian ―way‖ (disciplina).  
     In the Confessions (6.8), Augustine vividly describes how, while in Rome, his 
friend Alypius was carried away by the powerful effects—the sounds and sights 
aroused his curiosity—of the same games that Tertullian had condemned 150 years 
prior.
 64
 Augustine shares and replicates many of Tertullian‘s objections,
65
 but his 
primary aversion fits his overall conception of the good life and the self‘s loves. That 
is, ―The desire for the spectacle was fueled by a deeper, idolatrous curiositas which 
sought sensible things as ends to be enjoyed in themselves rather than used as a 
means of knowing the Creator (Conf. 10.35.55).‖
66
 These spectacles‘ immoral 
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effects, when coupled with human cupiditas, forge a moral experience that is self-
referential and that fails to point to the highest good, God. 
     In the City of God (I-V),
67
 Augustine echoes Cicero‘s point about the link 
between the moral decline of Rome and the popularity and pleasures of games. He 
cites the games as evidence of Rome‘s moral bankruptcy, and he attacks their 
idolatrous origin and purpose.
68
 Despite the church‘s objection to the games, 
Christian emperors did tolerate contests. Christians attended the games, and wealthy 
Christians even sponsored some of the events. However, partially under the influence 
of Constantine, the games were already declining by the time of Augustine. The 
Olympic Games ended during the reign of Theodosius the Great (392-5), and 
Theodosius‘ son Honorius terminated the gladiatorial contests in 399 A.D. Fox 
remarks that, ―Not until the Christian empire did athletic games lose their pagan 
religious accompaniment.‖
69
 Guttmann links this development to the secularism that 
eventuated from Roman sports as one of the chief characteristics that modern sport 
has maintained: ―Modern sports are activities pursued for their own sake, partly for 
other ends which are equally secular.‖
70
  
     In summary, a few points emerge from this overview. First, we need to determine 
the nature of play as it relates to sport. Play theorists and sport philosophers assume 
that play is a ground principle of the social practice of sport. If this assumption is 
accepted, how then do we move forward with a theological reflection that interprets 
play as a fundamental good of our humanity and that preserves the integrity of its 
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structure for sport? Even if we hold that Augustine failed to do so in practice, I argue 
below that his theological construct actually positions Christian moral reflection to 
deeply value this good. Second, for Augustine and for contemporary sport, how we 
construe sport is largely determined by the socio-cultural context of sport. For 
example, Augustine‘s view was shaped by his boyhood experiences and by the 
strong association that sport had with idolatry and the imperial cult. Two 
contemporary sport ethicists, Steenbergen and Tamboer, argue that socio-cultural 
consideration is important when evaluating sport. They advocate that, because sport 
is a complex phenomenon, we should accept the double character of sport as a 
framework for understanding the relationship of the values and norms—internal and 
external—to sports. By honoring the ―relative autonomy‖ of sport, i.e., by 
understanding that sport is not completely identical to other practices (some real 
differences), Steenbergen‘s dialectic model endorses what is intrinsically good to 
sport (like play), but at the same time challenges any ―pure‖ notions of sport because 
all sport is embedded in institutions and socio-cultural contexts.
71
 This ―double-
character‖ model serves us well because it causes us to live with the tension of both 
the internal and external logic of sport. The significance of this tension is revisited 
later in this thesis. Furthermore, this tension relativizes Miller and Johnston‘s charge 
because their attempts to understand play lack critical reflection on what the logic of 
play means for modern sport. They correctly preserve the integrity of play, but the 
logic of play and sport are not equal. If these two concepts are conflated, then all 
play is equal to sport. However, although play is a part of sport, sport is not only 
play. We need to say more about this later because, for most sport-play theorists, 
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such an assertion readies play to be at the service of some other end, which in their 
estimation violates the non-purposefulness—the autotelic nature—of play. Moreover, 
according to MacIntyre, these twin elements—the ―double-character‖ model—make 
it necessary to examine any account of sport from the larger, moral context of human 
life; that is ―an overriding conception of the telos of a whole human life.‖
72
 Based on 
the tenets of the Apostle‘s creed, O‘Donovan asserts that, in the Christian tradition, 
because there is a Creator of this world, all of creation is ordered so that by ―its very 
existence it points to God.‖
73
 The Christian tradition construes the shape of the moral 
life, indeed of all existence, according to God. Thus, even though play may be 
described as free and separate from ordinary time and life, it still is defined by our 
relationship to God because we are created in His image.  
     At this juncture, I want to organize briefly several important themes of 
Augustine‘s moral philosophy—God, goods, love, and happiness—that serve as an 
initial framework for a Christian exploration of sport.  
St. Augustine’s Concept of the Good Life 
God and Happiness 
In his correspondence with Dioscorus,
74
 Augustine embarks on his quest to 
understand what will make us happy by way of the same starting point as other pagan 
schools of philosophy.  
All philosophers in common in their studies, their questionings, their arguments, 
their lives, have sought to apprehend the happy life. This was the one cause of 
philosophising; but in this matter, I think, we Christians are at one with the 
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philosophers. If I were to ask you why you have believed in Christ, why you 





Similar to his classical antecedents, i.e., Aristotle‘s ethic (Eudaemonism),
76
 
Augustine understands our actions as arising from this universal desire for happiness 
(beatitudo) in that,
77
 ―All persons want to be happy; and no persons are happy who 
do not have what they want.‖
78
 But the predicament of this desire centers on the 
subject ―to know what one should desire in order to be happy, and to know how to 
obtain it.‖
79
 In other words, the ―wanting‖ is ever-present, but it is the having or 
holding of the right thing that brings real happiness. Babcock regards this distinction 
between wanting and having as critical for obtaining true happiness: to have and 
want what will legitimately provide happiness.
80
 Augustine, in The Morals of the 
Catholic Church, asserts, ―For he who desires what he cannot obtain is tormented, 
and he who has attained what he should not have desired is deceived, while he who 
does not desire what he should seek to attain is diseased.‖
81
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     Though other philosophers have correctly identified this human yearning, 
Augustine‘s answer is strikingly different because he identifies this human quest as 
―the gift of God.‖
82
 Only God as our supreme good can satisfy the intensity of this 
desire; thus, ―happy is he who has God.‖
83
 Hence, Augustine‘s most famous line 
from the Confessions praises God for both stimulating and satisfying this human 
longing, the defining telos for all of humanity: ―Nevertheless, to praise you is the 
desire of man, a little piece of your creation. You stir man to take pleasure in praising 
you, because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in 
you.‖
84
 Nygren argues that in such a claim Augustine reduces God ―to the level of a 
means for the satisfaction of human desire;‖
85
 that is, Augustine uses God to meet the 
need for human happiness. But John Burnaby cautions that this is a linguistic 
confusion that blatantly misrepresents Augustine by limiting his use of amor to 
always mean ―a means to an end.‖
86
 Burnaby corrects this misunderstanding by 
pointing out that the focus is on the union we have with God through love. Augustine 
declared that, since this union was our created purpose—a purpose that resulted in 
joy and happiness—it is worthy of praise. In Burnaby‘s words, ―To ‗enjoy‘ is to 
cleave to something in the love which is enjoyment, not by means of the love which 
is desire.‖
87
 I introduce this point because Augustine‘s moral life was painstakingly 
theocentric, particularly as his own theology developed. This theology begs the 
question, why God?   
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     Because life is fragile and our earthly existence is enveloped in fallen conditions 
and fortuitous circumstances, we are unable to completely manage all the things that 
are imperfectly available to fulfill our wants. Thus, the impermanence of those things 
leaves us forever threatened by their eventual loss.
88
 Since these temporal things 
(whether equal to or less than ourselves) fail to deliver happiness, the only sure 
option—and the one superior to all others—that remains is God himself.
89
 This 
option leaves us to have the best object, God, whose permanence brings a happiness 
or fulfillment that is perfect.
90
 Hence, Augustine envisages God as the true object of 
our happiness, which the redeemed experience as members of the city of God.  
The reward of virtue will be God himself, Who gives virtue, and Who has 
promised Himself to us, than Whom nothing is better or greater….God will be 
the end of our desires. He will be seen without end, loved without stint, praised 
without weariness. And this duty, this affection, this employment, will, like 




     Why do not all people realize the happiness for which they are created? The 
problem originates with us. For Augustine, sin, as pride, characterizes our restless 
condition as human beings—mankind turned in on itself (homo curvatus in se)—
which Augustine‘s own odyssey dramatizes as a self misdirected in regard to this 
world.
92
 Elsewhere, he casts our estrangement from God and our moral problem as 
being due to a ―perversity of will twisted away from the highest substance, you O 
God, towards inferior things . . . .‖
93
 Burnaby makes clear that sin was both a ―failure 
                                                 
88
 Babcock, ―Cupiditas and Caritas,‖ 41. It should not be deduced from this that God is left as some 
kind of ―Pascal wager‖; the best bet after analyzing all other options.  
89
 Augustine, The Moral of the Catholic Church, 1.6.10; Augustine, Confessions, 10.22.32. 
90
 Burt, Friendship and Society, 38. Cf. Augustine, The Morals of the Catholic Church, 1.3.4. 
91
 Augustine, City of God, 22.30. 
92
 Augustine, Confessions, 1.18.28; 2.10.18; 10.33.50.  
93
 Augustine, Confessions, 7.16.22. 
   53
to love God‖ and ―the inevitable transference of love to objects which, though good 
because God‘s creatures, are goods less than the highest.‖
94
 That is, sin as a violation 
of God‘s moral design separates us from the highest good. Since our wills are 
corrupted, humans require a physician to heal this brokenness and God is the only 
one who can remedy this brokenness with his own gift of love.
95
 By faith through 
Christ Jesus, the true Mediator,
96
 Augustine was born from above and freed from his 
―burden of misery,‖ and hence, he was able to walk the road to happiness ordered 
now by God‘s love. Let us examine his basic structure of love. 
Love: Ordered and Disordered 
     Augustine‘s theory of love assumes a complex Greek metaphysic. That is, there is 
a hierarchical cosmic ordering for all the beings of this world, with each being‘s 
fulfillment found in its proper end, telos.
97
 God rules by imposing his order on 
nature.
98
 Because this dynamic is rooted in the nature of things, the ―motion‖ or 
―weight‖ of our human love, according to Augustine, carries our quest for happiness 
to objects that we believe will bear the load.
99
 Augustine draws an analogy between 
the pull or direction of human love and material bodies:  
For the weight of bodies is, as it were, their love, whether they are carried 
downwards by gravity or upwards by their lightness. For the body is carried by 
its weight wherever it is carried, just as the soul is carried by its love.
100
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Therefore, as referenced above, the motion of our love should be properly related to 
or oriented toward mankind‘s ultimate end, union with the eternal God.
101
 But 
because of the reality of Genesis 3, we principally exchange God‘s love and delight 
for creaturely loves which leaves us alienated. Augustine makes his classic 
distinction between these two loves, which qualify the inhabitants of the two cities, 
in the City of God. Caritas is the rightly ordered love with the accompanying actions 
that are deemed moral (true virtue), whereas cupiditas connotes idolatry as 
disordered love or immoral actions (vice).
102
 Augustine contrasts summarizes sharply 
the qualitative marks of these loves which radically divide all of humanity in the 
following way: 
What I mean by charity or love is any urge of the spirit to find joy in God for his 
own sake, and in oneself and one‘s neighbor for God‘s sake; by cupidity or 
greed any impulse of the spirit to find joy in oneself and one‘s neighbor, and in 




Therefore, Augustine grounds love in God and points it toward him, who is the 
ultimate reference for meaning. So our human predicament lies not so much in what 
we love (for creation is affirmed as good by virtue of its good Creator) but in what 
manner or direction we love something.
104
 Again, Augustine deftly writes that ―the 
two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the 
contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self.‖
105
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Thus, a good action is ordered by the right love because its aim is God, respecting 
the integrity of his ordered reality.
106
 
Goods: Proper ―Use‖ and ―Enjoyment‖ 
     Augustine‘s hierarchical (top-down) ordering of values provides him with a 
method of sorts to know ―what objects or states of affairs are to be considered good 
(or evil), and to [know] how various goods (or evils) are to be ranked in relation to 
each other.‖
107
 In other words, Augustine‘s theocentric vision of the good life 
permits him to grade the diversity of goods that regularly present themselves to a 
moral agent in an ethically complex world--a world that for him was being shaken 
both intellectually and socially as the Roman Empire was attacked by barbarians. At 
least on a macro-level, William Schweiker argues that this kind of value theory (in 
terms of this feature of higher and lower levels) for a Christian ethic is significant 
―because it understands questions of faith to be basic to human existence. Faith is 
about what one trusts in and is loyal to in all actions and relations.‖
108
 Augustine‘s 
moral vision in general specifies which goods a person ought to promote because his 
commitment to God (the higher level) gives meaning and coherence as a framework 
for how to integrate earthly goods (the lower level) with the other goods.  
     How should a Christian regard his relationship with the world? Augustine 
addresses this relationship, a specific distinction and pairing of words (uti and frui), 
in numerous places in his writings. In the text cited below, Augustine defends this 
justification--that is, how to distinguish between the created goods and the uncreated 
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good--based on valuing all goods for the sake of the highest good. The ultimate good 
is meant to be enjoyed because it is an end itself. In Christian Doctrine, Augustine 
writes from the context of theologically and philosophically defending his method of 
exegesis, hermeneutical theory. He differentiates between signs and things (1.3.3) as 
a prelude to the ethical significance (1.22.20-1.34.38) of how Christians ought to 
relate in this world.  
There are some things, then, which are to be enjoyed, others which are to be 
used, others still which enjoy and use. Those things which are objects of 
enjoyment make us happy. Those things which are objects of use assist, and (so 
to speak) support us in our efforts after happiness, so that we can attain the 
things that make us happy and rest in them. We ourselves, again, who enjoy and 
use these things, being placed among both kinds of objects, if we set ourselves to 
enjoy those which we ought to use, are hindered in our course, and sometimes 
even led away from it; so that, getting entangled in the love of lower 
gratifications, we lag behind in, or even altogether turn back from, the pursuit of 




For Augustine, everything falls into two classes: those (goods) we are meant to 
enjoy, which make us happy, and those (goods) we are meant to use, which ―assist‖ 
our path to happiness.
110
 Since God is the only good we value for its own sake, all 
other goods ―must hold a subordinate position.‖
111
 Enjoyment (frui) is the ―attitude 
we entertain towards things we value for themselves, and ‗use‘ (uti), the attitude we 
entertain towards things we value for the sake of something else.‖
112
 As discussed 
above, the aim of our desires dynamically drives what we love and how we love, thus 
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manifesting whether we are enjoying God and properly referring
113
 all other loves to 
him. Does this mean that if everything else is subordinate, then in reality we simply 
―use‖ it for God‘s sake?  
    At first glance, this hierarchy of loves contradicts what Immanuel Kant spells out 
in his second formulation of the categorical imperative. Kant articulates this aspect of 
the categorical imperative as thus: ―Act in such a way that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as 
an end and never simply as a means.‖
114
 Because human beings are ―ends in 
themselves,‖ they possess intrinsic worth and value, which prohibits us from using 
them simply as means for our good or predetermined end.  
     What if a sportsperson is an object of uti? An arguably crude reading of 
Augustine potentially justifies a number of harmful actions for the sake of one‘s own 
good. Let us assume for the sake of argument that another contestant is a means to 
my good. What is at stake for the Christian tradition?  
     First, this use-value tears asunder the love commandment because how a Christian 
relates to the opponent is no longer based on what is good for the opponents‘ sake. If 
this becomes the starting point, then what prevents a category of actions that are 
contrary to Christian agape? I am only a few steps away from justifying acts of 
violence and aggression, even hating the opponent, because their value is subject to 
my good. The ―Thou‖ impedes the forward progress of the ―I,‖ so why not reduce 
them to a status of less than a person? The warlike rhetoric of annihilation that we 
are sometimes inclined to use acts as a form or arousal or motivation—it allows us to 
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objectify the opponent as the enemy. What we as soldier-athletes value is more of a 
military-style victory (might makes right) rather than a mutual moral quest for fair 
play and respect for human relationships.  
     Second, a corollary to the first, is the value of teammates within this perspective. 
When I hold this perspective, instead of valuing the good of my teammate, I base our 
relationship on usefulness. According to Aristotle, this species of friendship is built 
on what good or gain each person will obtain from each other. ―Thus, friends who 
have been brought together by a feeling that they will profit by their association do 
not love one another for personal qualities, but only so far as they are useful to one 
another.‖
115
 For example, the proliferation of trades and free agency make it easy for 
some people to leave teammates behind because they are not useful as other people 
could be. 
     Third, I am left with a competitive ethic that stresses survival at all costs, not only 
at the expense of my opponent and teammate, but also at my own body‘s use-value. 
Taking performance-enhancing drugs, playing through pain and injury (and 
assuming serious risks to body and mind), creating unhealthy eating habits (as seen 
in some female gymnasts), following extreme training regimens (such as those use 
by ―endurathon‖ athletes), and drastically reducing body weight (as practiced by 
some wrestlers), exemplify this use-value ethic.
 
 
     Fourth, how do I account for the use of words and gestures that display intent to 
harm? The practice and ritual of ―trash‖ talking, along with other purposeful 
intimidation (e.g., psychological antics like showboating/ strutting, or trying to take 
an opponent out), would appear alien and inane without this use-value because these 
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practices are unnecessary for sport/games to exist or flourish. Moreover, the losers 
are belittled and booed (praise is withheld), given (at times) extreme workouts as 
punishment for their failure to win, and inflicted with negative reinforcement, thus 
ritualizing the failure to meet this use-value ethic.  
     This sport-ethic dissolves both fair play and the friendships belonging to 
competition. However, it also inverts Augustine‘s ethic by giving too much ―weight‖ 
to these earthly goods. It implies that, by doing such acts, a person puts his ―rest‖ or 
reference in some earthly good to satisfy his desire for happiness (winning) instead 
of in God. I address some important aspects of this pathology in my final chapter. 
But this explanation still does not straightforwardly answer whether Augustine‘s 
ethic validates ―use‖ because God is at the top of the ladder of being, properly 
ordering all ―uses‖ toward Him. Because this concept of use performs a significant 




     First, Augustine indicates that our love of God does not preclude our love of 
created goods. God‘s love is the source and means for how we lovingly relate to each 
other. 
This word is conceived in love of either the creature or the creator, that is of 
changeable nature or unchangeable truth; which means either in covetousness or 
in charity. Not that the creature is not to be loved, but if that love is related to the 
creator it will no longer be covetousness but charity. It is only covetousness 
when the creature is loved on its own account. In this case, it does not help you 
in your use of it, but corrupts you in your enjoyment of it. Now a creature can 
either be on a par with us or lower than us; the lower creature should be used to 
bring us to God, the creature on a par should be enjoyed, but in God. Just as you 
ought to enjoy yourself not in yourself but in him who made you, so too with the 
one whom you love as yourself. Let us then enjoy both ourselves and our 
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brothers in the Lord, and from that level let us not dare to lower ourselves down 




Burnaby charitably grants maturation to Augustine‘s theological development, not 
least to this word pairing. The key to the above passage is to see the value of the 
means (uti) in reference or relation to the Creator, for ―the distinction of uti and frui 
is merged in the ‗order of love‘.‖
118
  
     Second, the whole range of temporal, sportive goods is good based on their 
created goodness, which closes any chance of anything (other than God himself) 
possessing value independent of God.
119
 Subsequently, when talking about the love 
of another person, this love too depends on God‘s value. However, this does not 
mean that we love and value sensible objects in the same way that we do the love of 
neighbor. Hence, as noted by others,
120
 Augustine seeks to describe how we should 
properly relate to our neighbor, loving her. In True Religion (47.91), uti was used in 
common parlance for how to treat others: ―a standard Latin locution—found also in 
earlier English, e.g., ‗He used him well‘—indicating how people are to be treated; 
the notion of ‗exploitation‘ is not to be read into it.‖ 
121
  
     Third, in Christian Doctrine (Book 1), Augustine clearly states that we should 
love our neighbor, ―For we are commanded to love one another.‖
122
 Yet, the 
dilemma is in what way to love: for use or for enjoyment. When compared to God 
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(hierarchical ordering in nature), the neighbor is treated below God according to the 
value conferred on this person by God. That is, the love of neighbor is because of 
God‘s sake which means, ―If that ‗because of God‘ were not there, we should be 
treating people as material objects, and if God himself were not there, we should be 
justified in so doing, for the man would not be made in his image.‖
123
 Thus, we 
should love them for their intrinsic worth; this is a worth conferred on them because 
they belong to God.
124
 
    Fourth, in writings after Christian Doctrine, Augustine departs from this 
pronouncement concerning the use of human beings by teaching ―that we should 
enjoy them [people] as related to God.‖
125
 In the City of God (19.13.1-2), Augustine 
reconciles the neighbor-love with the enjoyment that awaits our appointed end with 
others who believe in God.
126
 In summary, Vernon Bourke, who utilizes these same 
texts both to defend and exegete Augustine‘s thought on this critical topic, says  
that all temporal things are provided by divine providence to be used lovingly by 
us but not with any permanent or exclusive affection. They are not goods-in-
themselves, nor are they final ends. They are to be loved because they enable us 
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Reconceptualizing Sport: Toward Christian Moral Reflection on Sport 
 
     What are the initial implications that Augustine‘s moral construct holds for 
Christian moral reflection on sport? Below are some initial brushstrokes that provide 
direction for the development of the remaining chapters of this thesis.  
     All goods derive their value from God as the good Creator. Metaphysical 
goodness of materiality counters all forms of dualism, whether attributed to 
Gnosticism or Manichaeism, which historically has crept into Christian 
investigations of cultural activities through the tendency to devalue or reject bodily 
activities like sport. Whether in dance, theatre, or the arts in general, dualism has at 
various times plagued an authentic engagement for evangelical Christians in North 
America. If Christians analyze sport primarily as a fallen, idolatrous activity, they 
restrict the scope of the Bible‘s complete narrative—creation-fall-redemption—and 
the depth of God‘s kingdom purposes.
128
 Instead of beginning with an affirmation of 
humanity and this world from the doctrine of creation, incarnation, and the 
resurrection, dualism identifies the problem as an inherent feature of our earthly 
embodied existence. In turn, the religious or spiritual realm is privileged over the 
profane, earthly realm. Though Augustine might appear ambivalent about accepting 
the sensible or material world, his more mature reflection undeniably promotes the 
idea that God as the chief good has created all these things to be good (Confessions 
7.5). So for the Puritans to reject or waver in their acceptance of sport is 
fundamentally unsound because there is nothing in principle about sport that is 
immoral. Equally, when Muscular Christianity and sport parachurch ministries turn 
toward sport for what it can produce (use-value), i.e., good character or converts, 
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they fail to provide a theological rationale that the goodness of creation posits God‘s 
acceptance of embodied activities like sport. This use-value rationale also 
perpetuates and contributes to the existing problem of instrumentalism in our 
consumer culture; capitalistic market forces often ride on this extrinsic value. I return 
to dualism and its problems for modern muscular Christianity in chapter four. I work 
with Bonhoeffer‘s ethical vision to critique and repair this problem of dualism. 
     If sport were intrinsically idolatrous, the Christian tradition would be forced to 
avoid this cultural activity. As implied above, sport is not intrinsically evil; therefore, 
sport is not evil in principle. However, as Tertullian and Augustine have described, 
moral problems have abounded in sport, so where does the problem lie? Augustine‘s 
construct examines the rightness and wrongness of action according to the intention 
of the will or the direction of the love. In the Confessions, Augustine states that 
iniquity is due to the ―perversion of the will, turned aside from Thee, O God, the 
Supreme….‖
129
 In the Augustinian tradition, the direction of love helps to 
differentiate between the ontology or structure of something and the ethical direction, 
or how we relate to external goods or other people. A good will is evident in its 
service of God. Moreover, Allen Guttmann insightfully invokes this structure and 
direction construct in his own assessment of modern sport when he muses that ―the 
crux of the matter for us is whether the abuses represent the distortion of modern 
sports or the very essence of the phenomenon. Are sports a modern curse?‖
130
  
     For the Christian tradition, sport essentially is not bad. However, as with any 
other action, sport can be misused. Thus, if we value sport in such a way that we love 
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others and the goods of the game toward God, it is morally praiseworthy. But if we 
love sport as an ultimate end, it is morally blameworthy—it is idolatry. Therefore, 
Tertullian and Augustine correctly identified the immoral effects (ethical direction) 
of the spectacles, but problems arise with Tertullian‘s conflation of ontology with 
ethics. That is, Tertullian‘s absolute prohibition traces the problem to the nature of 
sport, which is an ontological distinction. To make this error commits Tertullian to 
wrongfully reject certain spheres of cultural activity. For Tertullian to do this is 
wrong because the substance of something is good by virtue of its metaphysical 
goodness, but the ethical direction of the structure (i.e. sport as an activity) 
determines if an action is good and right.  
     Augustine‘s view that our bodies are structurally good opens a way to more 
completely realize other goods that are intimately connected to this particular aspect 
of human activity. That is, if sport operates in the Christian tradition as a form of 
play and human excellence (basic goods) among other goods specific to this practice, 
then it is a determinative feature of our humanity, since we are embodied selves who 
play and excel. Basic goods are important because the value of sports inheres in the 
activity itself as a capability and function of our humanity that is created by God.  As 
a basic good then, sport is not valued primarily as a means to an end—education, 
evangelism, health, etc.—but because it constitutes what it means to be a human 
being. To clarify, as a basic value, I mean that sport (as play and a human excellence) 
is an intrinsic good: it ―is considered to be desirable for its own sake…‖ not for some 
extrinsic value (instrumental worth) that playing produces or results in, such as fame, 
wealth and power.
131
 Furthermore, the Christian tradition proscribes sport institutions 
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and sponsors who diminish the quality and violate the integrity of play by exploiting 
and manipulating others for the sake of their own ends and economic interests. 
Though Augustine did not use the same kind of language as basic good theorists, it is 
not reaching too far to see sport as a form of play and excellence as a good his moral 
philosophy could defend—even if his education disparaged it—particularly on his 
best anti-Manichean days.  
     My construal of sport as a basic good is an important concept that I borrow from 
the natural law tradition—particularly, John Finnis and Germain Grisez, who argue 
for such basic goods as work, family, life, marriage, friendship, beauty, knowledge 
and play.
132
 Sport activities fulfill significant substantive goods of our humanity. 
These goods are attractive because who we are as human beings reaches toward 
them, recognizing that they are marks of a flourishing human being.
133
 In chapter 
three, I follow the trajectory of sport as an ontic-embodied good and develop it 
specific to John Paul II‘s sport ethic. For a Christian ethic, sport as an ontic-
embodied good is important in lieu of others like Paul Weiss, whose eschatology 
instrumentalizes embodied pursuits such as sport.  
    Not only does this basic good concept serve to repair the use-value ethic 
precipitated by the Puritans and morphed toward different ends by the YMCA and 
sport ministries, but it also critiques and corrects the androcentrism of sport that is 
associated with the Greek ideal and adopted by Muscular Christianity. For 
Christians, this ideal was developed for the sake of manly strengths and virtue, 
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blending both piety and manhood. However, sport as a form of play and human 
excellence is intrinsic to women also, so as co-equals they share in these goods for 
their own personal and meaningful fulfillment. Consequently, if sport is a good that 
all people share as an aspect of their humanity, then its development and realization 
includes all people, all races, and all socio-economic strata. That means sport as a 




     Augustine‘s moral vision has believers share and pursue the goods common to 
sport with everyone else because sport is an admixture of the two cities and loves, 
even though the full human good awaits eschatological fulfillment in the future rule 
and reign of God.
135
 Sport as a ―network of human interaction‖ embodies such goods 
as play, excellence, friendship, discipline, mastery of skills, health, and cooperation. 
A Christian ethic upholds these as temporal common goods that manifest imperfectly 
the ultimate good. In the fifth and final chapter, we see that Bonhoeffer‘s ultimate 
and penultimate paradigm elucidates how these goods of the natural life participate 
right now, even if not completely, in Christ incarnate, crucified and resurrected—
Christ-reality. Furthermore, Augustine‘s moral vision entails that the spoiling of 
these common goods, according to the Christian tradition, is the result of both 
personal actions—disordered loves privately possessing goods for one‘s own sake 
(i.e., love of glory, honor, and power)—and system injustices (e.g, institutional 
corruption and domination of the common good), which produce alienation and 
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exploitation. Both personal actions and system injustices impede us from properly 
sharing the common goods intrinsic to sport. Practically speaking, a Christian ethic 
seeks to create regulations to support equal access and opportunity for contestants 
and to challenge inequalities that arise from technological and economic inequities 
between teams and nations. Each of these is an example of justice and harmony, 
which are necessary to order sport toward God. In summary, Augustine‘s order of 
love prescribes that Christians take this domain of civic life seriously by contributing 
to the betterment of the common good of sport so neighborly love can properly relate 
it to God. 
     Since Christians experience ultimate happiness and meaning by enjoying God 
(frui Deo), the desires and pleasures that traverse the experience of sport can assist us 
on our way to happiness. The multiple benefits associated with sport, such as 
personal renewal, joy, release, and pleasure, are not ends in themselves; we must 
remind ourselves lest we again confuse the frui and uti distinction. Augustine implies 
two further points for sport in this distinction. First, (as implied above), if I as a 
contestant find my motivation primarily from attaining extrinsic goods, then my 
motivation disrupts the fidelity to sports by plundering the intrinsic goods. This 
motivation or preference is instrumental in nature. Extrinsic goods like rewards or 
money prostitute sport and constrict the excellences of the activity itself. Second, not 
only is the integrity of the activity at stake, but also the integrity of a person‘s moral 
identity. That is, instead of functioning as a pointer to God, sport reverses the 
direction by referring to itself, which is idolatry. Idolatry constricts the fullness of 
God‘s image because contestants seek happiness in something less than God. Hence, 
the degradation is two-fold: (1) It affects the state of affairs for all those involved in 
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the social practice of sport, and (2) The identity of the moral agent is affected 
through and beyond the sport experience. I follow this degradation more closely in 
the final chapter.  
     Since Augustine‘s theological construct properly values physicality and 
embodiment, sport is a mode of being in the world that participates in the good 
―gifts‖ that Creator God gives for cultural making activities like sport. Our 
participation in sport is an appropriate use of the gift of our hands and bodies, which 
is meant to be developed as part of the God-given mandate in Genesis 1-2. God‘s 
directive to ―fill the earth‖ involves the making of culture. Though the original 
context was given to Adam and Eve in a garden environment, a Christian ethic 
interprets this mandate as containing in seminal form all future human poiesis and 
cultural patterns, such as art, athletics, technology, and so on.
136
 Furthermore, if this 
mandate is granted, then sport receives its meaning as an aspect of the good created 
order that depends on God. Sport is not an autonomous zone disconnected from 
God‘s rule, nor does it have meaning in and of itself. Sport as a cultural activity 
derives its value from its position as a creation of man the player and maker. What 
does this imply?  
     First, a Christian ethic engages sport as an activity under God‘s authority and 
control. If not, then sport takes on the meaning and value of whoever is using it. I 
have addressed this idea above in a number of points, and I return to it in detail in 
chapters three to five, specifically concerning how the gospel reconfigures sport.    
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     Second, these gifts are not simply basic goods that constitute our humanity but ―in 
principle it means God reveals himself in the sensible or material.‖
137
 For a Christian 
ethic, our participation in sport as a sensible mode is an embodied form of 
worship.
138
 Sport then must be appreciated as a part of the ―all‖ when Paul 
doxologically declares, ―For from him and through him and to him are all things.‖
139
 
In the third chapter, John Paul II becomes an important interlocutor on this point of 
embodiment as a sign and gift and on what difference it makes for a Christian ethic 
and sport.  
     Third, if sport possesses a doxological character, this character subverts the 
ancient Greek ideal of mens sana in corpore sano. Contrary to the Greeks and the 
―muscular Christian‖ version, the chief aim is not ―a sound mind in a sound body,‖ 
for that cultural aspiration deifies the perfecting of man (literally, the male gender) as 
the end to be obtained from sport. However, even in its fallen misdirection the 
envisioned end attests to a perspective that attempts to reach beyond our finitude and 
toward the divine. So, to apply Augustine‘s distinction between a ―sign‖ and a 
―thing‖,
140
 sport as a thing or part of the world should function as a sign that points to 
God as the source and meaning rather than referring to itself as an idol.
141
 In other 
words, a Christian sportsperson‘s bodily performances should spiritually and 
ethically direct sport in service and praise to God, which is an alternative end. Thus, 
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instead of taking the ―idol‖ direction that Tertullian credited to ancient Roman sports, 
we now restore this being-in-the-world as an icon for worship. Smith corroborates 
that Augustine‘s creational ontology attests to ―the integrity of creation as the theatre 
of the Creator‘s glory‖ so that ―this zone of immanence is where transcendence plays 
itself out, unfolding itself in a way that is staged by the Creator.‖
142
 Therefore, since 
sport is sacramentally valued because of creation and re-affirmed in the 
incarnation,
143
 it consecrates this earthly penultimate existence for Christian 
believers. So instead of harboring the cupidity that inclined Alypius to watch the 
games (denigrating what is structurally good about sport) in the Confessions, a 
Christian player redeems her passion for sport and games with ordo amoris so her 
play might arouse other players‘ and spectators‘ desires and purposes toward God. 
Augustine iterates,  
…we have to use this world, not enjoy it, so that we may behold the invisible 
things of God, brought to our knowledge through the things that have been made 
(Rom 1:20); that is, so that we may proceed from temporal and bodily things to 




     Fourth, this reconnection with God heals what the secularization of sport tore 
asunder from ancient Roman. As mentioned earlier, Guttmann contends that, from its 
conception in ancient Greece, sport had a religious character and purpose, but 
beginning with imperial Rome, the religious purpose was gradually replaced by 
multiple secular purposes. Contrary to these instrumental purposes in ancient Rome 
(and for that matter even the false religious purposes in ancient Greece), a Christian 
ethic grounds sport in and points it back to God. If all life receives meaning based on 
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where it stands metaphysically with God as His creation, then everything is sacred or 
religious. This final point takes this thesis in a direction that not only contests 
modern muscular Christianity in North America, but that also challenges and 
clarifies the most recent thesis and renewal efforts by Shirl Hoffman.  
     Does this mean that religion conscripts sport instrumentally for its end? If so, we 
return to where we started either with idealism vitiating this sphere of life (attributed 
to Augustine) or with some institution like religion only valuing this activity because 
of its use-value. For this thesis, in the Augustinian tradition, all human beings have a 
sense of the Divine, a seed of religion, that constitutes their humanity.
145
 This 
religious structure is not confined to any one sphere of life, nor is it limited to 
religious rituals or creeds, for it cuts through all of our creaturely existence. For 
Augustine, true religion—properly ordered love--designates the worshiper or 
Christian.
146
 Therefore, those who play sport, as those who participate in all cultural 
activities, are religiously oriented; however, the importance of the matter again 
consists of whether this activity is directed toward or away from God. So God is ―in‖ 
sport, and the religious structure of our humanity ineradicably pervades all of sport. 
Hence, God is not like some human institution, externally valuing sport for whatever 
end He deems praiseworthy. Rather, because he gifts and creates the very people 
who play sport, then ontologically He has already determined that sport should be 
directed toward Him for its true value. 
     Finally, Augustine‘s teleology raises important issues related to the actual goods, 
such as sportive excellence, in regard to the practice of sport. If Augustine‘s axiology 
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is not idealistic, then how should the different characteristics of modern sport be 
construed within a Christian ethic? Because Augustine‘s ethic on these specific 
elements of modern sport is speculative and relatively thin in regards to addressing 
and describing the thickness—nature and goals—of this sport practice, I turn to Paul 
Weiss an important proponent of bodily excellence in modern sport.  
     In a manner similar to a Christian ethic, Paul Weiss appreciates that sport teems 
with attractions or desires, such as the basic good of excellence, that, if properly 
appraised, can lead to personal fulfillment in and through sport. In the Christian 
tradition, this quest or pursuit of excellence finds its true end in the divine. This quest 
is undeniably true of all cultural activities. Human aspirations or loves, even in sport, 
are the creative impulse in personal and social life, as well as the deep roots of 
human conflict.
147
 What would it look like to think about sport in terms of human 
aspiration and the objective satisfaction or fulfillment of this quest in and through 
sport? Augustine can provide some direction, but he was not responding to modern 
sport. How are we to construe sport today in relation to this important element that 
Paul Weiss singles out as the primary good of sport?  
     Paul Weiss‘s inquiry aims to relate his philosophical outlook to sportive life. In 
the next chapter, Paul Weiss is my primary interlocutor and foil. He constructs a 
philosophy of sport that applies ideals from ancient Greece to today. Weiss‘s Greek 
ideals and philosophical categories function as heuristic tools because many issues of 
modern sport are connected in certain ways to the ancient Greek ideals. Augustine 
simply did not know modern sport, nor was he responding even to Greek sports, so 
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Weiss functions as a historical and philosophical bridge to thicken our description of 
modern sport, to refine this thesis‘s analysis of some important categories inherent to 
modern sport, and to focus on what this phenomenon entails for a Christian ethic 
today. Weiss‘s retrieval of these classical ideals for understanding contemporary 
sport realities in some ways mirrors MacIntyre‘s method for addressing 
contemporary moral theories, although Weiss wrote fifteen years earlier. Like 
MacIntyre in general, Weiss is a helpful connection between Greek virtue and 
modern sport. In short, Weiss adumbrates important categories that a theologico-
ethical outlook needs to address.
148
 His project has formed a foundation for many in 
the field of sport ethics, representing one of the major ethical theories in sport today. 
Just as other philosophers of sport got their start with Weiss, I will cut my teeth on 
some of the issues Weiss raises that I directly respond to in chapter three with John 
Paul II.   
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PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE: PAUL WEISS‘S PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 
OF SPORT 
 
     In this chapter, I consider one of the first serious philosophical works by a trained 
philosopher on modern sport in America. In 1969, Paul Weiss wrote Sport: A 
Philosophical Inquiry. This work is a philosophical examination of sport, the human 
activity that had received little to no examination up to that point. Paul Weiss 
recognized sport as a universal occupation of men, but one that lacks a philosophical 
treatise devoted to it in the Western world of philosophy. For example, he notes the 
lack of attention to sport from the Greek philosophers. After reviewing some of the 
reasons for their neglect, he asserts that ―sports have not been taken seriously enough 
as a source or instance of large truths or first principles.‖
1
 If this was true for 
philosophy almost forty years ago, it is equally true, as I contend in my introduction, 
for evangelical theologians today in North America.  
     Like Socrates, Weiss sets out to examine the unexamined.
2
 As far as his method, 
he makes it clear that his task begins with stock concepts or principles from the 
discipline of philosophy (e.g., metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, ethics, etc.) that 
                                                 
1
 Paul Weiss, Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University, 1969), 8.  
2
 Weiss states that sport is a subject for which humans are serious about and for which philosophical 
reflection is worthy. His purpose is to illuminate ―instances of general principle‖ which may have 
been hidden or neglected (Paul Weiss, ―Reply to Daniel A. Dombrowski‖ in The Philosophy of Paul 
Weiss, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1995),656; Daniel A. Dombrowski, 
Contemporary Athletics and Ancient Greek Ideals (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 
37-39.). 
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function as heuristic tools for analyzing and speculating about sport. Weiss is a 
philosopher looking at sport as his subject matter. He believes that any inquiry of a 
particular activity shares a family of concepts that are ―pertinent to other fields—
indeed, to the whole of things and knowledge.‖
3
 Thus, the result of this work is not a 
philosophy of sport. He is not trying to generate a philosophy belonging exclusively 
to sport as his object of scrutiny, although he respects sport as a unique phenomenon.  
Rather, it is ―a work in philosophy, and not in sport. It is a work in philosophy just as 
a philosophy of history or a philosophy of art is a work in philosophy and not in 
history or in art.‖
4
 Dombrowski adds that, in particular, Weiss makes philosophical 
sense of sport by drawing primarily from ancient Greek philosophers and their ideals, 
such as arête, sophrosyne, paidia, kalakogathia, askesis, eudaemonia, telos and 
dynamis.
5
 That being said, Weiss‘s philosophy of sport was a forerunner for many in 
sports ethics who claim that ―sport can be counted as one among many elements in 
human flourishing and in a good life.‖
6
 This teleological ethic judges the morality of 
an action based on whether it fulfills or realizes certain ideals—both general and 
sport-specific values and norms
7




                                                 
3
 Paul Weiss, Sport, viii.  
4
 Weiss, Sport, viii. See also, Randolph Feezell, ―Sport, Pursuit of Bodily Excellence or Play? An 
Examination of Paul Weiss‘s Account of Sport,‖ The Modern Schoolman 58 (May 1981): 257-270. 
5
 Dombrowski, Contemporary Athletics and Ancient Greek Ideals, 38-39. Cf. Daniel A. Dombrowski, 
―Weiss, Sport and the Greek Ideal,‖ in The Philosophy of Paul Weiss, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn 
(Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 637-654.  
6
 Sigmund Loland, ―Normative Theories of Sport: A Critical Review,‖ Journal of the Philosophy of 
Sport 3, no. 2 (2004): 116.  
7
 Loland, ―Normative Theories of Sport,‖ 116; Robert L. Simon, Fair Play: The Ethics of Sport 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004). Another approach to this theory adds that games in general 
possess certain interests like playing for the good of the game; therefore, acts like cheating run counter 
to what is in the best interest of the game itself which as an athlete you adopt when you choose to 
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     My primary objective in this chapter is to expound on Weiss‘s argument for sport 
as the pursuit of excellence (arete). I believe his philosophical outlook and themes 
serve my thesis well because they provide me with a respected, influential 
philosopher and interlocutor whom I can argue both with and against as he 
adumbrates important categories that a theologico-ethical outlook needs to address. 
His outlook, which stresses dimensions of reality, helps us understand the 
phenomenon of sport. I largely reserve my critique, other than making some general 
criticisms and raising some important issues that must be addressed, until the next 
chapter. I am using Weiss‘s thoughts to delineate many of the important issues that a 
Christian ethic must address, but I do not intend to address all of them. In the next 
chapter, I deal primarily with John Paul II‘s personalist ethic to broadly critique 
Weiss‘s ethic and to examine what a Christian ethic adds to this moral discourse. 
Paul Weiss: An Ethic for Excellence 
Teleological Foundation for Sport: Aristotelian and Platonic Expressions 
 
     In his inquiry, the phenomenon of sport is almost a universal interest on the level 
of fact, Weiss asks, ―Why are so many so deeply involved, so caught up emotionally 
in athletic events?‖
9
 Weiss contends that, as an individual, the ―athlete in action‖ 
(chapter 8) meaningfully carries out his role and tests his attributes of speed, 
endurance, strength, coordination, and accuracy with and against others because he is 
                                                                                                                                          
contest with others (Robert Butcher and Angela Schneider, ―Fair Play as Respect for the Game,‖ 
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 25, no. 1 (1998): 1-22.).  
8
 Because many share this method of moral reasoning, it should be noted that for some it really is a 
mixed theory that includes norms for actions (deontological), the respective duties that contestants 
have to one another.  
9
 Paul Weiss, Sport, 4.  
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fundamentally concerned with or attracted to excellence.
10
 Because others generally 
seek and appreciate this ideal, Weiss claims this pursuit of excellence ―is a truth that 
will surely hold as long as men compete with one another.‖
11
 A good athlete is a man 
who fulfills excellently his function per his role in a particular sport at a particular 
time. If we want to know what an athlete is, according to Weiss, we must understand 
this concept in relation to a good athlete—―to become excellent in and through the 
use of a body.‖
12
 Furthermore, as he pursues excellence, the athlete learns ―how he 
meets various tests, what it is that perfection demands, and what man can bodily do 
and be.‖
 13
 For Weiss, we humans appreciate the ideal of excellence as an end value 
because, ―It is what ought to be.‖
14
 He summarizes this appeal accordingly:  
Excellence excites and awes. It pleases and it challenges. We are often delighted 
by splendid specimens whether they be flowers, beasts or men. A superb 
performance interests even more because it reveals to us the magnitude of what 





Thus, we see that Weiss‘s philosophical starting point is an ethic of excellence. 
     Weiss discerns, according to his Aristotelian teleology, that there is a certain 
ordering among a diversity of things, such as flowers, beasts, and men.
16
 He observes 
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 Paul Weiss, Sport, 14, 17. See Randolph Feezell, Sport, Play and Ethical Reflection (Champaign, 
IL: Illinois University, 2006); cf. Feezell, ―Sport, Pursuit of Bodily Excellence or Play? An 
Examination of Paul Weiss‘s Account of Sport,‖ 257-270. Feezell examines Weiss‘s account of sport 
and insists that a more plausible explanation for why men (and women) seek the good of sport is 
―based on the classic accounts of play offered by Huizinga and Caillois‖ (Feezell, Sport, Play and 
Ethical Reflection, 5).  
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 Weiss, Sport, 14.  
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 Weiss, Sport, 36. 
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 Weiss, Sport, 142. 
14
 Weiss, Sport, 3. 
15
 Weiss, Sport, 3.  
16
 Paul Kuntz identifies in Weiss a cosmos that is law-abiding; there is an ordered-realism detected in 
the cosmos which gives directional structure to actualities (Paul Kuntz, ―Cosmos and Chaos: Weiss‘s 
Systematic Categorization of the Universe,‖ in The Philosophy of Paul Weiss, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn 
(Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 117-132.).  
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these indications of order as instances of excellence that we as rational creatures are 
able to appreciate.
17
 This ordering is natural, for there is a point to their movement; it 
is in this world that we observe this ordering-to-flourish.
18
 I interpret this common 
ordering as something Weiss believes to be inherent in the very nature of things. 
Weiss‘s approach implicitly draws from Aristotle‘s final cause, and when Aristotle‘s 
final cause is applied to sport, a young man as an athlete competes for the sake of 
bodily excellence, to excel athletically. Since they undertake sport for the sake of this 
end, bodily excellence—a mastery of the body—is what young men are striving for. 
Bodily excellence justifies sport, and it is a necessary condition for self-completion. 
This is Aristotle‘s telic principle for this cultural activity.
19
 It is important to note that 
this end is given metaphysical priority or value. Sport, like other things, has purpose, 
and this purpose is not arbitrarily set up, for it appears that Weiss‘s metaphysic (the 
nature of a thing) directs this end. Weiss gives due consideration to the object that 
young men desire in sport (bodily excellence) and that he deems as good because it 
functions as a referent for other and future performances. Equally, excellence is the 
end because it is the terminus of a sportive performance. Here Weiss treats ethics as 
a correlate of metaphysics, which means that purpose (telos) is a basis for values, or 
how we ought to act.  
     A Christian ethic, in particular that of John Paul II, affirms this discernible order 
as a natural law that addresses us, and because it exists (for this is the way things 
                                                 
17
 Weiss, Sport, 3. Weiss appears to give dignity to mankind and that some kind of hierarchy exists 
because men possess abilities, like appreciating excellence, which other beings do not. I investigate 
his metaphysical basis for this dignity more in chapter three.  
18
 O‘Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 31-52. It is quite apparent that I am indebted to Oliver 
O‘Donovan for my theoretical understanding of teleological foundations for sport and how this builds 
a bridge to my interpretation and application of John Paul II‘s ethic for sport.  
19
 Aristotle, Physics II.3 (194b 24ff). 
   79
are), it shapes how we ought to act. Moreover, this teleological pattern, as given in 
and thus, as it confronts humans in the created order, is the proper end that comes 
from God and returns to God (exitus et reditus).
20
 Each thing‘s existence is ordered 
by some larger, further purpose. Not to be directed toward this purpose results in 
moral disorder, both personally and socially. I made this concept explicit in the last 
chapter with Augustine. I will build on this idea when I argue for John Paul II‘s 
philosophical and theological concerns for sport. However, Weiss does anticipate the 
axiological significance of a larger purpose in his own exposition. 
    For Weiss, this ordering is not merely a horizontal ordering. Rather, he argues for 
some aspect of vertical ordering, presumably to depict a fuller teleology. That is, 
excellence is ordered to some higher value. I interpret this teleology as Platonic 
because sportive excellence is ordered to an eternal value. With an Aristotelian 
teleology, we focus purely on natural ordering; therefore, questions about 
transcendence lie outside his immanent teleology.
21
 However, Weiss includes a 
Platonic cosmology to complete his axiology of sport. He asserts that ―all men 
illustrate cosmic truths,‖ and it is when we identify with such ideals as truth, beauty, 
and goodness that we participate in and become acquainted with the eternal.
22
 Weiss 
believes it is through an athlete‘s body via excellent kinds of performances that she 
                                                 
20
 Following the lead of Thomas Aquinas, John Paul II accepts this thesis that the normative order is 
ultimately based on the metaphysical measure of being (Karol Wojtyla, ―On the Metaphysical and 
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incarnates or instantiates the eternality of the laws that govern the operation of her 
body.
23
 Here Weiss grounds values in a transcendent reality on which the meaning of 
mankind and excellence depend; these ideals obligate us to pursue excellence.
24
 It is 
when an athlete excels, just as it is for the artist, thinker, or religious man, that he 
epitomizes and articulates for all a true representation of mankind.
25
 Weiss‘s 
Platonism has him describe the athlete in action as one who should exemplify the 
corresponding form of excellence even if it is partial and distorted. Sport has value in 
so far as it resembles or participates in the form of excellence.  
    This vertical ordering proves important for a Christian ethic. This vertical 
ordering, according to O‘Donovan, steps onto theological ground, which John Paul II 
organizes as the supernatural end that is inseparably related to the natural ordering 
for such cultural activities as sport. What does this standard of excellence mean in 
regards to God rather than to Weiss‘s Platonic form, an abstract impersonal entity?
26
 
As Augustine argued, a personal God is the ultimate reality for a Christian ethic. 
Therefore, the basis of our obligation comes from God rather than from a 
metaphysical concept. What does this do to Weiss‘s claim that bodily excellence is 
the final cause? How do we relate sport to this ultimate end? Further, is the athlete 
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 Weiss, Sport, 247.  
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 Weiss, Sport, 247-248.  
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26
 In fairness, see Weiss‘s metaphysics below, Weiss makes a vague reference to God which in many 
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alone the true representation of man? If so, what does this claim imply for Christian 
doctrine concerning Christ as the true representation of mankind? Does it annul the 
goods relative to this creational good? Or might the seriousness of this ultimate end 
properly free an athlete to realize the goods in this non-serious mode of being-in-the-
world? John Paul II‘s transcendental teleology offers us a way forward to answer 
many of these questions.  
 
Anthropological Foundations: Human Nature and Sport 
 
     In his philosophical reflection, Weiss admits that his inquiry is ―what is close to 
the core of man, what he seeks, and what he does.‖
27
 Here Weiss, like Aristotle, 
includes in his teleology an understanding of the human person, or basic 
philosophical anthropology. As he examines the different theories that try to account 
for what is the fundamental attraction to sport, Weiss indicates that we must probe 
beyond the apparent by getting ―to an essential human disposition which achieves a 
distinctive expression in those who devote themselves to an athletic career.‖
28
 Keith 
Algozin interprets Weiss‘s inquiry as plausible because sport does indeed attract 
people universally, which is a clue that it is a basic tendency reflective of human 
nature.
29
 For Weiss, this ordering-to-flourish is intrinsic to the nature of mankind in 
                                                 
27
 Weiss, Sport, 4. Feezell objects that this ―fascination‖ of the athlete‘s participation and the 
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 Keith Algozin, ―Man and Sport,‖ in Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, eds., William Morgan and Klaus 
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an Aristotelian sense.
30
 Built into mankind is an inherent striving to make ourselves 
complete, and it is this self-completion that athletics provides: an amiable, ready 
opportunity for young men to experience their true end.
31
  
     Weiss‘s ―first principle‖ affirms that this attraction or desire for excellence 
uniquely pervades all human activities and that we are moved and inclined toward 
this good. Athletes aim at the good by nature, so for Weiss, the good life has to do 
with the athlete‘s telos and its actualization. Excellence demonstrated in sport depicts 
the virtuous life of an athlete who is pursuing and realizing the good of this art.
32
 
Aristotle writes: ―Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and human 
pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been 
declared to be that to which all things aim.‖
33
 This attraction is recognized not only 
by the most immediate participants—which for Weiss is primarily young men—but 
also as an ideal that ―interests almost everyone.‖ This very attraction is what Weiss 
sees as territory for philosophical speculation, for this quest to know and experience 
excellence has chiefly occupied philosophers in the kinds of matters they 
interrogate.
34
 Thus, human nature grounds his value of sport.  
                                                 
30
 For a thorough overview of a teleological ethic, assumed throughout this chapter, which draws from 
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     I believe Weiss‘s elevated view of humankind has him envisage sport as a school 
or practice for reaching those excellences that complete the athlete. The issue 
becomes how this school or practice comports with his teleology once it is more 
critically interpreted. MacIntyre argues that within this ―teleological scheme there is 
a fundamental contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-
if-he-realized-his-essential nature.‖
35
 Similarly, Weiss interprets the point of sport as 
an athlete carrying  
out to completion one of the types of effort everyone occasionally makes to be 
or to become an excellent man . . . . The excellence that the athlete wants to 
attain is an excellence greater than that attained before. He wants to do better 
than he had; he would like to do better than anyone ever did. What he once 
achieved and what he might now achieve is an excellence relative to some 
particular period of time and circumstance. At another time and on another 
occasion, a superior state or performance will perhaps be produced, thereby 
making clear that man‘s final limits had not been reached before. This is a truth 




     This perfectionist kind of ethic, i.e., constant improvement to become better, 
places the emphasis on what we can and should become as human beings in this 
athletic role; the athlete expresses to all of us ―what one might be were one also to 
operate at the limit of bodily capacity.‖
37
 Again, Weiss‘ anthropology presupposes 
that men possess this nature that aims toward perfection and excellence, ―a state 
where they feel fulfilled, somehow completed.‖
38
 What prevents superiority and 
dominance from overtaking Weiss‘s view of competitive athletics? Weiss 
unabashedly promulgates that a necessary feature of competition is an athlete who 
                                                                                                                                          
more pure, noble truths of the contemplative life (Weiss, Sport, 6). However, this was not completely 
true for Plato did recognize the educative value of sport (Daniel A. Dombrowski, ―Plato and 
Athletics,‖ 29-38.).  
35
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 52.  
36
 Weiss, Sport, 13, 14. 
37
 Weiss, Sport, 14. 
38
 Weiss, Sport, 13. 
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desires and attempts to win or to defeat his opponent; strategy and means are to 
assume sport-specific forms that ―will enable him to outdistance all.‖
39
 Thus, it is 
clear that, for Weiss, striving for excellence is only half of the picture because 
achieving excellence in a comparative sense is what identifies the athlete with what 
is lasting or eternal.
40
 Though the spectator may recognize the eternal possibilities in 
the striving, only the athlete who participates in sport can achieve sportive excellence 
and thus can epitomize the well-embodied, ideal portrait of mankind.
41
 
     For a Christian ethic, I grant that a Christian mode of response often does overlap 
with a secular ethic because of our shared humanity and common perceptions about 
certain aspects of the world we inhabit together. Weiss recognizes the importance of 
an overriding conception of the telos for sportspersons, without which his account of 
sport virtues appears fragmentary.
42
 John Paul II also regards sport as a pursuit of 
excellence, for our human constitution is such that we will or intend the kind of 
goods and values that satisfy and fulfill our persons. We are attracted to these kinds 
of goods. However, if a Christian ethic arises from a definite worldview, then it is 
imperative that we think Christianly about the reality of sport and its basic moral 
questions, which means there will be substantive, if not radical, differences between 
a Christian ethic and a secular ethic.  
     In the next chapter, we take up John Paul II‘s own outlook as shaped by his 
Christian perception of reality. John Paul II‘s outlook is an occasion for a fresh study 
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because of the traditional/historical neglect in Christian ethics and sport. John Paul II 
departs from Weiss in that he filters all his moral teachings through his personalistic 
norm. Thus, the dignity of personhood organizes what he says about sport and the 
concomitant goods internal and external to this cultural activity. Personalism 
considers ethical questions ―from within,‖ which John Paul II turns to 
phenomenology in order to understand the subject‘s experiences. This means that, for 
sport, a subject does not merely act or relate as an objective being or to other persons 
(a Thomistic given), but the subject experiences his play as his own.
43
 So what? John 
Paul II believes it is the primacy of persons revealed through their actions that 
obligates us to compete fairly and to strive toward excellence. In Love and 
Responsibility, one of his first major philosophical works to assume the philosophical 
anthropology set forth in The Acting Person,
44
 John Paul II lays the principles for a 
personalistic norm that warrants all of what he said about the human person.
45
 In 
particular, it lays the groundwork for chapter three of this thesis. That is, 
―…whenever a person is the object of your activity, remember that you must not treat 
that person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but must allow for the fact 
that he or she, too, has, or at least should have, distinct personal ends.‖
46
 Our duties 
arise in relation to who we are as persons.  
                                                 
43
 Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, trans. Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 
1979), 42. Wojtyla offers a new interpretation of the moral self by synthesizing ontology and 
phenomenology. See Rocco Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope 
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Wadsworth, 2001), 46-63.  
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 Rocco Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla, 90.  
46
 Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, trans. H.T. Willetts (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1982), 
28. 
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     Like MacIntyre in After Virtue, Weiss fails to offer us a metaphysic concerning 
the human person, so what obligates us is some ideal of excellence that he assumes 
attracts us as human beings. Excellence is tied to our humanity, but we are not told 
much about who we are other than how function, what an athlete does, is intimately 
connected to an athlete‘s essential human nature. Perhaps Weiss foresaw what (early) 
MacIntyre did, in that they both wish to propose a secular teleology that avoids 
Aristotle‘s metaphysical biology. Not so for John Paul II; his personalist 
anthropology derives our treatment of others in sport and life directly from our 
human worth and dignity. Yet, this worth is not to be detached from its religious 
roots, for this worth signifies the transcendent character of human nature as the work 
of God himself. John Paul II avoids anthropomorphism because he does not begin 
with man as the chief value; the humanum makes sense by virtue of the divinum, God 
as the ultimate source of all values. In particular, sportive actions proceed from 
human persons who possess a God-given value prior to acting. Before a human being 
becomes an athlete or assumes any other specific role, he is a human.
47
 For John Paul 
II,
48
 this means that the athlete as the author of his sportive actions has a 
metaphysical priority over what he does. Sport praxis presupposes a human being 
who already exists and who happens to be playing sport. Furthermore, as a human, 
the athlete has unique ends specific to sport, but these ends are subordinate to the 
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 See Vernon Bourke, Ethics: A Textbook in Moral Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
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ultimate, human end. Therefore, a sportsperson‘s value envisages excellence in 
relation to who we are as God‘s image bearers and how excellence as an aspect of 
persons is a good that fulfills us as human beings. This Christian understanding of 
excellence is not less than Weiss‘s claim concerning the athlete in his pursuit of 
bodily excellence, but it surpasses Weiss‘s basis. Again, the issue of goodness in 
relation to God and the metaphysical priority of the human, no matter the cultural 
role, lie at the heart of the next chapter concerning John Paul II‘s personalistic ethic 
and sport.  
 
Platonic Participation and Ascent 
 
     Certainly, Weiss‘s theory of sport commends a holistic understanding of 
excellence in that he incorporates bodily goods into his structure of excellence. 
Because of Weiss‘s indebtedness to ancient Greece, for humans, excellence (arete) is 
not only an intellectual and moral matter, but also an ideal that can be applied to all 
of life.
49
 Excellence applies to things that actualize their potency. Yet, at the end of 
chapter two when Weiss concludes that athletes strive to complete themselves, he 
expounds on his doctrine of being, claiming that each person is imperfect and 
incomplete.
50
 What does he mean? What is the importance of this doctrine of being 
in relation to his theory of sport? Is he separating goodness (excellence) from 
existence itself? If so, is existence something that must be proven or achieved in 
order to identify a thing with the fullness of being? 
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     Weiss infers from metaphysical and anthropological reflection that each reality 
has an internal horizontal relationship to other particular realities and that mankind is 
not to confuse its reality with other realities.
51
 In their ordering alongside each other, 
some realities are alien, congenial, useful, and injurious.
52
 I understand him to mean 
that mankind as a reality relates and is ordered to other realities in a variety of ways, 
whether they be generic, teleological, or contingent.
53
 In his estimation, man is 
conscious of these other beings, and his ability to transcend time, space, and 
individuality enables him to identify the roles and differences that each reality has 
with the others. Further, this ordering among the particulars causes him to conclude 
that, because mankind is distinct and independent, humanity is only part of the whole 
of reality.
54
 Weiss‘s actualities share a common, ordered universe based on an order 
of kind and end. His cosmos ―is an interrelated dynamic whole...that is intelligible.‖
55
 
However, following the above Platonic distinction, if man as a part of the whole is 
incomplete, then to be fully real, Weiss claims that man ―must lack nothing; he and 
they must therefore be one.‖ Though imprecise, Weiss‘s language bears ontological 
implications.  
     If I interpret him correctly, then being itself, according to the nature of a thing, is 
insufficient; therefore, the thing is incomplete in its existence. So for Weiss, in order 
to alter this condition of our existence, we must strive toward unity with other 
                                                 
51
 For a more detailed metaphysic on how actualities relate to other actualities and to final reality, 
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beings. By virtue of its incompleteness, existence is not good. Therefore, because of 
his causal efficacy, the athlete must perform acts that complete him—that make him 
good in the sense of his existence. Let us examine my understanding of Weiss in 
more detail on what I believe is critical to his notion of excellence.  
     Weiss‘ metaphysical reflection states that, when we observe our world, we see 
that it is impure and corrupt.
56
 For him, this is the way things are. Corruption inheres 
in an actuality. In my interpretation, Weiss never accounts for why this corruption 
exists. What is wrong with this world? Corruption or evil is a given. It is located in 
actualities themselves indicated by the reality that they lack something in their being. 
This lack (in their being) is only overcome as they participate in finalities en route to 
self-completion. Weiss‘s universe depends on limited defective goods.
57
 Wherever 
there is finitude, there is evil or corruption. Though Weiss apparently contradicts 
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 Weiss, Sport, 6. Weiss makes this point in reaction to Aristotle. According to Aristotle, since God 
preoccupies himself with the most pure and noble thoughts, then our philosophical investigations 
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 Paul Weiss, Man‟s Freedom (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), 243-248. 
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himself at places,
58




     In Sport, it is the existence of ideals like excellence that constitutes a higher 
degree of reality. The same ideals necessitate a corrective to cure the problem and the 
fact that particular things live in and under the ―remorseless flux of time.‖
60
 As 
humans, because we are situated in a world of restless change, we must be awakened 
to this hierarchy by living virtuously in sport and life in order to enhance such 
permanent values. These values lift us out to what is objective, permanent, and true.
61
 
This dualism is redolent of Plato‘s cosmos in which the Forms are real, and sensible 
things are only semi-real. Dualism implies that our finitude is itself a lack of good. 
Because Weiss‘s philosophical narrative rejects an original creation, ex nihilo,
62
 and 
a human fall from grace, I believe that Weiss assumes the Greek conception that 
corruption and disorder are intrinsic to the material world rather than the Augustinian 
conception that evil is the result of human rebellion, a disordered exercise of free 
will. If this world is impure and corrupt, then my interpretation of Weiss seems 
plausible both to account for what he explicitly declares and to make sense of his 
own gaps. This lack of good is a corruption and therefore ―to be‖ is it to be 
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incomplete.
63
 According to Weiss, ―to be‖ is convertible with an incomplete 
actuality.
64
 Furthermore, he elsewhere insists that, when we compare ourselves to 
God in the scale of being, we stand guilty and unable to measure up in the presence 
of the Good.
65
 Human beings are guilty by virtue of existing. Our finitude is a fault 
that positions humans as guilty before God. Because we are finite, guilt is required 
by the nature of our being.  
     According to Christian ethics, creation is fundamentally good, but according to 
Weiss, embodiment and finitude lack in an important sense. Based on the Creator-
creature distinction, a creature will never possess the same fullness of being that its 
source has. For Christian theology, created realities cannot equal their Creator in 
plenitude of being. Thus, Weiss appears to seek a solution to a problem that does not 
metaphysically exist for Christian theology and that, when ignored, results in 
violence to the existence of an actuality. It also erases an ontological boundary that 
exists between God and his creation now and forevermore. When this ontological 
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ontology. However, Reck asserts that this formula of incompleteness pervades all his later thinking, 
and beside the fact Weiss, in Sport, operates from this ontology (Reck, ―The Five Ontologies of Paul 
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guilty as substantial entities because their being when put beside finality like God lacks the fullness of 
his being. I am not sure how hope ever figures in because this appears to be a never-ending struggle 
unless pantheism is accepted so that our being is absorbed into the Ultimate itself, where are all such 
good and evil distinctions are irrelevant. Weiss dogmatically avers that even God cannot atone for the 
absolute guilt native to our human constitution for this obligation can never be fulfilled (Weiss, Man‟s 
Freedom, 262.). 
   92
boundary is forsaken, we find created realities idolatrously attempting to bridge an 
impossible gulf; they fail to remember that they are utterly dependent thanks to their 
created reality. I argue that, when suspended from his Platonic metaphysic, Weiss‘s 
notion of excellence commits his athlete in action to seek escape from this transient 
world through bodily performances. These bodily performances, as they participate 
in excellence, are a ladder-like ascent to the ideal. If Plato‘s ideal man, the 
philosopher-king, sought philosophical salvation, then Weiss‘s ideal athlete seeks 
athletic salvation. The nature of my argument pieces together a number of reasons 
that I believe my hypothesis best explains.  
Turn from and Turn to the Sportive Ideal    
     Weiss claims that, like others, athletes ―turn from the world of common sense and 
its practical demands to try to come to grips with distinct finalities.‖
66
 Initially, this 
metaphor seems to advocate one of the chief characteristics of sport as play or 
games. That is, play is a free activity that stands outside ordinary life and yet is 
permeated with both seriousness and non-seriousness. Johann Huizinga refers to play 
as an ―an absolute and peculiar order.‖
67
 Thus, an athlete ―turns‖ in the sense of 
stepping out of real life. Every sport or game has its own distinctive order, time, 
space, and dynamics that are unique to its function.
68
 The sport world is separate 
from the ordinary world. However, even if Weiss intends to respect the structure of 
                                                 
66
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play, which is odd in light of his overall stance toward play, he includes other men 
(e.g., ethicist, artist, scholar, religious believer) in the ―turn‖ from this world to the 
ultimate and everlasting.
69
 He includes these other roles as examples because they, 
like his athlete, seek to break free from the ordinary world in order to contemplate 
and attain the eternal possibilities of truth, beauty, and goodness.
70
 Weiss makes the 
point that this metaphor communicates something about the structure of reality. The 
practical demands originate in this material world, and Weiss aims for the world 
beyond, over this world, because the material world depends on the everlasting. Even 
if sport at its very best functions as a Platonic microcosm of the ideal realm, it is still 
embedded in a transient, material world. Since the goal is to ascend to a higher 
reality, these other roles like Weiss‘s athlete are part of a vital struggle to produce a 
result and obtain an ideal that links them to the ultimate.
71
 Weiss states, ―The more a 
man cuts himself off from the world around him, in order to identify himself with 
what is ultimately real, the more he opens himself up to the presence of Actuality.‖
72
 
When this identification occurs, the athlete identifies himself with what is ultimately 
real, facing and opening himself to Actuality (see below). He is ―caught up and 
almost swallowed in the role of ideal athlete.‖
73
 Plato‘s ideal man becomes the ideal 
athlete. For Weiss, this identification becomes the common referent that excellence 
in this world corresponds to in the Platonic supra-sensible realm. And it is in this 
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     Like Plato,
75
 Weiss conceives the doctrine of participation as a means of making 
sense of the one and many; it unifies particular things because they have reality by 
virtue of something they presently share with Actuality. Actuality is that finality as 
an ultimate being that everything is oriented to and that ―related particulars equally 
participate in.‖
76
 For an athlete, this oneness culminates when he has learned 
properly to deal with other realities so he can accept and become one with his body.
77
 
If the athlete must become one with everything so that he lacks nothing, then he 
becomes excellent or good when informed by Actuality, a transcendent reality. In 
Philosophy in Process, Weiss prepared the way for his metaphysics in Sport: ―The 
excellence of Actuality is mediated by the athlete in his dedication or self-sacrifice. 
He in effect is saying to all men ―we are‖.‖
78
 This transcendent reality means, 
furthermore, that an athlete participates in ―that which is in fact and forever the case‖ 
as he becomes one with his body, a habit of dedication, because he refers or points to 
Actuality.
79
 It is the mode of being that sustains such contingent resemblances of 
excellence. In summary, Actuality functions as a Platonic Form in which athletes and 
others participate as they strive to exhibit excellence.  
     Some might object that this read of Weiss forces some kind of religious 
philosophy of sport. However, Weiss regularly argues by using religious analogies to 
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illumine the world of the athlete. He witnesses similarities and dissimilarities 
between these two modes of being-in-this-world. In fact, I argue below that Weiss 
employs an ascent metaphor, which is commonplace in certain religious traditions 
that assume an objective, transcendent referent that embodied activities serve. In 
chapter ten, Weiss even invokes the language of ceremony to depict the almost 
sacred space of games, for games, like religious ceremonies, are bounded events 
framed in formality and solemnity. Moreover, Weiss reclaims this religious import 
for his own metaphysic: ―An athlete once was, and still can be, treated as a sacred 
being who embodies something of the divine in him. He is credited with the dignity 
of embodying a supreme value.‖
80
 He goes on to say that this value, as expressed in 
bodily excellence, qualifies a more remote reality. Of course, Weiss admits that 
today these ceremonies are secular even though the athletes themselves carry this 
divine value. Moreover, Kuntz, drawing from Weiss‘s other works, claims that 
Weiss‘s metaphysic is religious because his athlete opens himself up and relates to 
―superior being.‖
81
 He concludes that Weiss‘s religious philosophy of sport is 
consistent with French Catholicism in the nineteen and twenty century.  
Virtues toward the Ideal: An Aretaic Scheme  
     After establishing this obligatory turn to the Platonic Ideal, Weiss compares the 
struggle in the pursuit for wisdom with the struggle inherent in an athletic contest. 
For Weiss, both struggles aspire to participate in and contemplate higher truths. Once 
again, excellence or arete is the chief end for Weiss. Heather Reid argues that this 
link between the struggle for wisdom and the struggle demanded by athletic agon 
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resonates with Plato‘s moral education in the Republic.
82
 Activities such as physical 
training and competition were parts of gymnastikê for the sake of cultivating 
excellence.
83
 In the Republic Book VII, after explaining the allegory of the Cave, 
Socrates delineates the goal of education by using the turn metaphor (518b-519b). 
The turn metaphor says that the human psyche must transcend earthly matters by 
turning away from the world of the shadows in order to come to grips with the 
enduring reality of the Forms. For Weiss, this turning away disassociates an athlete 
from the fruits of his labors (e.g., fame, fortune, and money) and pushes aside the 
practical demands located in this world so that the sportive domain can mirror the 
characteristic particulars of the ideal Good.
84
  
    Kuntz identifies this classical theme of education (paideia) in Weiss under Kuntz‘s 
discussion of discipline.
85
 Though this theme is more developed in Philosophy in 
Process than in Sport, discipline is a form of training or craft, and it is the means for 
attaining sportive excellence and drawing out gifts to be actualized in sport. Kuntz 
references how discipline functions metaphysically for Weiss under the Ideal:  
When we try to see what such an activity as sport is trying to do we can use . . 
. a kind of chart. Like every enterprise concerned with the realm of paideia it 
is concerned with improving men, of helping them attain excellence. It must 
make him healthy (Actuality), self disciplined, restrained (Ideal), adjusted 




     In Sport, Weiss develops discipline more along the lines of dedication. Sport is an 
opportunity for the dedicated (virtuous) athlete to accept, identify, continue, unite, 
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coordinate, and extend himself—as a body—freely through and with other objects or 
items (like equipment) beyond his body.
87
 Sport is where desire brings forth ―acts 
which are relevant to the realization of a prospect focused on.‖
88
 If the athlete 
effectively dedicates his body because the body has been conditioned and trained, 
then the athlete has fulfilled his role with excellence. If the purpose of sport is 
excellent performances, then this last point gives attention to how the acts, skills, and 
traits (dedication) allow an athlete to pursue his practice successfully, thus 
actualizing his potential. More precisely, Weiss envisages the good athlete as well-
coordinated, which involves the dynamic combination of three things:
89
 1) Accuracy 
is ―a willed arrival at a selected target. It is an achievement,‖ 2) ―Skill is the acquired 
ability to accomplish an act with minimal waste and delay,‖ and 3) ―Gracefulness is a 
quality adorning smooth, harmonious movement. It pleases.‖ All three things help 
form the human good in sport. Again, this conception of good is consistent with an 
aretaic ethic, for the good life is not static: it requires acts consistent with virtues that 
comprise and lead to a sportive good.  
     Weiss painstakingly describes the lived experience of the complex, decisive acts 
or bodily moves in sport. The disaccord—perhaps read defects and vices, which 
Weiss argues is more true for men than women—between the body and mind is 
corrected as moves are modified, mastered, habituated, and perfected from 
instruction and through practices so that men are made to do something well.
90
 
                                                 
87
 Weiss, Sport, 73-74. Weiss describes the telic structure in sport most vividly in chapter 4. His 
choice of terms (attention, desire, intention, commitment, dedication) shape and contribute what 
constitutes the human telos as identified and textured by the athlete‘s role.  
88
 Paul Weiss, Sport, 59. 
89
 Weiss, Sport, 127. Cf. Kuntz, ―Paul Weiss,‖ 176. 
90
 Weiss, Sport, 42-47. 
   98
MacIntyre‘s concept of a practice illumines Weiss‘s descriptive account of the 
―moves‖ and ―acts,‖ which I interpret more as the distinct techniques or skills 
exercised by the sport practitioner.
91
 These parts constitute the practice itself with an 
internal good, such as excellence, that is realized through attention, commitment, 
endurance, and dedication. Thus, the skills, traits, or virtues point us to the telos, 
pivotally serving as a means to the attended and future prospect of excellence. 
Weiss‘s explication of sport practices encapsulates one of the many brilliant insights 
his vision of sports tenders in conjunction with a teleological structure. I might add 
that this application of practices, as described phenomenologically, was developed 
well before the steady stream of philosophers who saw the cash value of this concept 
mined more from MacIntyre‘s After Virtue, which was written fifteen years later.   
      So, what preeminently constitutes the athletes‘ telos? Weiss concentrates on 
dedication as the primary evaluative criteria for what ―marks‖ an athlete for 
excellence.
92
 According to Weiss, dedication coordinates an athlete‘s intentions, 
desires, and inclinations in light of the sport‘s telos, ―the obligating end‖.
93
 This 
dedication determines which actions are virtuous, enabling the achievement of this 
prospect or preferred sportive end, and which actions are undesirable, preventing his 
self-completion.
94
 This self-completion is imperative, for Weiss thinks that 
dedication as an active character trait must be regularly rekindled through obvious 
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rewards, extrinsic motivation, and ―tales of glory‖ so that the athlete senses the great 
value that sport merits from giving oneself to it completely.
95
  
     Dombrowski adds to this discussion, if not remedying Weiss‘s neglect to 
explicitly develop this Platonic distinction more, concerning Weiss‘s method since 
he recognizes within this athletic striving a Platonic distinction that proves important 
for achieving excellence. That is, pursue excellence with moderation (sophrosyne). 
The athlete must respectfully learn when and how to master his own body and the 
bodies of others while at the same time remaining himself by accepting his own 
bodily limitations.
96
 This balance or moderation is the means to self-completion. 
Dombroski notes that Weiss draws directly from Plato (Sophist 247E), for the 
dynamic power (dynamis) is what affects others and is affected by others in the give-
and-take interchange of seeking harmony while pursuing sportive excellence.  
     If a good athlete fulfils his function specifically by striving ―to have a fine body 
and to use it well,‖
97
 then Weiss appears to align himself (rather nostalgically) with 
the Roman ideal of a sound mind in a sound body (mens sana in corpore sano):  
An interest in a splendid body does not of course preclude thought. He who 
improves his body and uses it well must use his mind; he needs sound 
knowledge of fundamentals, good judgment of what a situation involves, and an 




Weiss is conscious of an ideal of perfection. The body realizes excellent per-
formances when the mind supervises and serves the body. The mind itself ―has 
learned a good deal about ideals, abstract categories and logical consequences,‖ 
                                                 
95
 Weiss, Sport, 67. 
96
 Dombrowski, Contemporary Athletics, 42-43; Weiss, Sport, 34-35.  
97
 Weiss, Sport, 13. 
98
 Weiss, Sport, 12-13. Italics are mine for emphasis. 
   100
which Weiss believes informs and dictates what the body ought to do.
99
 Perhaps it 
would be best to classify his anthropology as a form of dualism, an interplay which 
he admits is more mystery than solid fact.
100
 He states, 
The body is, of course, a precondition for the exercise of some, and perhaps 
even all, mental functions. This fact is sufficient to make it desirable to cultivate 
the body, and to consider the body seriously in any attempt at understanding the 




I take up this dualism and its problems more in the next chapter.  
     On a more technical side, Weiss speaks about this mind-body relationship in 
terms of a ―vector‖, a mathematical metaphor, to describe phenomenologically how 
the mind provides direction (i.e., purpose and intent) and service for the body so that 
the real goods of the body will be realized and produced. In effect, sport offers an 
opportunity for unified existence through this harmony of mind and body.
102
 Implied 
throughout this ordering of the body to the mind is a struggle, for the body makes 
demands; therefore, the athlete must get the body to conform to the mind‘s 
understanding of the true ideals. The athlete must correct the vectoral thrust; he must 
alter the body by self-mastery.
103
 This sense of an ordered direction is in keeping 
with his transcendent structure or ascent. Weiss situates his analysis in a metaphysic 
that recognizes both the realism of ideals,
104
 and a hierarchy or scale of living beings 
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with higher organisms embodying thought or intelligence to ―dictate what the body is 
to do.‖
105
 Because of his teleological ethic,
106
 I think it is a fair reading of Weiss, in 
the same way I read MacIntyre, to see that he deliberately avoids divorcing the 
essence of human nature (what something is) from its function and purpose in any 
way. Against antirealism, Weiss relates this purpose or ordering to the laws or 
structures (―cosmic truths‖) that all humans carry or embody.
107
 
     If we see that Augustine struggled at times with the sensuous life, then it is from 
John Paul II that we gain the meaning and theology of the body according to his 
theological anthropology.
108
 The meaning of the body is another major theme for the 
next chapter, so I postpone any substantive interaction with this theme and sport until 
then, save for a few preliminary points. In an address to athletes, John Paul II makes 
it clear that his understanding of the body is central to his view of the person in 
sport.
109
 His anthropology denies any form of dualism, for he recalls from church 
fathers that ―neither the soul, nor the body, on their own, is a man, but rather, he who 
we call by this name that which is born from the union of these.‖
110
 Because of this 
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unity, the body shares in the dignity that God confers in and through us as image 
bearers. In the sportive world, the athlete‘s body manifests how he acts. The body 
then is a sign that not only signifies the transcendent reality, but that also 
simultaneously gives the spiritual reality to us. For sport, this means that, if the body 
is a sacrament, then Christian athletes are called to act as God‘s representatives. 
When Christian sportspersons act as God acts, they physically image God. At the 
core of this self-communication for a Christian sportsperson is the virtue of love. If 
he truly loves the contestant, he must self-donate in and through a physical body. 
When the athlete fails to do this, John Paul II argues that he maligns himself and 
others because he has put himself at the service of sport instead of sport at the service 
of the human person. The paradigm of this self-giving love is grounded in the person 
and incarnation of Christ. For John Paul II, who cites regularly from Gaudium et spes 
of Vatican II, Christ is the source of truth about the human person. Since this 
paradigm is true, this paradigm raises an important question: Is sport about excellent 
performances or maximal achievements, or is it about sacrificially giving to others in 
a manner that furthers their own good? Are these two purposes mutually exclusive? 
If Christ is the center of history, and if Weiss‘s aim is for immortality, how does this 
aim displace Christ by placing the athlete‘s actions at the centre? I will explore these 
questions in relation to Weiss‘s main thesis in the next chapter.  
     Reid points out another example from Plato in the Phaedrus, namely, that this 
struggle for arete is described with an athletic analogy ―as an upward climb toward 
truth and divinity.‖ 
111
 Plato and Weiss both depict the struggle with a spatial 
metaphor that requires the athlete to look up and ascend to the eternal. How do they 
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ascend? The bodily goods of sport are construed as ascending toward the eternal 
realm via participation in the eternal realm. The athlete makes himself effective by 
identifying with the ―persistent laws which cover the operation of that body.‖
112
 
Because sport is situated in Weiss‘s ordered cosmos, Weiss follows Plato in saying 
that there are laws that give the body‘s proportion, measure, and harmony. When an 
athlete identifies himself with this reality through his excellent acts, he meaningfully 







 and evidencing the eternal. That is, 
excellent performances correspond to what is eternally true (sub specie 
aeternitatis).
116
 Weiss‘s actualities must lack something for they, and the athlete in 
particular, only benefit from such reality as they participate in this higher 
metaphysical realm. Athletes illustrate cosmic truths insofar as they embody 
realities--both as local matter and the meaning of mankind--that last forever.
117
 
Weiss summarizes accordingly: 
The athlete unites his local matter with the meaning of mankind, enriched and 
mediated by the meaning of excellence which he seeks to embody. When he 
understands himself to encompass these two abiding components and to provide 
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Eternal over the Temporal  
 
     Weiss equates the mathematician with the athlete because they both ―are 
acquainted with the eternal in many ways.‖
119
 Toward the end of his ―Metaphysical 
Excursus,‖ his final chapter in Sport, Weiss references mathematics as part of the 
intelligible realm that the mathematician accesses through contemplation. This 
reality abides forever because it is above the world that decays and passes away. In 
the Republic book VII (525-527c), Plato emphasizes mathematics‘ educational value 
because it turns ―the soul around, away from becoming and towards truth and being‖ 
(525c). Math is an exemplar of the world of the Forms. If math allows us to 
acknowledge Forms, then in a like manner, so does the athlete when he acts.
120
 Why 
this equation? I believe the most plausible explanation comes from Weiss‘s stance 
that only those who identify themselves with eternality receive benefits. As 
theoretical man, the mathematician attains the eternality of the laws that govern math 
when he contemplates, and as practical man, the athlete attains this same eternality 
when he seeks to achieve excellence with maximum effect by making his body his 
servant in his sport.
121
 According to Plato, genuine knowledge occurs when we focus 
on the Forms because they are unchanging and eternal. Similarly, Weiss‘s athlete 
sees his acts become eternalized when he bodily attends to and unites himself with 
ideals such as excellence. Excellence removes the athlete from the world of 
becoming and lifts him to the realm of Being that always is and never becomes. 
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Weiss states that this eternalizing applies to those individuals who get taken up and 
almost absorbed in the role of ideal athlete.
122
 This state of affairs, like the truth 
value of a proposition, remains true, according to Weiss, even if others differ or lack 
the realization to agree with this truth.  
     If I am correctly discerning how Weiss, similar to Plato, privileges the invisible 
and eternal over the visible and temporal, then his ascent aims at an ontological 
union that overcomes the vicissitudes of life and escapes the flux of the sensible 
world--a strange world indeed for Weiss. Weiss himself corroborates this idea: 
When we attend to any truth we remove ourselves from the transient world, 
becoming one with eternity. The athlete, in his commitment, vivifies this fact. 
He not only represents all mankind—as we all do—when he judges and knows; 
he represents it in his effort to achieve a maximal result in his sport. The world 
of sport intensifies the meanings which any man in the course of his life 
inevitably expresses in his judgments and decisions. The athlete is sport 
incarnated, sport instantiated, sport located for the moment, and by that fact is 




Immortality and Records: Participation in the Eternal  
     Because of his Platonic participation thesis, Weiss explicitly contends that 
participating in what is eternal eventuates in immortality. Without rehearsing Plato‘s 
arguments for immortality from the Phaedo (which is unnecessary because he simply 
assumes immortality), Weiss references immortality as an index for what bodily 
excellence attains even if modernity distrusts such notions. Indeed, many athletes fail 
to illustrate the kinds of performances that illustrate eternity.
124
 Furthermore, Weiss 
admits that, although athletic bodies decay and eventually cease to exist, there is 
something that survives death. According to Weiss, when the athlete incarnates those 
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enduring laws pertaining to the body (though as an individual he passes away), ―he 
has made himself into a place where those laws for the moment are.‖
125
 At the 
moment the athlete embodies an ideal of truth, goodness, and beauty, he abides 
forever (in the loosest sense pertaining to personal identity)--or more precisely, his 
performance as it participates in the realm of ideas continues in the eternal hall of 
fame. The latter point is important because Weiss says that individuality is irrelevant 
that personal identity in fact passes away, but that the bodily performance is 
identified with the role of the ideal athlete.  
     Watson advances the thesis that Weiss‘s discussion of immortality is consistent 
with his logic and conception of excellence.
126
 That is, because of mankind‘s 
essential human disposition, the value of excellence attracts men like a magnet, and 
this attraction moves the athlete to strive for maximal performances that resemble the 
good and ―achieve some form of immortality in a more permanent, ultimate, or ideal 
realty.‖
127
 Furthermore, Watson infers from Weiss that what follows from this 
concern for excellence is the quest for records.
128
 The quest for records completely 
expresses the concern for excellence in that records offer the possibility for 
transcendence and immortality. In his trenchant analysis of modern sport, Guttmann 
distinguishes records as a major characteristic that differentiates Greek athletics from 
modern sport.
129
 That being said, Guttmann concludes that, in spite of these 
differences, the very setting of records has become ―a uniquely modern form of 
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immortality.‖
130
 Though records themselves are imperfect indicators of achievement 
for a variety of reasons that Weiss puts forth,
131
 nonetheless, Weiss asserts that, ―the 
ultimate object of all athletic records is to set down the best results that men have 
brought about, severally and together, in public matches under well-established 
conditions, governed by rules and competent judges.‖
132
 Thanks to Watson, I believe 
that Weiss emphasizes the quest for records because he is committed to the Platonic 
prime value of excellence. If excellence underlies the reach for immortality, then the 
dynamism of these two together grounds the quest for records in Weiss‘s inquiry of 
sport. Spencer Wertz avows that Weiss, Novak, and Keating all depend on this quest 
for superiority and eminence because it was and is still a goal that has dominated 
Western man, beginning with the Greek ideal in sport.
133
 He quotes Keating, who 
says that maximal effort is the chief value of sport, which this quest abides in its 
power to communicate and employ the athlete‘s true potential. For Wertz, this 
plainly speaks of transcendence. Though records may not have been a distinguishing 
characteristic of sport in ancient Greece, ancient and modern sports both find 
significant continuity in Weiss with his dual emphasis on excellence and 
immortality.  
Heroic Ideals: Attracted to Self-Completeness  
     Weiss‘s aretaic scheme suggests an implicit, if not direct, relationship between 
excellence and the heroic, with the heroic hypothesis being mainly concerned with 
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young men. Weiss focuses on young men who are attracted to athletics ―because it 
offers them the most promising means for becoming excellent.‖
134
 That is, these 
young men are poised at this time in their lives to succeed more at sport rather than 
in other, more profound, ways.
135
 Young men readily occupy themselves with this 
pursuit of excellence because it is easier to ―master their bodies,‖ distinguish, and 
fulfill themselves by pursuing sport at this stage of their development than by 
pursuing other means of achieving excellence. In other words, this practice 
commends itself to the nature of young men—striving is warranted by their own 
emotional make-up, capacities, and abilities—better than other practices (i.e., piety, 
wisdom, success in business, etc.), which demand more maturity than they are yet 
capable of in their pursuit and performance of excellence. Without contesting his 
thesis about young men (with which I fundamentally disagree), I want to focus on 
this link with the hero.
136
  
     Once again, Weiss plainly believes that the pursuit of excellence is the attraction 
of athletics, and though not everyone experiences it, sport exhibits ―what man at his 
best can do.‖
137
 The focus is on those bodily acts and performances that indicate 
excellence. What is admired is that this feat visibly communicates a mastery or 
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oneness with the body--a bodily good. However, Weiss unapologetically holds that 
when these ideals are realized in sport, they put the athlete ―over and against the rest 
of men. Mankind looks on him [the athlete] somewhat the way it looks on glamorous 
women, the worldly successful, and the hero.‖
138
  
     Why does Weiss conceptually connect excellence with hero? Because athletes 
experience this kind of flourishing, self-completeness, their ―set apartness‖ becomes 
a true representation of the ideal man in harmony with his body. Their excellence 
exhibits a power that we recognize and confer on others at the far end of human 
promise; the promise are the noble ideals realized through an effective use of the 
body.
139
 Weiss focuses on heroism as greatness. He considers greatness to be most 
about young men and their individual achievements, which link them to transcendent 
ideals. However, contrary to Weiss‘s opinion, greatness is not merely a bodily good, 
nor is it the concept of a hero separate from the moral category. To be sure, Weiss 
would not disagree about moral excellence, but as Dombrowski perceptively 
recognizes, Weiss borders on ―resigning the young athlete merely to the kalos half of 
the more complete Greek ideal of kalokagathia, to physical excellence without the 
intellectual, to kalos without agathos.‖
140
 I believe Weiss‘s presentation of the hero 
supports this primary focus on physical excellence, especially since he includes the 
athlete in a category with other occupations where bodily goods and actions are 
inordinately prized as the qualities favored and honored by the public. What about 
the athlete who stops to help a fallen opponent even if it might prevent him from 
achieving bodily excellence? If Weiss keeps moral and intellectual excellences in the 
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shadows, then he undervalues these other traits, because they equally contribute to 
the qualities that make heroes. Fireman, teachers, and police officers might not 
receive the adulation that an athlete does, not because they are any less of heroes, but 
because we lack a full understanding of what qualifies as a hero. Weiss so believes in 
excellence embodied in athletics that when he later contrasts the hero in war to the 
hero in sports, he reiterates that the desire in sport is for the hero—something athletes 
strive for—because the nature of the game arouses, promotes, and sustains those very 
virtues that contribute to the making of a hero.
141
 How does the contest itself promote 
the hero? 
    Though Weiss clearly suspends any strong association between sport and warfare 
(which in ancient Greece instrumentalized sport), it nevertheless makes sense for 
Weiss to ally arête with honor as was done for the classical hero because sport is a 
medium of self-fulfillment. Jernej Pisk highlights that contests gave classical heroes 
an opportunity to demonstrate arete, which strengthened their role in society.
142
 In 
that culture, the goal was to gain public honor and to avoid shame. The love of 
victory spurred these athletes on because successful achievement offered them the 
glory of immortality, to be forever remembered. Victory proved who was better than 
the other and therefore deserving of praise. At first, this quest for immortality may 
seem to be something limited to Homer‘s symbolic world since Homer fashioned this 
ethic of glory with the legendary and heroic tales of Achilles; however, Plato has 
Socrates relate this same ethic in his Symposium (208c-208e):  
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Of that, Socrates, you may be assured;—think only of the ambition of men, and 
you will wonder at the senselessness of their ways, unless you consider how they 
are stirred by the passionate love of fame. They are ready to run all risks, even 
greater than they would run for their children, and to pour out money and 
undergo any sort of toil, and even to die, ―if so they leave an everlasting name.‖ 
Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to 
avenge Patroclus, or your own Codrus in order to preserve the kingdom for his 
sons, if they hand not imagined that the memory of their virtues, which still 
survives among us, would be immortal? Nay, she said, I am persuaded that all 
men do all things, and the better they are the more they do them, in hope of the 
glorious fame of immortal virtue; for they desire the immortal.  
 
     If competition was the test and vehicle for arete, or what Spivey refers to as the 
agonistic ideal of life,
143
 then it was the drive for manly excellence that victory 
illustrated and immortality glorified. Certainly, I am not naive enough to confuse the 
Greek orientation to the value of agon and heroism with ours today. For that matter, 
Miller makes a compelling argument that the standards for what a hero was then are 
different from the standards in the twenty-first century.
144
 Yet, even if Weiss‘s 
distinctions are determined more by values of Western civilization, it stands that 
Weiss operates from the assumption that young men accept such values because to 
do so is central to their motivation, and therefore it is part of his aretaic program. He 
maintains that what the Greeks practiced in their zealous desire to win because of the 
disgrace of losing and the rewards for winning, we perform in a muted form.
145
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     Weiss organizes the role and place of goods such as honor according to the logic 
of dedication, his chief mark of athletic excellence. He states,  
As a rule, we take it for granted that young men will accept the prospects of 
honor, power, self-esteem, good opinion, and the like. We, therefore, offer these 
prospects to them at times when there are no competing attractions, in the hope 
that they will make those prospects the focused objects of their desires. And we 
try to redesign the young men, to habituate them, and to train them so that when 
they are faced with those objects of desire they will produce only those relevant 




He goes on to say that, if his thesis is correct regarding why men engage in sport—
which is because it offers a means by which they can realize excellence in and 
through the body—then 
one must appeal to more obvious rewards if one is to keep their minds fixed on 
sport. The dedication must be kept alive, or be regularly renewed, by making 
men aware, in the guise of models and tales of glory, of the nobility of the 





     Compared to the heroic society of classical Greece, Weiss‘s athletes at least are 
more socially mobile to realize such excellent ends. Therefore, many receive the 
opportunity to obtain benefits from external rewards, which, according to Weiss, the 
coach utilizes to help tutor the athlete. For Weiss, the practice of sport is attracted to 
excellence, while at the same time this pursuit of excellence is animated by the 
rewards and outcomes of winning. He claims that the true athlete must give himself 
to obtaining maximum results, constantly trying, striving, and wanting to win. I 
commend Weiss for his focus on excellence. However, as philosopher Raymond 
Belliotti argues with respect to this kind of philosophy applied to sport, I believe that 
Weiss‘s overexposure to the image of the great transcender causes him to miss the 
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entire deep truth concerning the nature of being human and the practice of sport.
148
 
His idealism makes him push for better and better, constantly striving, without 
experiencing a sense of contentedness with one‘s efforts because there is always 
another opportunity to improve. Excellence beckons the athlete to realize better 
performances. Because excellence is for young men, these athletes have an even 
shorter span to achieve sportive excellence, so the pressure exacerbates this anxiety 
and negates goods like peace and respite in sport. Weiss admittedly hones in on the 
individual athlete because the goal is to realize mankind‘s excellence in the abstract. 
Contesting with others, however, is bound to a social context, which according to 
Belliotti means that athletes should ―relish their interdependence with others and 
appreciate how self-identity is linked to social contexts.‖
149
 In short, as Feezell and 
Dombrowski claim, goods such as enjoyment of play itself are overlooked, if not 
lost, by Weiss‘s idealism. In the next chapter, we see that John Paul II synthesizes 
the transcendent with the immanent, so that our embodied humanity relishes this 
social activity as a gift (prior to a bodily task) directed toward God.  
Detachment: Mystical Ascent  
     Paul Kuntz correctly estimates that Weiss assumes some kind of chain of beings 
with mankind at the apex of all that is finite, not because the Lord made him a little 
lower than the heavenly beings, but because he possesses certain powers.
150
 Man‘s 
rational and moral powers enable him ―to aspire to a higher state of being... [to] 
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move upward...a movement into those finalities.‖
151
 This helps to elucidate the 
background beliefs that organize Weiss‘s metaphysic and ethic. Moreover, Weiss 
compares this ascent to what the yogi seeks, as articulated in the Bhagavad-Gita. 
Similar to the yogi, the athlete as a man of action detaches himself from the 
mundane.  
     If the yogi‘s path to union with ultimate reality serves as an example for how an 
athlete comes to experience distinct finalities, then the athlete‘s path must be 
accompanied by a detachment from the fruits of his sportive action, an indifference 
to any action.
152
 The yogi turns away from contingencies in order to dwell on the 
everlasting, while the athlete pushes past the dynamics of sport ―to create another 
domain with its own beginning, ending, process and laws.‖
153
 Within this account, I 
see Weiss describing transcendence in two senses. The first is a harbinger to how 
sport psychologists today conceptualize athletes‘ peak experiences, or ―being in the 
zone‖. Consistent with this sense, Weiss claims that ―what he [the athlete] is and 
what he does is for the moment thereby severed from the rest of the world.‖
154
 
During a game, boundaries like time appear to be manipulated and transcended with 
a contest‘s peculiar time outs, stops, and finishes. It is in these moments that athletes 
often describe experiences where they transcend the conventions of this world, losing 
a sense of time, self, others, etc. Whether these psychological states are identical to 
religious and mystical experiences is beyond the scope of my thesis. Nevertheless, 
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the nature of transcendence in the second sense concerns the structures of reality. 
This is what is most important for Weiss and his Platonic metaphysic.  
     The key both for Weiss‘s yogi example and Platonic ascent is to transcend the 
world of experience, which in some way lacks the fullness of reality. Furthermore, 
according to Weiss, we transcend our finitude because there is something inherently 
wrong with it. I do not think Weiss goes so far as to say with Vedantic Hinduism that 
the transitory does not possess genuine reality; however, the fact stands that for 
Weiss, humans are intrinsically incomplete. With his mystic tendencies and Platonic 
striving, Weiss clearly moves the athlete toward liberation through the body. That is 
why Weiss seeks a separation from this world, for separation repairs this lack or 
privation in actuality.
155
 Weiss explicates this striving as an effort that secures, even 
if short-lived, a public result that facilitates self-sufficiency.
156
 Weiss‘s eudaimonism 
shines forth here. The athlete in her sportive actions produces a good (excellence) 
that brings about happiness, even if temporary. Excellence as a result of athletic 
action is a limited version of an ultimate finality. Weiss declares that the athlete can 
live for a while with this production because it identifies her with what lasts forever. 
Weiss adds that this sportive performance as a production brings forth a condition in 
the athlete herself, namely, self-sufficiency.  
Self-Sufficiency: A Condition of Bodily Excellence  
 
     Julia Annas insightfully observes that in ancient ethics, especially in Aristotle, 
self-sufficiency (autarkeia) was a main concern.
157
 She recounts autoarkeia in 
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Aristotle as a condition of a final end. According to Martha Nussbaum, it can be said 
that self-sufficiency coupled with the ascent motif was a dominant theme in the 
Platonist tradition. Nussbaum reviews Platonism as a background belief for 
Augustine, stressing how the self-sufficient person moves through different stages 
toward the top of the Platonic ladder, where in contemplating the good, the self is 
free from neediness.
158
 In the Platonist tradition, the progression is to wean the 
person from earthly loves and temporal attachments so that his affections are 
transferred to the eternal, where he finds complete fulfillment and satisfaction. I 
believe that Weiss with his Platonic metaphysic includes self-sufficiency as a 
condition of the athlete‘s telos. I interpret self-sufficiency in Weiss as an aspect of 
human freedom, in that the athlete masters himself to a full participation in a 
contest.
159
 The athlete holds himself independent from ordinary life so he can invest 
completely in the game and nothing else.
160
 For Weiss, it is when the athlete is 
completely absorbed in the game while pursuing bodily excellence that he removes 
himself from the temporal and identifies with and inhabits eternity.
161
  
     In Philosophy in Process, Weiss even conceptualizes this progression as having at 
least four stages. Each stage emphasizes perfection because it involves an effort 
―which is an end itself and which also functions as a means or consequence in the 
realization of some further end.‖
162
 Athletes, for Weiss, have before them ―always 
the ideal of becoming complete men who have reached the limits of physical 
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achievement.‖
163
 To be clear, Weiss believes this ascent involves the body in a more 
robust manner than traditional Platonism does, especially since it focuses on mere 
philosophical ascent. Thus, this ascent toward excellence is a union of body and 
mind with the authority of the mind disciplining and controlling the body. Weiss 
construes the perfect athlete as ―Plato‘s state writ small, and thus, in Aristotle‘s 
terms, the embodiment of justice and temperance, the virtues where each part does it 
proper task, and the body is willed to be and is willingly subordinate to the 
mind...‖
164
 When this harmony occurs, the athlete is said to be so identified with his 
body that he surpasses others because he is eternalized.  
     What about the Platonic view of love for Weiss? In Man‟s Freedom, Weiss 
espouses different aspects of the four views of love, one of which is Plato‘s 
metaphysic of love. Plato‘s love connects dependent, imperfect beings with the 
perfection they long for.
165
 I believe that, for Weiss, the beloved in sport is the good 
or excellence that the athlete is ultimately at the mercy of because it is the ideal that 
exists independent of him and that he strives sacrificially to embody and resemble in 
his maximal results. The athlete needs this ideal because the good permits him to 
self-complete. In fact, it is the athlete‘s union with the beloved through his excellent 
bodily performances that sustains his existence even after he has been separated from 
his body.
166
 In the last paragraph of his final chapter in Sport, Weiss declares that the 
athlete ―dedicates himself to a superb performance, to make himself one who loves 
                                                 
163
 Weiss, Sport, 141.  
164
 Weiss, PIP 5, 157.  
165
 Weiss, Man‟s Freedom, 296. Weiss characterizes love in this early work as consisting of eros, 
agape, caritas and cupiditas. None of these should be neglected for all of them offer strengths; love is 
more than the sum of its four parts.  
166
 This brings together my point above about personal identity and death.  
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too coldly, perhaps, but persistently and well. In his play he exhibits in a steady, 
impersonal form that love which some men on occasion extend toward a few.‖
167
 
Clearly, Weiss views this kind of love as dispassionate. Moreover, according to 
Nussbaum, the Platonic lover ―has gotten beyond the tension of erotic longing, since 
he has found an object that satisfies his longing to ―be with‖ the beloved always.‖
168
  
     Assuming my connection between self-sufficiency and ancient ethics,
169
 Weiss‘s 
selection of this concept is important because it carries forward this metaphor of 
ascent. Self-sufficiency describes what bodily excellence and the athletic life is 
altogether directed toward. Like Plato‘s just individual, the self-sufficient athlete has 
dedicated and disciplined himself so that his self-mastery, a cardinal virtue, directly 
relates him to the immutable, which alone is ultimately real. Thus, the self-sufficient 
athlete is the self-complete athlete. For Weiss, then, the two are interchangeable, and 
the athlete attains eudaimonia by his own efforts.  
     I should probably qualify this idea of self-sufficiency, for Paul Kuntz raises an 
important point as to whether Weiss even believed that excellence in sport enables a 
man to be complete and integral.
170
 Weiss believed that in different periods, different 
categories of people were viewed as complete.
171
 For example, in ancient Greece, the 
wise man was complete, whereas in Rome, the political man was complete. Kuntz 
believes that Weiss denies that the athlete can ever become a complete man. I agree 
with Kuntz in part, because Weiss does qualify that the athlete is complete in that he 
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reaches the limits of physical achievement. Furthermore, Weiss explains that the 
athlete (particularly Weiss‘s young athlete) lives only a partial life because he 
accepts this role for a limited time in an artificial world and, like other societal roles, 
keeps the rest of himself suspended. That is, a larger life awaits the young person 
both in the future and outside the actual game since he will adopt many other roles 
during the course of his life. Keith Algozin explains that, for Weiss, the athlete does 
not represent the full nobility of what it means to be human, but that he can realize a 
facet of the perfection that attracts men in order to be complete.
172
 So it is not 
necessary to play sport in order to achieve excellence, but at the same time, the 
athlete represents the bodily support of the higher ideals.  
     In Philosophy in Process, volume 5, Weiss admits that he has not properly 
defined the term ―complete‖ life, nor has he justified that the complete man in a 
particular period was nothing more than an outstanding man.
173
 Perhaps the athlete 
cannot be complete in an absolute sense. Yet Weiss‘s athlete strives for self-
completion and his best performances gesture the kind of excellence that represents 
and epitomizes mankind: ―the athlete instantiates man in a splendid form... [showing 
us] what we ideally are as bodies.‖
174
 Even if the athlete only carries this excellence 
momentarily, he presents and participates in an ideal that the best of men in different 
epochs must at least incite.  
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     Because of this self-completion objective, the athlete puts himself ―in a fine 
position to heal the breach that daily separates him and the world beyond.‖
175
 When 
Weiss admits that some kind of gap exists between this temporal world and the world 
beyond, I believe he invokes Platonic categories once again. For example, in the 
Phaedo (100c), Plato states that what makes something beautiful is the presence and 
participation of beauty. Beauty is a Form that exists independently and beyond this 
world, and anything on this earth that resembles beauty can be said to participate in 
it. Like Plato, Weiss‘s participation thesis is an attempt to bridge the gap between 
ideas and things. Weiss explains the presence of ideals by virtue of the fact that they 
are present in things and partake of the ideals. In fact, all particulars have being 
because they participate in a finality, such as beauty or excellence. This break 
assumes that some gulf exists between these two worlds. If I am correct that 
something is wrong with this world, then the world needs a cure. And this problem 
with the world implies that, if there is a separation, then regardless of the cause, the 
result is alienation. Weiss never tells us what the cause is, only that this is the way 
things are. Conflict and alienation exist between these two worlds, or there would not 
be a split. Moreover, this conflict exposes an insufficiency, which for Weiss is 
inherent to our existence.  
     Since this alienation is what is wrong, then Weiss proposes that the athlete, like 
other men who choose to identify themselves with what is ultimately real, has it 
within his powers to atone for the transgression that separates this world from the 
world beyond. Weiss holds that, after he attains this ascent, the athlete returns to the 
sensible world enlightened: he is ―more able than most to return to his daily tasks 
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with some sense of what is stable and fundamental there, and what is not.‖
176
 The 
athlete enters back into this world informed by higher realities. Weiss takes for 
granted another Platonic distinction because he assumes that the athlete accesses the 
intelligible structures of reality after his ascent. He can look past appearances to see 
things for what they are.   
     Before I move on to the third chapter, I want to summarize a couple of important 
theological points that clearly distinguish a Christian ethic from Paul Weiss‘s ethic. 
These points help segue to my study of John Paul II and his personalistic ethic and 
sport.  
    First, the goodness of creation as described in chapter one (Genesis 1-2) means 
that all actualities, all finite things, participate in the gift of existence given by 
God.
177
 Sport as a human performance derives its meaning from the fact that this 
embodied and physical activity is upheld by God through his creational laws. 
Athletes as human beings are created by God, who gives them a reality of their own 
with powers specific to human reality. Since these delegated powers are from God 
himself, it reasonable to infer that they are ordered and structured for good ends.  
     If these powers are from God, this means that this strenuous and sensuous mode 
of being-in-the-world receives its meaning and structure from a personal God rather 
than from the impersonal cosmic forces that Weiss‘s Platonic participation assumes, 
and therefore its direction is valued and ordered in the material to the transcendent. 
Weiss attempts a secular version of the latter point; however, Christian theology 
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grows out of an anthropology that acknowledges the supernatural end and the 
goodness of embodied life. Thus, we encounter the goodness in sport by actually 
experiencing excellence and other goods in this human reality, and though we can 
look beyond sport to its ultimate sustaining source, we do not do the latter at the 
expense of full celebration of the former. I underscore how important this human, 
earthly reality is when I develop Bonhoeffer‘s ethic as a critique of modern muscular 
Christianity‘s failure to properly value sport as a bodily good.  
     Second, in keeping with Guadium et Spes, John Paul II‘s ethic recognizes the 
goodness of every aspect of human culture. This recognition opens the Church 
toward the modern world for dialogue with sportive culture. He identifies a direct 
relationship between who we are as humans and how earthly activities bring 
fulfillment. Because of Vatican II in particular, this broadened perspective functions 
as a corrective to the scholastic natural law theories that instrumentalized earthly life 
as primarily a bridge to heaven. This instrumentalizing of earthly life was French 
Catholicism in the nineteenth century, and hence Kuntz labels Weiss‘s theory of 
sport accordingly. By affirming such worldly activities, John Paul II heals a breach 
that occurred between sacred and secular life. John Paul II‘s ethic re-envisions the 
Church as an ―expert in humanity‖ so that sportive goods are not neglected. Against 
the legalism of the scholastic natural law theory, John Paul II promotes the dignity of 
the sportsperson so that right actions direct her toward realizing her well-being. John 
Paul II‘s anthropology specifies our human fulfillment and dignity in Christ. Our 
sportive actions donate the gift of self to another in such a way that contest is 
oriented primarily around gift and love, not the self-mastery of the body as a task. 
 





THE HUMAN PERSON AT THE CENTRE OF SPORT DRAMA:  
 
JOHN PAUL II‘S PERSONALISM AND SPORT 
 
Introduction 
     Paul Weiss contends in Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry that sport is a pursuit of 
bodily excellence. Bodily excellence is a bodily good that can be realized in the 
practice of sport. Weiss‘s teleology provides the content and context for his 
philosophy of sport. 
     Weiss‘s teleological foundation for sport and the athlete offers a point of entry 
from which a Christian ethic can think theologically about sport.
1
 John Paul II 
follows from Paul Weiss because he answers a number of the problems a Christian 
ethic has with an ethic of excellence. Comparing and contrasting John Paul II and 
Weiss forces a Christian ethic to clearly consider both its own core convictions about 
sport as a pursuit of excellence and also how other theological matters, namely, 
embodiment, gift and persons, relate to ethical considerations; it lays bare important 
aspects of a Christian theological framework that, without a foil, might lie 
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unexpressed, unacknowledged, or indiscriminate. Furthermore, this method of 
comparing and contrasting redresses the problem concretely for modern sport with 
the aid of another interlocutor.  
     Weiss understands bodily excellence as a virtue because of his underlying 
conception of good and anthropology. Bodily excellence assumes a common telos 
grounded in the good life for human beings. Weiss is correct that bodily excellence is 
a worthwhile objective; however, he claims that bodily excellence is the primary 
good and, herein lies the main problem.  
     In this chapter, I will argue that, by selecting bodily excellence as the primary 
good, Weiss neglects goods that are equal to (if not more important) than bodily 
excellence because of who we are as full human beings. I emphasize not so much the 
other goods (non-moral and moral), but who we are as human beings and the source 
of those goods. Hence, we see that the good of sport for Weiss‘s athlete forfeits an 
integral human fulfillment and human dignity. Weiss‘s impoverished anthropology 
leads him to limit what it means to be a human being. He commits his athlete to a 
way of being in this world that is not fully human. If becoming physically excellent 
is specific to what it means to be human, and if there is more to being human than 
bodily excellence, then surely there is more to who we are when performing in and 
through sport. We are persons who bear a host of goods; therefore, we value and are 
attracted to a plurality of goods in sport because, as Augustine argues, our loves 
ready us for such goods. Weiss‘ single focus on bodily excellence is a ―Promethean‖ 
anthropology because it glorifies the athlete who heroically performs in a way that 
exhibits self-sufficiency.  
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     I contend that Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II fixes this problem by grounding both 
sportive action and this entire discourse about sport in personalism. His personalism 
organizes why and what he John Paul II says about goods in competitive sport.
2
 
According to Wojtyla, personalism is important for a theological ethic because ―at 
the basis of morality is found the human being as a person. Morality is properly and 
fundamentally a correlate of personality: ‗the human being as a human being‘ means 
‗the human being as a person‘.‖
3
 The human being as person resides at the core of 
morality, and any other thing put in a person‘s place is inadequate. Further, 
Wojtyla‘s axiology, following Thomas, directs all goods (i.e., bodily, spiritual, or 
moral) toward what fulfils and perfects a being.
4
 For this thesis, personalism means 
that a Christian ethic considers excellence as it relates to what it means to be human. 
First, I begin with John Paul II‘s personalism and what it means in general for human 
dignity and excellence. Second, in the latter part of the chapter, I continue with his 
personalism, but more specifically, with his theology of the body and what 
embodiment means for excellence. Throughout the chapter, I move between his sport 
homilies and his other works in order to demonstrate the direct relationship between 
them.  
John Paul II’s Personalism: Human Dignity and Sportive Excellence 
     For John Paul II, sport is a proper object of theological reflection because at the 
heart of sportive action is the human person. The athlete as a person is the proper 
object of sport. Man himself is the central problem that Wojtyla sought to defend 
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4
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throughout his academic and papal works. From his earliest homilies on sport,
5
 John 
Paul II asserts that it was the Catholic Church‘s view of the human person that 
grounds the Magisterium‘s evaluation, which it gives to the discipline of sport.
6
 He 
states repeatedly that the person is the goal and criterion of all sporting activity.
7
 If 
personalism is his starting point, then it is necessary to explain what John Paul II 
means by personalism as it pertains to the human person. First, I will describe some 
of the key characteristics of his personalism and show how his account of sport 
emerges from his personalism. Second, I will return to Weiss and explain how 
personalism relates to his concept of excellence.  
     Wojtyla‘s personalism, as explained in pre-papal writings such as Love and 
Responsibility, Person and Community, and The Acting Person, underlies all his 
teachings. Personalism is the anthropological basis of his teachings.
8
 In general, 
personalism operates from a philosophical and theological anthropology that 
emphasizes the nature and value of the human person with a particular focus and 
interest on the dynamics of personal, concrete existence and action. Brian Johnstone 
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indicates that this emphasis on the person was a noteworthy shift (from ―human 
nature‖ to the ―human person‖), a shift that occurred in the wake of post-Vatican II 
methods of moral reasoning. According to Johnstone, this shift was ―a transition 
from a methodology based on a particular interpretation of human reality or 
‗anthropology‘ and a particular account of moral reasoning, to another methodology, 
also including an account of human reality and an account of moral reasoning.‖
9
 
Thus, this shift was a shift to personalism.
10
 
     Wojtyla declares that personalism‘s ―meaning is largely practical and ethical: it is 
concerned with the person as a subject and object of activity, as a subject of rights, 
etc.‖
11
 According to John Paul II, what we think it means to be human is 
foundational to ethics and axiology.
12
 As a young man, John Paul II witnessed the 
abominable acts that the Nazi and Communist regimes inflicted in Poland. This 
experience deeply affected him and this experience became for him the foremost 
crisis for humanity today because these kinds of tyrannies center on false 
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conceptions about what it means to be a person.
13
 For John Paul II, when any 
sportive practice or activity is not an occasion to exalt the dignity of the human 
person,
14
 then the fundamental value of the human person, ―as the end and measure 
of every sporting activity,‖ is violated. This neglect of the fundamental value of the 
human person lies at the heart of Weiss‘s sport ethics, and it equally confronts and 
plagues sportive life today. Karol Wojtyla resisted these ideologies because they 
failed to delineate a marked difference between human persons and the rest of nature.   
Personalism: What is it? 
Human Beings are Persons 
     A key tenet of personalism is that humans are persons.
15
 Wojtyla believes that the 
human being is a person. Despite the differences between different worldviews, 
―everyone in some way agrees with this assertion,‖ which is a conviction of 
experience according to Wojtyla.
16
 Wojtyla continues, saying that this reality of 
personhood properly identifies the position of being human in the world; it marks out 
human beings‘ natural greatness because humans are distinct and superior to all other 
created realities. Wojtyla utilizes the term person ―to signify that a man cannot be 
wholly contained within the concept ‗individual member of the species‘, but that 
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there is something more to him, a particular richness and perfection in the manner of 
his being, which can only be brought out by the use of the word ‗person‘.‖
17
  
     In Love and Responsibility, Wojtyla explicates this essential distinction of 
personalism in relation to sexual ethics, namely, that the person is both subject and 
object of action. He states ―that every subject also exists as an object, an objective 
‗something‘ or ‗somebody‘.‖
18
 When talking about persons, he means that, 
regardless of what we may feel or believe about persons, the human person exists as 
a real entity that other subjects, who are also objects, meet and greet. His realism 
implies that each person is then set apart from every other object or entity in the 
visible world that he belongs to,
19
 for the distance between a person and a thing is a 
great gulf.
20
 Persons are in a different metaphysical category from other kind because 
their reality is different in kind from the reality of the rest of nature. Thus, we deal 
with persons according to their personhood. Ethics relates to ontology. The special 
stress that Wojtyla lays on the value of the person makes all the difference on how 
athletes act toward other athletes versus toward another non-person reality. He 
explains that,  
The value of the person is, in turn, the basis of the norm that should govern 
actions that have a person as their object. This norm may be called personalistic 
to distinguish it from other norms, which are based on the various natures of 
beings lower than the human being—nonpersonal natures...All norms, including 
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the personalistic norm, as based on essences, or natures, of beings, are 




Similarly, in Love and Responsibility, Wojtyla accentuates the fact that the 
personalistic value of the person mutually conditions the personalistic norm. How we 
relate to and treat sportspersons is not arbitrary because it is rooted in the ontological 
status or value of the human person.
22
 In this thesis, a Christian ethic attends 
throughout to the value of an athlete, a sportsperson, for this value then gives rise to 
the moral requirements and relates to the ends (excellences), habits, and actions that 
either affirm or retard this personalistic value.   
     This natural greatness and superiority of the personalistic value—which radically 
differentiates us from non-persons—is verified by what humans do and what effects 
their actions have: human persons freely make, produce, and create culture and 
technology.
23
 In Genesis, the Christian tradition recognizes that function is inherent 
to this natural greatness. Adam and Eve were commanded to care and tend to the 
garden because they and only they bore God‘s image. Function testifies to this 
natural greatness because humans act in ways that non-persons cannot or do not.
24
 
Human persons are given the cultural mandate or dominion, not non-persons.
25
 
Sports is a prime example, for, although non-persons might be able to play on some 
level, humans can transform nature by imaginatively creating and perfecting both a 
sportive contest and themselves, all of which testifies to this dignity. Wojtyla adds 
                                                 
21
 Wojtyla, ―Catholic Sexual Ethics,‖ Person and Community, 287.  
22
 Williams, Who is My Neighbor?, 119-120. 
23
 Wojtyla, ―The Dignity of the Human Person,‖ in Person and Community, 178.  
24
 Wojtyla, ―The Dignity of the Human Person,‖ in Person and Community, 178. 
25
 Sadly, this reality often has been misunderstood with respect to nature, but the fault does not lie 
with human dignity but with humans who misuse their responsibility.  
   131
that ―a being that continually transforms nature, raising it in some sense to that 
being‘s own level, must feel higher than nature—and must be higher than it.‖
26
  
     At this point, it is important to explain that Wojtyla‘s metaphysic is an objectivist 
metaphysic. He works from the premise that man is a part of objective reality. This 
metaphysic interprets man in light of the whole of the cosmos. It is in effect a 
cosmological anthropology.
27
 Specifically, the person is a substantial being, 
suppositum, an ―objective being with its own proper subsistence.‖
28
 A person 
possesses his own existence and action. Wojtyla upholds the ancient concept of 
suppositum, for the human person is an individual substance.
29
 When developing his 
sexual ethics, Wojtyla adds that, since human nature exists in a concrete suppositum 
that is a person, all aspects, functions, and urges are always attributes of a person.
30
 
The same can be said of sports. The mode of existence in sport is a mode of cultural 
activity unique to the level of a person because the person plays sports.  
     This objective foundation is important for Christian ethics and for sport. First, it 
assures that a Christian ethic begins with the objective truth of a human person as a 
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metaphysical fact. This reality is independent of us; thus, it serves as an objective 
measure. Therefore, athletes play and compete in a sportive reality that is not 
fictional or absolutely separate from ordinary time because they meet other athletes, 
who are also substantial beings. Though the conventions and way of relating may be 
unique and sport-specific (e.g., stealing a base), they still involve and proceed from 
human persons, thus affecting real human persons. For example, when I slide into a 
home base with a catcher defending it, each role is known or experienced in the 
given acts from real people.  
     Second, in sport, we meet other persons who share the same personalistic value, 
regardless of their age, race, role, or position on a team. Athletes compete or contest 
with human persons who must be seen as they are really are; the choices an athlete 
makes are in a field of experience where contestants are somebodies. What is 
primary is the value of a person. The corollary then is how a particular sport practice 
affirms and develops the objective value of a person. For example, we do not begin 
with the sportive practice itself with regard to a moral problem in sport, but with 
what it means to be human. The human person exists before, during, and after a 
sportive practice. It is certainly conceivable that some sport practices allow for 
human excellence but can be found to violate human dignity when evaluated in light 
of what it means to be a human. Persons precede and act as the base for all human 
activities. John Paul II‘s personalism concurs that bodily excellence is an indication 
of the purpose intended by God in this human action sphere, but this good is not the 
only value that should be realized with respect to who we are as persons. In the latter 
half of this chapter, I argue that excellence as a human act must be expanded to 
include both transitive and intransitive action lest we be left with a form of 
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excellence that, like Weiss‘s, ultimately neglects who we fully are as persons. 
Because of Wojtyla‘s personalism, I reject Weiss‘s inversion, for Weiss subordinates 
dignity to excellence. This subordination of dignity fails to give the fullest account of 
what it means to be a person in sport. Instead of making the person primary, Weiss 
apotheosizes the ideal of bodily excellence.    
     Third, this truth about a person conforms to the value that subsists in the person. 
This truth is the personalistic value grounded in the nature of personhood. In other 
words, John Paul II‘s understanding of the human person arises from a general 
theory of things as they are, which means that persons as well as values and norms 
are linked with a realist objectivity.
31
 Ong concurs that John Paul II‘s metaphysical 
realism is important ―because it provides an objective foundation for his conception 
of the dynamic unity of a person as well as his personalistic ethics.‖
32
 No matter how 
you analyze or describe the human person, Wojtyla‘s Thomistic doctrine of being is 
given priority as the ultimate ontological foundation because ―it is in the subject as a 
being that every dynamic structure is rooted, every acting and happening.‖
33
  
     Fourth, as implied above, this personalistic value carries with it responsibilities 
for a Christian ethic. Human responsibility is derived from personalistic value. 
Williams notes that Wojtyla‘s personalism ―allows the Christian ethicist to regain for 
the human person, by analogy like the divine Person in whose image he was created, 
a place for reasonableness and moral responsibility for his acts.‖
34
 Athletes are 
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responsible to other sportspersons because sportspersons are persons with objective 
value. Thus, this attraction to and striving for excellence must be coordinated with 
who we are as persons. Excellence as an exercise of power should respect and 
enhance the integrity of sportspersons. John Paul II does not hold excellence as an 
ideal independent of who or what a person is. It is precisely who a person is that 
enables us to understand how a person acts. But this responsibility to other 
sportsperson also extends to an athlete herself because she presents her own being to 
herself through her actions. This self-respect becomes an important matter when 
discussing a theology of the body below.  
     If this objective foundation is important for Christian ethics and sport, how we 
talk (language) about sportspersons is another moral responsibility that follows from 
the value that subsists in the person. In Elshtain‘s account of language and how it 
relates to anthropological presuppositions, she argues that our language is important 
because how we name things either draws us closer to or farther away from that 
which our language describes.
35
 Elshtain sees that language has descriptive power, 
which enables us to describe and pierce reality as best or close as we can.
36
 Wojtyla 
names the human being a ―person,‖ a name that carries important meaning regarding 
dignity and respect.
37
 In the context of sport, athletes are regularly named with 
language (e.g., enemy, foe, sissy, idiot, loser, etc.) that fails to address the depth of 
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what it means to be a human person. Our speech directly relates to whether we see 
the natural greatness of this kind of being, a human person. Thus, speech should be 
ordered or conformed to the truth about the personalistic value of human persons.  
     Fifth, Wojtyla‘s metaphysical realism, especially when he exercises the tools of 
phenomenology, prevents a Christian ethic from sliding into manifold forms of 
empiricism, solipsism, or subjectivism, which reduce humanity to either phenomena, 
consciousness, or measurable functions.
38
 A human, though equally a distinctive 
subject of her actions, is an objective, enduring reality regardless of what she does or 
what happens to her. Therefore, a human person has absolute dignity, which cannot 
be relativized.  
     Before moving on to another important characteristic of John Paul II‘s 
personalism, I want to address what is at stake thus far in regards to Weiss‘s 
philosophy of sport where his metaphysic neglects this personalistic value.  
     Weiss recognizes that all actualities are directed toward some comprehensive 
good. This presupposition assumes a deficient metaphysic, for he asserts that some 
inherent wrong plagues human existence—not a wrong in a merely ethical sense, 
which a Christian metaphysic attributes to an evil fall, but a wrong in an ontological 
sense. His metaphysic appears to resemble Gnostic dualism. According to 
O‘Donovan, a Christian ethic must challenge this metaphysic, for it confuses the 
goodness of natural structures with sin and disorder. This means for Weiss that, if 
human nature has no integrity or natural dignity within itself, ―then actual good and 
evil alike stand together under the judgment of historical fulfillment, as 
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‗imperfect‘.‖
39
 As I presented in my last chapter, Weiss does not account for what it 
means to be human from a created order where purposes are given. He assumes that 
these purposes, like excellence, are indications of this order. However, his order or 
structure lacks on the most fundamental level.  
     If Weiss‘s metaphysic makes no recourse to the way things were originally 
intended, and if all he knows is evil and an incomplete world, then how can he 
principally evaluate what is good from what is evil? A Christian ethic begins with a 
narrative that describes both this world and human beings as good, thus establishing 
evil as a transgression of this original goodness or purpose and as a fact of this 
universe. Weiss‘s world only knows a metaphysic of incompleteness and fallenness. 
What criterion does Weiss use to judge the incompleteness or ontological lack in 
human nature? He appears to be trapped in a world that is incomplete without a 
metaphysic that positively characterizes the way things should or should not be. Both 
good and evil lack definite characterization and normative standards from which he 
can morally discern these important differences. Thus, Weiss‘s perfectionism strives 
to realize a future prospect like excellence, yet this end, which attracts or calls his 
athlete forward, is bound by an incomplete metaphysic.
40
  
     Did not Weiss claim, as described in the last chapter, that this striving toward 
excellence was in-built? Weiss does hold that human beings, like other things, are 
directed toward specific ends because metaphysically, all things tend toward this 
ordered end or excellence. However, his metaphysic does not warrant this claim, for 
it is incapable of making such evaluative or structural distinctions. Again, he presents 
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human nature as a natural structure that fundamentally lacks ontological goodness. 
Instead of creating a strict relation between the good and being,
41
 Weiss‘ doctrine of 
being admits imperfection in being; therefore, bodily sportive goods perfect 
something that by nature or structure is not good in being. His perfectionistic ethic is 
problematic because, as Wojtyla argues, the good that is supposed to perfect or 
enhance a being‘s existence is in keeping with its nature.
42
 Weiss‘ human being is 
incomplete, so actions build from a state of being that is structurally evil or bad. If 
human nature is the basis of an athlete‘s activity, then all her activities operate from 
an essence that is ontologically incomplete for Weiss.
43
 How do future performances 
help this problem? Weiss‘s self-completion is deferred to the future, but it is a future 
that appears to fare no better than did its beginnings. That is, sportive activities 
express or externalize objectively an athlete‘s incomplete human nature. Existence is 
fundamentally flawed in that finitude lacks the fullness of being; athletes are guilty 
by virtue of their existence. What is Weiss‘s solution to this problem?  
     It is in and through excellent athletic performances that the ontological problem 
concerning our finitude is repaired. Weiss‘s theory of sport rightly recognizes how 
necessary some outside (beyond the temporal) help is for transforming what for his 
metaphysic is immanently not present. He opts for a Platonic divine ordering to 
complete what I estimate is lacking in his Aristotelian natural teleology for sport. 
That is, sportive performances become a means to participate in and then produce 
excellence. Excellence, as iterated, functions as a Platonic Form. This excellence 
invests in natural structures—human nature—what they lack on a fundamental level. 
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Thus, dignity, which Weiss‘s natural structures lack metaphysically, is a function of 
the athlete‘s productivity or power. Self-realization is a way to climb up the 
ontological ladder by participating in Platonic ideals that survive this temporal 
problem located in human nature. This implies that Weiss‘ athlete attempts to 
outgrow her own human nature; it is as much a metaphysical adjustment as it is a 
self-completion.  
     What is so confusing is that Weiss pictures humans as special in one sense 
because they possess certain qualities that non-persons do not; however, he views 
personal dignity as more of a function of intelligence, abilities, healthiness, and 
accomplishments and less of a value that is inherent in human nature.
44
 Since natural 
dignity is not something inherent in all human beings (for his metaphysic does not 
permit this integrity of structure), excellent performances confer dignity, albeit an 
extrinsic one. The athlete that performs strives for and achieves excellence represents 
the perfect ideal of mankind, Plato‘s Form. Weiss avers that it is because of this 
participation that athletes recognize and accord respect—what I take to be dignity 
achieved—to other athletes.
45
 Weiss‘s view of excellence and participation entails 
that human worth or dignity is alien because it resides in those who pursue and 
realize sportive excellence. It is not an immanent, universal value of human persons 
who have been created in the image of God. On the contrary, it is bestowed on those 
who obtain excellence; it is an elitist achievement that connects them with what is 
truly good, beautiful, and true, an everlasting Form. Williams explains that, 
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according to Wojtyla‘s realist metaphysics of the human person, worth is an 
ontological dignity intrinsic to a person.
46
 Ontological dignity is different from moral 
dignity. In the Christian tradition, moral dignity was lost through sin, but ontological 
dignity remains. Weiss appears to conflate the two. If I am correct, then human 
nature, according to Weiss, begins with a loss of ontological dignity because we 
stand guilty before God.
47
 This standing leads to an irresolvable problem because it 
posits human dignity as something humans have forfeited by virtue of their finite 
existence, and sport becomes a means to acquire both kinds of dignity. In the end, 
Weiss instrumentalizes sport.  
     If Weiss‘s understanding of what it means to be human misconstrues human 
dignity, then how does a Christian ethic understand human dignity? The answer to 
this question leads me to the second major characteristic of personalism, the 
characteristic that examines the human person as subject.  
 
Human Dignity: The Person as Subject  
    For Wojtyla, a Christian ethic bases dignity on a natural, God-given, greatness. 
Personalism affirms the dignity of the person.
48
 Wojtyla argues that, in order to get 
beyond the threshold difference between what persons can do and what non-persons 
cannot do, we must ground dignity within the human being.
49
 For him, this 
grounding entails more than what makes us persons when compared with all of 
nature, or, for that matter, when thinking universally about all persons, for our ontic 
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realities (e.g., rationality, freedom, conscience, etc.) and their employment can vary 
for whatever reason as far as their use.
50
 But being human is essentially about who 
we are as persons. Who human beings are comes from within the human person. 
That means that it is the person who is the cause and origin of her actions. Thus, all 
objective acts—externalizations—are works, efforts, products, and achievements that 
have the human person as their unique origin and cause.
51
 Consequently, human 
beings not only experience cultural works such as these as objects from without, but 




     Wojtyla picks up the conceptual tools that phenomenological analysis avails to 
mine the subjective structure of the lived experience. He determines to interpret the 
total human person by complementing his Thomistic metaphysic with his personal-
ism through a phenomenological method that allows access to the personal lived 
experience. Wojtyla was not satisfied to conclude with a Thomistic metaphysic--a 
more objectivist account of human persons. Weigel points out that, for Wojtyla, 
phenomenology was simply giving due consideration to human subjectivity so as to 
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more fully explore and appreciate all dimensions of human experience.
53
 Wojtyla 
himself admits that St. Thomas stops short of this emphasis on experience because 




     ―Lived experience,‖ therefore, refers to John Paul II‘s phenomenological method 
of interpretation. Wojtyla asserts that this category was alien to Aristotle‘s 
metaphysic, although this former metaphysic was sufficient for differentiating 
between what happens in the human being and what the human being does. This turn 
to the subject evades objectification because the subject herself experiences her own 
acts and inner happenings. Wojtyla develops his personalism by shifting his attention 
from the objective side to different subjective dimensions of the human person as 
viewed from a person‘s own inner experience.
55
 Wojtyla claims that who humans are 
―cannot be derived by way of cosmological reduction; we must pause at the 
irreducible, at that which is unique and unrepeatable in each human being, by virtue 
of which he or she is not just a particular human being—an individual of a certain 
species—but a personal subject.‖
56
 As a personal subject, a person uniquely 
possesses attributes that Wojtyla says are ―in the inner self of a person.‖
57
 That is, 
what a person thinks, imagines, or wills are all constitutive elements of her own 
personhood that are equally regarded as sources of personalistic value. The inner self 
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refers to those dimensions of the rational and therefore spiritual nature that a person 
acts from and experiences from the inside.
58
  
     As an example of this irreducibility, John Paul II addresses this source of dignity 
when giving a sport homily to blind athletes. He draws on their attraction to sport, 
which is no less than the attraction experienced by anyone else who might have all 
her sight capacities intact. He begins his address by citing the sport advertisement for 
these games: ―Not seeing does not mean not loving; not seeing does not mean 
closing in upon oneself; not seeing does not mean failure to enjoy the beautiful 
things of life; not seeing does not mean the inability to participate in sports.‖
59
 His 
personalism interprets this experience as true because of the irreducible dignity that 
radiates through these athletes. He argues that these words gain our attention  
because they appeal to everyone who has the gift of health, of sight, of 
efficiency, to understand that within every man or woman suffering from some 
sort of physical defect, there is always a human person; the [sic] is a human 
heart, with all the riches of an individuality which must not only be respected, 
but helped to develop itself according to its own gifts and inclinations, for the 




     In this message, John Paul II gives particular attention to the fact that there is 
something more to a human person than sight. Because of the riches of individuality, 
each person is a unique and unrepeatable entity that is native to a person‘s inner 
self.
61
 These athletes uniquely experience themselves from within. John Paul II 
reminds his audience that, thanks to this fact, we encounter the incommunicable 
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person because each person is her ―own‖ as a subject who must be respected. He 
surmises that all encounters and relationships are posited on this reality: ―All true 
conceptions about education and culture begin and return to this point.‖
62
 As John 
Paul II‘s emphasizes, this source of personal dignity excludes no one. Though blind 
athletes might appear externally to lack the outstanding traits or functions of an 
excellent athlete, they are unrepeatable because they as subjects experience the 
richness of their own personhood.  
     To summarize this idea of human dignity, both the human person as subject and 
object are sources of human dignity. The athlete imitates a social role that human 
beings can play, but it is still the human person with an absolute dignity inherent in a 
person who is the cause that precedes this role (or any other cultural role, for that 
matter). Wojtyla acknowledges that this principle and dignity of the person, prior to a 
person‘s acts, grounds all cultural discourse.
63
 He states that it is not man who works 
(homo faber) or man who thinks (homo sapiens) that functions as the basis of a form 
of life, but rather the incontrovertible call and demand concerning human dignity. 
This call is the purpose of any cultural activity: ―Human beings do not live for the 
sake of technology, civilization, or even culture; they live by means of these things, 
always preserving their own purpose.‖
64
 When applied to sport, this means that it is 
not man who plays (homo ludens) or man who sports (homo sportivus) that serves as 
the basis of sport, but rather the inherent worth and uniqueness of the sportsperson.  
     Since the human person as the subject is the cause, then to focus on excellent 
performances is to recognize excellent effects or beautiful expressions of who a 
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human being is. Excellence is valued in regard to human persons. On one hand, our 
common human nature, which causes us to appreciate and value sportive excellences 
for these cultural activities, proceeds from other human beings, whom we are like. 
On the other hand, it is not enough to ground human dignity in some universal 
nature, for the excellence of Michael Jordan is not the same as the excellence of 
Cristiano Ronaldo. Therefore, if we want to understand and even succeed in our 
pursuit of excellence—human fulfillment—we must carefully consider who we 
really are. The human person is the unique subject of her own intellect, freedom, or 
desire for excellence. This uniqueness of the human subject leads to another point of 
contention with Weiss.   
     Weiss short-changes the meaning of being human in sport by reducing it to the 
ideal of bodily excellence, or becoming excellent physically. Neither bodily 
excellence itself nor play, for that matter, is the answer to what it means to be human. 
Randolph Feezell argues that what attracts people to sport is something they find 
with which they uniquely identify.
65
 They identify with it because of who they are as 
human beings. I concur with Feezell and Weiss about the goods they argue for, but 
why does it have to be either play or excellence when it is not merely the good which 
we affirm, but also the origin and cause of the good--the human being who 
experiences the good? Feezell argues that sport includes many goods, but primary for 
him is the enjoyment of play. Feezell examines Weiss‘s account of sport and insists 
that a more plausible explanation for why men (and women) seek the good of sport is 
―based on the classic accounts of play offered by Huizinga and Caillois.‖
66
 This 
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explanation is more basic and, in fact, probably universal since Weiss‘ bodily 
excellence is certainly not true for nominal athletes, who because of bodily 
limitations are attracted more to play, friendship, community building, and sheer 
delight. Yet, if we understand Wojtyla‘s argument, a Christian anthropology does not 
have to decide between play and bodily excellence.   
     Both Weiss and Feezell equally neglect a more full and rich account of human 
persons, namely, human beings who cannot be reduced to play or skillful mastery.  
Being human is the key to sport and to appreciating the multiplicity of goods in 
which athletes revel as they contest with one another. Therefore, I do not find it 
helpful to search for ―The Holy Grail‖ among a list of what is most basic. Instead, I 
ground the discussion in the richness and perfection of our humanity.  
     In a sport homily during the Jubilee of Sport 1984, John Paul II states,  
The dignity of the human person is the goal and criterion of all sporting  
activity . . . . Sport is sincere and generous confrontation, a meeting place, a 
bond of solidarity and friendship...Sport can be genuine culture when the setting 
in which it is practiced and the experience it brings are open and sensitive to 





As Christians, John Paul II draws our attention to the idea that, whatever goods we 
demarcate in the practice of sport, their value is directly related to our dignity and 
fulfillment as persons. As humans then, we appreciate certain values as connected 
with and accentuated by sporting activity.
68
 For example, John Paul indexes such 
goods as sensible, moral, relational, intelligible, and spiritual goods.
69
 I might add 
that there sport tests and develops a plethora of moral and non-moral goods based on 
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the richness and uniqueness of our humanity, i.e., self- discovery, play, magnanimity, 
honesty, health, reasoning, creativity, efficiency, etc. 
     There is no need to single out one among the many goods that attract athletes as 
the kind of goods they can realize in this sphere of life. In fact, John Paul II argues 
that to do so is an axiological reduction because it restricts sportive value to the 
body; it fails to respect the integrity or wonderful structure of the human person as 
created by God.
70
 A proper understanding of our humanity implies that there are 
other goods—in addition to bodily goods, such as sportive excellence—that are 
integral to persons. Though John Paul II would grant to Weiss that bodily excellence 
is an important value, I believe he would have grave doubts as to whether it is the 
essential element that describes our attraction to sport because he understands that 
sport actions flow from human beings who are irreducibly unique and wonderful. 
Human dignity is a fact worked out and performed by human beings. Moreover, 
Weiss misdirects us when he isolates the value of excellence, for his account neither 
explains nor represents the many other values that attract sportspersons to the 
practice of sport.
71
 Thus, Weiss lacks a richer account of persons.  
Human Embodiment and Excellence 
     John Paul II provides a richer account of persons than Weiss because, for him, the 
human person as an embodied being is the bearer of excellence or virtue. The bearer 
of excellence and dignity is the whole person; thus, sport is an activity of the whole 
man. In some ways,
72
 Wojtyla‘s anthropology should not come as a surprise, for his 
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synthesis was well underway by others; for example, Söll finds this 
phenomenological shift at the heart of Catholic theology and sport post-WW II and 
through Vatican II.
73
 Wojtyla makes his contribution primarily via his anthropology, 
which maintains a unified view of man when facing such realities as sport. In this 
section, I address the body-soul dualism inherent in Weiss so a fuller account of our 
humanity, and thus our dignity, can sustain a Christian ethic and sport.  
     Wojtyla‘s affirmation of the goodness of the body is central to his commitment to 
human dignity. Shortly after he was elected as Bishop of Rome, he delivered a series 
of teachings on the theology of the body in St. Peter‘s Square between September 5, 
1979 and November 28, 1984.
74
 John Paul II determined to apply his theological 
personalism to the sexual aspects of bodiliness. In Theology of the Body, he carries 
forward modernity‘s belief that we must start with the human subject; however, he 
insists that this ―turn to the subject‖ involves an embodied subject whose 
embodiment is equally important for her self-knowledge and for how she relates in 
and to this world.
75
 John Paul II‘s pastoral concerns are evident throughout, for he 
desires to serve spouses by exploring the complexity of our bodily and sexual 
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natures. In a systematic catechesis on this subject, he asserts that an adequate 
anthropology must consider and defend the meaning of the body not as a mere object 
of nature for human power, but as a primordial wonder, a gift that is to be received 
and respected because it is integral to human dignity. Wojtyla faced a modern 
challenge concerning matter as value-free in a Cartesian universe.
76
 Instead of the 
kindred relationship with all of nature because nature as creation shares a common 
origin and is ordered toward the same ultimate good, the mechanistic account of 
nature inherited from Descartes and Bacon severed this kinship between human 
beings and other natural beings. Nature and bodies are viewed externally as an 
extended object, detached from the principles and final causes that constitute their 
being.
77
 Thus, nature and bodies are stripped of their ontological interiority and 
meaning, making bodies morally neutral. With this void in or indifference toward 
nature, it did not take much for the Cartesian subject (consciousness) to now exert 
meaning and purpose on such material reality. Human freedom becomes the 
authority because it is inflated as the greatest good, thus allowing freedom to master 
nature or bodies.
78
 Bodies are ruled by the mind, which determines what is good, the 
project for nature and human bodies. John Paul II counters such thinking in Theology 
of the Body by rescuing the body from this Cartesian split and denigration, and he 
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affirms the goodness of the body, especially in the spousal union.
79
 This same 
personalist concern and thesis is found in his sport homilies.  
 
The Significance of the Body-Soul Unity and Dignity 
     Wojtyla maintains Thomas‘ hylomorphic view of the human (compositum 
humanum). As an individual substance, the person is a composition of matter (hylē) 
and form (morphē), body and soul.
80
 The soul is a spiritual substance, which as the 
substantial form of the body is ―the principle of life and activity of the human 
being.‖
81
 Because the human person is a substantial whole, a union of soul and body, 
then this is a fact peculiar to the human person, a unique component of what it means 
to be human.
82
 Cullen claims that ―the hylomorphic view that man is a form-matter 
composite is present as the unstated premise of this theology of the body...‖
83
 John 
Paul II does not confuse these categories ontologically, for each of them has a 
unique, positively valued, order of existence, dynamism, and activity.
84
 This 
philosophical presupposition means that, since the human person is a unified whole, 
the compositum humanum stands under and within all cultural activities; human 
dignity applies to the person in total.   
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     John Paul II‘s hylomorphic view explicitly governs his sport homilies. In one of 
his earliest sport addresses, shortly before his Wednesday Audience addresses on the 
body, John Paul II makes this point:  
I am glad to perceive with what clarity and precision you, Mr. President, have 
received this teaching of the Church‘s Magisterium in this matter. It is certainly 
an important teaching as it reflects one of the fundamental points of the 
Christian vision of the person. Regarding this, it is good to recall that already in 
the first centuries, Christian thinkers, with little biblical data, affirmed the unity 
of the human person, and vigorously opposed a certain ideology, then in vogue, 
that was characterized by a clear devaluation of the body, and misguided by an 
erroneous over exaltation of the spirit. ‗What is man- asked an author of the end 
of the 2
nd
 century or beginning of the 3rd – what is man, is not a rational animal 
composed of a soul and of a body? The soul, then, taken by itself, is not then, a 
man? No, this is the soul of a man. Then is the body a man? No, but it must be 
said that this is the body of a man. Because of this, neither the soul, nor the 
body, on their own, is a man, but rather, he who we call by this name is that 
which is born from the union of these‘ (De Resurrectione, VIII: Rouet de 
Journal, Enchiridion Patristicum, n. 147, p. 59). Thus, when the Christian 
thinker of this century, Emanuel Mounier says that man is ‗a body in the same 
way that he is spirit: entirely body and entirely spirit‘ (cf. E. Mounier, Il 
Personalismo, Roma 1971, p. 29), he is not saying anything new, but simply 




John Paul II‘s hylomorphic view means that the body‘s relationship to the human 
person is absolutely necessary.
86
 The human body gives concreteness to an 
individual person, for this physical body is this man‘s body. The union of these two 
is what we call a human person. This means, further, that the sportsperson is his or 
her body.
87
 John Paul II makes this claim precisely because his personalism takes 
embodiment seriously; the human body has an intrinsic and substantial connection to 
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the human soul.
88
 Or to say it in reverse, the soul as the form and its particular 
powers are intrinsically dependent on matter. There is an indispensable relationship 
between the soul and the body.  
     In The Acting Person, Wojtyla‘s phenomenological reflection links man‘s visible 
outwardness with his invisible inwardness. ―It is generally recognized that the human 
body is in its visible dynamism the territory where, or in a way even the medium 
whereby, the person expresses himself.‖
89
 This visible expression is important 
because a person‘s body physically locates him in this world. The body in action 
manifests those rich constitutive elements (e.g., transcendence, self-possession, self-
governance, and self-determination) that comprise the different dimensions of 
personal experience. Wojtyla explains that, because this experience is a bodily 
manifestation, this dynamic personal structure both manifests itself in action and is 
realized through action. He states that, because of its value, this complex dynamism 
―leads to integration in both the somatic and the psychical sphere of man.‖
90
 
     Wojtyla expounds that, since bodily performance is an action performed by the 
person or appropriate to the person, that performance is itself a fundamental value.
91
 
Once again this value refers to the personalistic value of the action. Wojtyla further 
defines this good as the value (pre-moral) that ―is a special and probably the most 
fundamental manifestation of the worth of the person himself . . . [it] is therefore a 
special source, and the basis of knowledge about the value of the person (as well as 
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about the values inherent in the person). . . .‖
92
 What follows is that any devaluing or 
misrepresenting of the body brings contempt on its fundamental value and its 
revelation of mankind‘s unique human dignity. John Paul II begins with the human 
being who before or prior to action is intrinsically valuable, and bodily action 
specially discloses this value. Weiss presents the body as a morally neutral object or 
instrument that does not have any essential connection to anything other than itself. 
Weiss‘s teleology becomes so important because, if the body is used by the mind 
(what is essential) to pursue the ideal of excellence, the body appears to hold value 
that is not intrinsic to the body.   
     For a Christian ethic, the body-soul connection is an intimate relationship. It 
follows that bodies speak a special language, for they reveal both to ourselves and to 
others who we are--they reveal our human dignity. If I am my body, then in some 
important sense ―there is no distance between us and our bodies.‖
93
 Therefore, the 
soul and body function as one, not two different substances, as Weiss insists. The 
body then becomes the foundation to possess anything in sport or to receive other co-
contestant‘s embodied actions because it establishes the very possibility of using 
sport equipment and contesting with others.
94
 An athlete picks up a racket or lines up 
a putt only because she has hands and eyes to perform these basic sport skills. In 
sum, the body is the concrete space where such sportive performances are acted with 
others; consequently, the body contributes to the fulfillment of the person. What our 
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bodies are is relevant to what we do and are. This link is significant because 
humanity is tied to materiality--our bodies.  
     This phenomenological link, further portrays the body as subject; the body is not 
felt and experienced only as an object, but the athlete as body does the sensing and 
reacting.
95
 The body as a person‘s body (my body) bears the kind of values—
sensible and organic—unique to the body‘s own somatic dynamism. Thus, the 
vitality of the body goes wherever the person goes because it is crucial to the identity 
of the whole person.   
     When the body is split from the mind, it is perceived totally as an instrument or 
object. According to Meier, splitting the body thus drains it of its humanity.
96
 
Therefore, reductive accounts, which Weiss favors, must be resisted because this 
orientation construes athletic endeavors as drilling, trimming, strengthening, and 
training the body as an objective to be mastered and directed.
97
 If this is the case, the 
body becomes primarily an instrument for completing the sportive task in order to 
obtain excellence. John Paul II‘s phenomenology is a middle path, for as the quote 
on page 150 attests, we are never merely a body or a soul.  
     According to John Paul II‘s middle path, sport that is construed subjectively is a 
lived experience. If sport is re-envisioned as a ―lived experience,‖ sportive actions, 
when understood phenomenologically, dynamically reveal the sportsperson.
98
 The 
standard Thomistic account always assumed that an action presupposes a person. 
Wojtyla still maintains this assumption, but he reverses the exploration in The Acting 
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Person, shifting the focus to instead look within the act since it mirrors or reflects the 
subject. He says that ―we look at the person through his action‖,
99
 and the subject is 
given or presented to us in these lived experiences. In particular, these sportive 
actions express themselves through an athlete‘s body in physical contests with other 
embodied sportspersons. An athlete‘s body is the very dwelling where she hospitably 
receives other embodied sportspersons. Thus, it is through these kinds of bodily 
actions in sport that a person dynamically reveals herself.  
Theology of the Body 
     In TOB, John Paul II turns to ―the beginning‖ of man‘s original experience, 
especially as it relates to human embodiment, in Genesis 2-3. He turns to the first 
chapters of Genesis with the goal of reconstructing the main elements of mankind‘s 
original experience. He intends this prehistory to illumine who humans are meant to 
be. He focuses on three primordial experiences whose extraordinary character we at 
times forget because they are intertwined with ordinary life: original solitude, 
original unity, and original nakedness.
100
 For John Paul II, this original experience is 
foundational because it is ―always at the root of every human experience.‖
101
 
Humans live this experience whether in marriage or in other forms of life.
102
 John 
Paul II asserts that this experience echoes in fallen man himself because it is rooted 
or revealed in historical man‘s theological prehistory. It is imprinted so as to speak of 
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the image of God, for ―sin signifies a state of lost grace;‖ sinfulness must be 
explained with reference to original experience.
103
 Just as Jesus turned to Genesis in 
order for his first-century audience to understand God‘s intention or purpose for 
marriage, so too does John Paul II when explicating who we are as bodies for the 
practice of marriage. I believe, as does Weigel in general,
104
 that if we listen, John 
Paul II invites us to take up Christ‘s approach by reflecting on God‘s plan ―in the 
beginning,‖ not merely for marriage but also for other cultural activities, such as 
sport as an embodied practice.
105
  
     This return to ―the beginning‖ is important for this thesis, because what it means 
to be human requires that a Christian ethic attend to what God originally intended for 
humans. God‘s intention, evident by how he made us as body-persons, is for us to 
function holistically rather than for us to be inherently troubled with this body-mind 
relationship. The latter is true for Weiss.  
     Because Weiss does not account for this body-mind problem historically, his 
problem is ontological at heart. He accepts the dualistic nature as a fact of life, and 
his objective, cosmological (from without) analysis places the body and mind in 
competition or disaccord by nature.
106
 As an adaptation from the sciences, Weiss‘s 
vectoral metaphor depends heavily on a quantitative analysis that distances the body 
from the mind because the body is a thing, a part of the external world. Through 
sportive training, the mind perceives and imposes this vectoral direction on the body 
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so that the disequilibrium between mind and body is altered, corrected, and 
adjusted.
107
 I find that Weiss‘s experience of the body favors if not reductionist, then 
common material structures—mathematical and quantitative—which neglects an 
internal qualitative analysis where the body is not only object but also subject. This 
problem brings my critique full circle with respect to human dignity.  
     Physical exercise and sportive performances are bodily actions. If we are going to 
decide whether these actions are good, John Paul II sees it as imperative that we treat 
the body as integral to who humans are. Spaemann adds that ―what is important is 
that we treat things, plants, animals, human beings and, finally, ourselves, according 
to the values or sets of values appropriate to them, in other words that we should deal 
fairly with reality.‖
108
 This description fits with John Paul II‘s because metaphysics 
affects and relates to moral deliberation. Weiss himself assumes this correlate; 
however, his conception of man is problematic. Weiss‘s portrait of the athlete does 
not deal with reality in its entirety. He paints the body as a thing that needs to be 
subdued and controlled in order for it to be accepted; hence, he titles his third 
chapter, ―The Challenge of the Body.‖ This objective analysis stops short of another 
aspect of bodily reality that John Paul II‘s view of ―body as subject‖ gets at in a way 
that fits human physicality. Again, Wojtyla‘s indebtedness to the method of 
phenomenology brings back into reflection things such as athletes as concrete 
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     Weiss‘s young male athlete commences with a separated mind and body, and it is 
only through the amiable practice of sport that a dedicated athlete is able to accept 
and overcome the discord of the body and, therefore, to become unified.
110
 
Dombrowski believes that Weiss‘s view is hylmorphism,
111
 but he qualifies that it is 
aspirational, not metaphysical. For this thesis, I interpret Weiss‘s mind-body 
relationship as dualistic because of his metaphysic; therefore, it is not hylmorphic. 
To say that it is hylomorphic is odd. Even though Weiss practically aims for this 
mind-body unity (with some kind of substance dualism interaction) as part of what it 
means to accomplish the intended end of bodily excellence,
112
 his metaphysic 
precludes this unity, especially considering that his eschatology dissolves any 
intrinsic relationship between mind and body. He lacks integration because he limits 
the body to manipulation.  
     Because Weiss reduces the body to a tool of the mind, he ignores the reality and 
value unique to the lived body both now and in the eschaton. As stated in the last 
chapter, Weiss‘s athletic body does not survive death because it decays and 
eventually ceases to exist.
113
 Any kind of personal identity as a bearer of 
excellence—whether soul and/or body—is dissolved because the only things that 
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survive are athletic performances. Those actions that participated in and were 
manifested in the temporal order the ideal of excellence. Thus, according to Weiss, 
who we are can ultimately be reduced to performances or actions that intersect—in 
the best case scenario—with this Platonic Form. Looking from the viewpoint of 
Weiss‘s theory, I pity the many athletes who never identify with this form of 
excellence because they never contest in a manner that meets his justification, this 
universal essence or ideal. I might add that older athletes are also vulnerable because 
the ideal of bodily excellence becomes more and more difficult to obtain; however, 
Weiss‘s category conveniently limits this endeavor for excellence to the young.   
     I believe this ideal is what causes Weiss to regularly refer to members of sport as 
a set or defined class (―the athlete‖). Like Plato, he believes that all the particular 
members in the temporal world have an archetype or exemplar existing in the 
immutable, eternal, and immaterial world of the Forms.
114
 However, his category is 
quite restrictive. Even if, for the sake of argument, I grant his premise concerning 
young people and excellence, some sports (e.g., cycling, golf) require age and 
maturity of thought in order to achieve bodily excellence; thus, the young are not the 
best candidates to achieve a good like bodily excellence.
115
 Furthermore, Weiss‘s 
ideality construes redemption as an escape from the body because excellent 
performances identify the self with a Platonic Form, which is what survives, not the 
body itself. Yet, this self ultimately passes away, for the self‘s individuality is 
irrelevant.
116
 Indeed, it is precisely Weiss‘s Platonism that neglects the particular 
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individual, for Weiss‘s athlete has no significance in comparison with the ideal.
117
 
The athlete‘s single importance is a function of her bodily participation in the form 
of excellence. Thus, whatever identity the athlete had is now lost in eternity.  
     I assume that, because John Paul II‘s hylmorphism works from a particular 
metaphysic grounded objectively in creation, humans ought to function holistically. 
This manner of functioning is how we were made, and furthermore, for a Christian 
ethic, our redemption eschatologically includes our bodies. In other words, since we 
are human persons, the body is indispensable both to who we are and to what we 
should do both now and forevermore.  
     Thanks to the influence of Descartes,
118
 Weiss holds that that the ―body is 
voluminous, spread out in space . . . . Through it we express tendencies, appetites, 
impulses, reactions and responses.‖
119
 Because it has no size, the mind is non-
corporeal, immaterial. Following his dualism to its full course, Weiss makes sense of 
the interaction between the body and the mind by emphasizing the authoritative role 
that the mind plays in supervising the body in order to achieve bodily excellence. I 
agree with Meier:
120
 his precise and pointed terminology demonstrates that the body 
is an instrument or object to be utilized and possessed so that it can follow its 
vectoral thrust. If I am correct, his view of the body helps us understand why Weiss 
spends more time arguing for bodily excellence than other goods. Bodily excellence 
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is a good his athlete seeks or wants, and in order to complete himself, he must as an 
athlete achieve this excellence.  
     For a Christian ethic, in particular for John Paul II, this objective approach is an 
inadequate and an inappropriate conception of human persons. It does not mean that 
everything Weiss says is wrong; John Paul II himself works from similar premises 
concerning an objectivist account of human nature, but his phenomenology 
completes Weiss‘s cosmological read because it turns to a subjective, experiential 
reading of the sportsperson. John Paul II‘s Theology of the Body, and more largely 
his personalism, repairs this problem by valuing the human subject as an embodied 
person. For this thesis, I will develop a few important qualities of the human body 
that serve to correct this problem.  
 
The Sportive Body: Theological Value 
For John Paul II, the human body as a creation of God is invested with natural 
dignity. His sport homilies echo his deeper analysis of the body in TOB. He states 
that 
The body, according to Christian concept, deserves due interest, real respect, 
loving and wise care, invested as it is with natural dignity, capable of a 
mysterious sacrality and destined to ultimate victory over death itself, as our 






Human Embodiment an Ontological Good 
     This natural dignity of the human body is understood with respect to the creation 
narrative in Genesis. In the first (Elohist) account of creation, the text informs the 
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reader of the objective fact that man and woman are made in the image and likeness 
of God (Gen.1:26-27).
122
 If made in God‘s image, then mankind cannot be reduced 
to the elements of the created world. John Paul II is clear that humans are bodily 
creatures, which ties them to the visible world, but that they are the same time ―in the 
image of God,‖ which affirms their inability to be reduced to the world. He clarifies 
this tension of humanity‘s unified existence in a later address as ―the divine image 
impressed in the body ‗from the beginning‘.‖
123
 This unified understanding of 
humans defines who humans are. John Paul II points out that the theological 
character of this first account defines man primarily in the dimensions of being and 
existing. He then continues with the story of creation, which he interprets as reaching 
its apex when mankind is created: God declares that this fact of human existence is 
very good (Gen.1.31). He comments that ―one must understand the entity of the 
good, that is, the aspect of value.‖
124
 That is, the human being, body and soul, is an 
ontological good that forms ―an incontrovertible point of reference and solid basis of 
a metaphysics and also for an anthropology and an ethics to which ‗ens et bonum 
convertuntur‟ [being and good are convertible].‖
125
 Human existence, body and soul, 
is good in itself.  
     In the second (Yahwist) creation account, John Paul II references mankind‘s 
original solitude (Gen. 2:18) to demonstrate that Adam, upon reflection, discovered 
that he was unique among all that God created.
126
 Again, this unique difference is 
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true because of ―the basic irreducibility of the human being to the natural world.‖
127
 
Adam experiences solitude because he uniquely among all that is visible is a human 
person. John Paul II states that this experience of solitude is derived from mankind‘s 
very nature, his humanity.
128
 The knowledge that Adam is a body ―belongs deeply to 
the structure of the personal subject.‖
129
 The other kinds of beings belong to a 
different bodily kind than Adam and Eve, who are made in God‘s image. As image 
bearers, Adam and Eve are in a special relationship to, with, and before God that 
these others are not, which expresses a special dignity and identity.  
     This special dignity and relationship are an embodied relationship. Adam tends to 
and cultivates the garden, and God gives him a task, which serves as a test, to name 
these other bodies. As a test, it links this task as an experience with the awareness of 
his body. Adam becomes conscious of his own body, and his knowledge and 
freedom both here and in Genesis 2:16-17 express that he is a body-person.
130
 
Because he can think and do things that animals cannot, Adam discovers not only 
that he is different, but also that the basis for this difference is his personhood. Thus, 
John Paul II concludes that the human person is subject not only of his interiority 
(i.e., self-consciousness and self-determination) but also of his own body.
131
 This test 
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demonstrates that Adam is aware of the meaning of his own body, the very structure 
of which ―permits him to be the author of genuinely human activity.‖
132
  
     John Paul II sees this awareness of bodies as an ―echo‖ in sport itself because he 
considers the human body the masterpiece of the whole of creation for its proportion, 
vigor, and beauty and because the sportive body witnesses to the soul—the breath of 
life—and the invisible qualities of our person.
133
 Because it holds an intrinsic 
relationship to the soul, the body participates fully in the dignity that God gives to 
humans made in His image.  
     John Paul II observes this lived-body experience as an expression of multiple 
goods. In sport, we can realize and discover who we are as acting, embodied persons; 
we can develop or form ourselves through the habits specific to sport. In a message 
delivered to an international group of athletes, he comments: 
Athletic competition draws out of the human person some of his noblest 
qualities and talents. He must learn the secrets of his own body, its strengths and 
weaknesses, its stamina and its breaking point. He must develop, through long 
hours of exercise and effort, the power of concentration and the habit of 
discipline, learning how to hold his strength in reserve and to conserve his 
energy for that final moment when the victory depends on a great burst of speed 




Note that John Paul II regards this lived experience as disclosing and unfolding new 
insights because it elicits values and limitations that belong to embodied persons. 
These values are specific to the body as subject rather than merely the body as 
object. Therefore, this stance toward the human person values the worth of an 
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individual—human dignity—from inside-out and outside-in. Both dimensions are 
integral to who we are as human beings and thus are also integral to personal 
development and fulfillment. 
     Because of his Cartesian dualism, Paul Weiss values the body as a means to 
achieve bodily excellence. This value, however, does not agree with the value 
appropriate to the body as created by God. The body does not have natural dignity in 
Weiss‘s view. His body is emptied of its humanity, ―a dead body devoid of its 
vivifying, expressive and intentional abilities and qualities.‖
135
 Instead of being a 
body indispensable to a person, Weiss‘s body is the ―mind‘s‖ body directed toward 
ideals that ultimately eventuate in its own dissolution. The eternal swallows this 




     The visible and invisible are intrinsically related; therefore, if the body is 
instrumentalized, the person‘s dignity is violated. Spaemann helps make this 
important connection for a Christian ethic. ―If body and language are not respected 
as the means by which the person is represented, but are used as means to other ends, 
then the person is used only as a means.‖
137
 This intrinsic relationship presses some 
immediate ethical inquiry. Are there any actions that Weiss‘s ideal of excellence 
would justifiably deem as inherently wrong? What precludes him from justifying 
actions that harm the body and that, therefore, also harm the dignity of the person?  
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     Moral justification of these kinds of moral matters, i.e., harm, is where Weiss is 
quite ambivalent. Feezell raises these same kinds of questions as he criticizes 
Weiss‘s impersonal stance. As an outsider to sport, Weiss fails to consider sport in 
the first-person, a lived experience.
138
 I believe that this impersonal perspective 
results not only because Weiss is an outsider, but also, as I have argued, because his 
athlete‘s body witnesses to an impersonal self and ultimately to an ideal of 
excellence where the self dissolves. Feezell recognizes that the ideal of excellence 
has difficulty making sense of the frivolity and non-usefulness that runs through the 
practice of sport. Sport is a form of play. Because he never played sport, Weiss 
considers sport alongside other realities and cultural activities where excellence is a 
basic good. In the case of sport, people try to realize the good of excellence in order 
to attain self-completion. Weiss‘s abstract stance, or what I call a cosmological read 
of sport, isolates this good not only over other goods that constitute sport, but also 
(perhaps even more) over the subjects who exist prior to sport. Feezell estimates that 
Weiss‘s idealism vitiates, if not eradicates, other important goods that, from an 
insider‘s perspective, equally justify and attract a person to sport. That much is true, 
and I equally point this same criticism to Weiss and even to Feezell. However, 
because Weiss‘s teleology overwhelms his own metaphysic and anthropology, I 
cannot see how he objects to actions that a Christian ethic, because of the natural 
dignity of the body, would deem morally blameworthy. Feezell acknowledges the 
same point concerning Weiss‘s ideality and even interprets Weiss as a 
consequentialist or utilitarian. He recognizes that Weiss‘s sporting experience ―must 
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be undergone because of a goal or an ideal; a ―that-for-the-sake-of-which.‖
139
 This 
use-value ethic is problematic for this thesis, not only because Weiss under 
appreciates other goods, but also because he devalues the person as a whole. Weiss‘s 
value of excellence does not correspond to reality, and when excellence is divorced 
from human dignity, it can lead to actions that harm the body and the person.  
     Weiss admits at the beginning of his own inquiry about sport that it is for the sake 
of excellence that athletes submit themselves to bodily risk, punishment, injury, and 
even death in some cases .
140
 In all fairness, he quickly asserts that, because of the 
purpose and rules of a game, any attempt to destroy or cripple others is morally 
objectionable.
141
 Is it morally objectionable because of the reality of human dignity 
presented to us in and through the body, or is it objectionable because of the purpose 
of the game itself? These are, of course, two different reasons for ethical 
justification. If a game can be identified with examples where the purpose and rules 
permit violence to the body, then what keeps Weiss from theoretically objecting to 
violence?  Because of their traditions, boxing, Ultimate Fighting, ancient Greek 
pankration, hockey, and other sports morally permit and even accept some forms of 
violence that at face value harm the body. To defeat Weiss‘s moral grounds only 
requires an example where the purpose and rules permit harm to the body. It appears 
that some games or sport, both historically and presently, do just that. In these sports, 
the aim is not merely to be assertive and aggressive—neither of which necessarily 
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entail violence—but to intentionally inflict hurt or injury. Because they are contact 
sports, this aim involves the body in ways that other non-contact sports do not.
142
  
     Weiss might cry foul on the inferences I have drawn. He strongly asserts that, 
―Athletics puts primary emphasis, not on the effort to subjugate others, as a theory of 
aggression maintains, but on the opposite effort to deal properly with other realities, 
in order to enable one to become excellent in and through the use of a body.‖
143
 This 
key text opens Weiss more fully to my criticism, for here his metaphysic assesses 
how an athlete must relate to others. Yet, when discussing the body as a reality that 
we must properly deal with, Weiss divests it of any natural dignity.   
     Because he views the body as lacking this ontic goodness and because he 
objectively conceptualizes the body as something external, his language of use has 
ethical implications. The body is an instrument that the athlete uses to become 
excellent. If sport is about achieving excellence, then Weiss‘s athlete not only uses 
his own body but also the bodies of others because the whole contest in general 
makes use of others‘ bodies for the sake of excellence. Weiss‘s metaphysical dualism 
deprives his athletes of the opportunity to deal fairly with bodily reality because he 
reduces this order of existence to instrumental worth. He prevents his athletes from 
properly valuing their bodies because his theory of sport abstracts them from the very 
reality that he claims must be properly dealt with. Because bodies manifest the 
dignity of humans, Weiss‘s athlete as a person disappears.
144
 However, if the body is 
                                                 
142
 I do not intend to address violence as an ethical issue. My point is to raise an objection which 
clearly mistreats the dignity of the body. For a helpful distinction between aggression and violence in 
competitive sports, see Jim Parry, ―Violence and Aggression in Contemporary Sport,‖ ,‖ in Ethics and 
Sport, eds., M. J. McNamee and S. J. Parry, (London: E & FN Spon., 1998), 205-224.  
143
 Weiss, Sport, 36. Italics are mine for emphasis.  
144
 Spaemann, Basic Moral Concepts, 75-76. 
   168
indispensable to what it means to be a human person and if the body participates in 
human dignity as an image bearer of God, then this reality demands a loving respect, 
for bodily reality is a gift of God.  
 
Body as Sign and Gift: A Call to Self-Donation 
     John Paul II claims that the body is a sign and gift. Since the second account of 
creation witnesses to man‘s consciousness or awareness of his own bodiliness, then 
as a subject of his own body, ―it permits him to be the author of genuinely human 
activity. In this activity, the body expresses the person.‖
145
 This line summarizes the 
thesis of John Paul II‘s entire theology of the body messages. It means that, 
according to its order of existence, the body as a sign or primordial sacrament is 
designed in such a way as to manifest the invisible in the material, visible world. 
John Paul II declares that only the human body ―is capable of making visible what is 
invisible: the spiritual and the divine.‖
146
 He emphasizes that invisibility includes the 
spiritual, which for him is the soul as the form of the body. Because we are images of 
God, the human body also manifests something of who God is. Thus, for a 
sportsperson, not only is the body a sacrament of her own person, but also her bodily 
action is an outward sign of God. Therefore, imaging God in sport is not limited to 
the interior structure of the soul, but this imaging includes human corporeality as an 
expression of the person.
147
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     John Paul II identifies the semiotic character of human corporeality.
148
 As a sign, 
the body refers to a reality beyond itself while simultaneously presenting this 
spiritual and divine reality to us in a physical fashion. To say that the body as a sign 
expresses the invisible means that the body is more than just matter. It is more than 
just matter because, ―…in the mystery of creation, the human body carried within 
itself an unquestionable sign of the ―image of God‖. …‖
149
 The human body bears 
the invisible. If it carries within itself an unquestionable sign, the body as sign is 
natural. This purpose is inscribed in the (natural) laws of the body, and it is 
intentional, for this is what God intended in how He made the human body. Jamros 
critically identifies that, if the human body was merely an intentional sign of God, it 
would not have any intrinsic meaning because its meaning would be derived solely 
from God‘s intention, which is arbitrary.
150
 He elucidates that, if the intrinsic 
relationship between the invisible and visible is to be maintained, then the soul as the 
image of God ―is the indispensable middle term between God and the body.‖
151
 It is 
a sign because of its relationship to the form, the soul. The soul-body connection is 
inseparable. Jamros concludes that the first meaning of the body as a sign—and how 
the body best functions as a sign—must be understood in relation to the soul, even if 
John Paul II does not make this connection explicitly clear.
152
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     Jamros, perceptively sees another point that is underdeveloped by John Paul II but 
that is necessary to strengthen a Christian theology of the body. Jamros recognizes 
some problems with John Paul II‘s imprecise language and conceptual clarity 
concerning the body as a sign. It is possible for something to be a sign and still be 
extrinsic to the person. Thus, Jamros argues that the idea of sign is not robust enough 
to explicate the indispensable and substantial connection between the soul and 
body.
153
 John Paul II does in places go beyond the idea of sign when he refers to the 
nuptial meaning of the body, where the body shows or expresses the richness of self-
donation,
154
 and when he refers to the fact that the body is as an immediate 
expression of the soul.
155
 If the body is a sign and an immediate expression, then this 
double affirmation of body as sign and an immediate expression does not expose 
John Paul II to the charge that his semiotic language instrumentalizes the value of the 
body. In sum, because the body is endowed with natural dignity and because its role 
as a sign is an essential aspect of its structure and relation to the soul as an embodied 
person, it is positively or intrinsically valued.  
     Since the human body expresses the person, there is a kinship between the body 
and the soul. The unity of the two as a composite is fundamental to this kinship. This 
kinship for John Paul II is most clearly evidenced by the fact that the body is created 
to meaningfully and directly communicate or express personal love. This 
communication of love is true because God‘s love was the divine motive for 
creation: ―only love, in fact, gives rise to the good and is well pleased with the 
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good.‖
156
 God‘s love is the source that willed the good of the world‘s existence and 
human existence.
157
 This action of God in the first account of creation signifies ―a 
fundamental and ‗radical‘ gift, that is an act of giving in which the gift comes into 
being precisely from nothing.‖
158
 As embodied beings, humans are loved into being 
out of nothing. If this act of love is true of the original gift of existence that all people 
share, then this gift is acknowledged when our own bodies communicate love toward 
God and others, even in sport. However, before I get ahead of myself, I must define 
more thoroughly the concept of gift. 
     John Paul II calls for a ―hermeneutics of the gift‖ in order to decisively interpret 
the essential truth concerning who we are as embodied beings. What he means by 
this hermeneutic is that, if everything that is brought into existence is a gift, then this 
reality serves as the interpretive lens for understanding all of life. For John Paul II, 
the language of gift means that God as the donor has lovingly given the gift of 
creation, and this giving establishes a relationship between the giver and the 
receiver.
159
 He makes it clear that what he means by gift involves a donor, a 
recipient, and the new relationship that is forged by the gift. This relation first 
appears when God creates man in his image (Gen.1:27). As the image of God, man is 
able to understand God‘s loving call into existence as a gift and to receive the world 
as a gift. This call of love establishes the original covenant relationship or 
partnership between God and man.
160
 Because of who he is, Adam is capable of 
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acknowledging and reciprocating this gift. This gift from God to us is predicated on 
His own love. It is his gift of love that makes all subsequent gifts possible. Adam can 
love because he first was loved.  
     John Paul II considers this gift aspect in sport when he writes,  
With this celebration the world of sport is joining in a great chorus, as it were, to 
express through prayer, song, play and movement a hymn of praise and 
thanksgiving to the Lord. It is a fitting occasion to give thanks to God for the gift 
of sport, in which the human person exercises his body, intellect and will, 




According to John Paul II‘s hermeneutic of gift, athletes witness to this reality of gift 
both as a fundamental gift that constitutes their body-person in and through sport and 
as God‘s own self-donation for bringing these gifts into existence from nothing.
162
 
God‘s love in particular is expressed through athletic talents because their very 
potential, though certainly needing to be developed, comes from the fact that God 
brought them into existence. God‘s love in the mystery of creation declared and 
approved that existence is good.
163
 God‘s repeated, primal declaration that ―it was 
very good‖ fits the reality of gift. Since these created realities exist, God‘s delight in 
them expresses his love for what is good. In the same way, John Paul II sees that it is 
fit for athletes to give thanks because thanks is a form of love that recognizes 
sportive talents as good. Giving thanks reciprocates this gift of existence because 
giving thanks is appropriate or fitting.
164
 Just as Adam recognized his own body as 
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gift, when athletes receive their sportive endowments as gift, they should respond in 
gratitude, an echo of God‘s love. However, as this quote implies, this reality of gift 
was never meant to be something that a person or athlete experiences alone. John 
Paul II argues that this love aims at mutuality, a community of persons, because 
mutuality perfectly expresses God‘s love.  
    We can find two meanings of this original experience in the second creation 
account. First, when he receives creation as a gift of God‘s love, Adam, unlike the 
rest of the created bodies, is conscious that this reality comes from God. 
Furthermore, the original solitude discloses that none of the other beings meet the 
basic conditions of a helpmate, so Adam needs a helper. This meaning of the original 
experience is a review of the above. Second, when Adam acknowledges and receives 
Eve, his helper, as a gift, he realizes that she is someone with whom he can ―exist in 
a relation of reciprocal gift.‖
165
 This latter is the original unity that demonstrates that 
Adam and Eve (and humans in general) were made for relationship and that the only 
way to fulfill themselves was to sincerely give or lovingly donate themselves to each 
other. John Paul II explains that this sincere giving, whether spousal or non-spousal, 
constitutes the communion of persons. Adam‘s solitude is not good (Gen. 2.18), 
which, according to John Paul II, means that Adam is not completely realizing his 
essence.
166
 Schmitz explains that, for Adam, ―something more is still needed to 
round out and to the complete origin and nature of man.‖
167
 Humans are meant to 
exist in relationship. John Paul II asserts that Adam does not realize himself fully 
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unless he exists ―with someone‖ or ―for someone.‖ He concludes that, ―communion 
of persons means living in a reciprocal ‗for,‘ in a relationship of reciprocal gift.‖
168
   
     Though the nuptial meaning of the body for Adam and Eve eminently incarnates 
this gift of mutual surrender for conjugal love, John Paul II finds that the nuptial 
meaning of the body stands in service of non-spousal or non-betrothed love as well, 
which is the primary implication for this thesis.
169
 In many ways, this point is a 
recapitulation of this whole chapter concerning the personalistic norm and human 
dignity. John Paul II states that it is necessary to penetrate this mysterious structure 
of the human body because, as a gift, the body-person was created both to love and 
to be loved. This fact of receiving and reciprocating love, a mutual surrender or 
donation, ―constitutes the fundamental component of human existence in the 
world.‖
170
 How we are supposed to relate to others, regardless of the form of life, is 
conditioned by this law of gift because it is inscribed in our humanity. Furthermore, 
this law of gift is in accordance with the reality that, as God‘s image bearers, people 
have dignity and value. Since humans are created with this value, it is this 
personalistic norm that has John Paul II boldly claim that love is the only proper way 
to treat this reality. In Love and Responsibility, John Paul II states that ―the person is 
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a good towards which the only proper and adequate attitude is love.‖
171
 Again, this is 
not an arbitrary principle, for it flows from the very essence and nature of the person. 
    In his sport homilies, John Paul II refers to this essential activity of love as the 
most authentic dimension of sport.
172
 His hermeneutic of gift has him charge the 
athletes to recognize in themselves and each other ―the sign of the Fatherhood of 
God‖ because of love.
173
 If the Father‘s love was the divine motive for creation and 
the original covenant, then the body as a sign carries within itself this gift structure as 
the image of God.
174
  If this gift structure is true, then athletes, like Adam and Eve, 
witness to this reality of the gift when they accept their own bodies and each other as 
gifts from God. Athletes understand the body as gift not only when they receive their 
own bodies as gifts, but also when this hermeneutic of gift moves them to play sport 
in a relationship of mutual gift. This mutual gift that was established in the original 
unity has John Paul II cite regularly from Guadium et Spes that man ―can fully 
discover his true self only in a sincere giving of himself.‖
175
  
     The gift does not pertain to only one dimension of our humanity, but to the whole. 
Wojtyla recognizes the whole human person when he examines the natural ground of 
the dignity of the person.
176
 If natural dignity applies to the whole person, since 
dignity is a gift of God, then an athlete is always conscious of how this gift relates to 
the being himself, other human beings, and the Creator in how he treats others and 
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develops his gifts. If this ontological character is forgotten or denied, as it appears to 
be for Weiss, then ―this leads to a fundamental disorientation of man‘s cognitive and 
active powers.‖
177
 Thus, as Augustine warns, when humans lose sight of their 
intended end, misdirection is inevitable. What we do is intimately related to human 
dignity, personalistic value, and what and who we are as created by God.  
     Since existence is a gift, anything athletes do with their abilities is never entirely 
their possession or their achievement. If existence itself is a gift, then the capacities 
that ground sportive abilities themselves are equally gifts because they are rooted in 
human dignity. Furthermore, athletes should correctly consider sportive kinds of 
abilities as gifts from God to themselves. Because this gifting is realized in the 
context of sporting communities, athletes reciprocate by intentionally acting as gifts 
to others. 
     This concept of gift raises a few important implications as it relates to Weiss‘s 
theory of sport and Christian ethics and sport. Since Weiss instrumentalizes the 
human body, his theory of sport begins with task and not gift. The body becomes 
primarily an instrument for completing the sportive task in order to obtain 
excellence. What unites Weiss‘s athlete‘s attraction to sport, the challenge of the 
body, and the urge to win is achieving certain goals, accomplishing certain tasks. 
Certainly deserving of credit for his phenomenological analysis of the sportive act, 
Weiss organizes the sequence of sportive moves for a specific sport in a manner 
where achievements motivate sportive action. These actions are the building blocks 
that prepare the body to realize success.
178
 Weiss posits that ―he [the athlete] should 
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make his body a locus of rights and duties, and a source of acts, desirable and 
effective. Only if he so structures and directs this body will he have a body that is 
used and not merely worked upon by what is external to it.‖
179
 Weiss‘s language of 
the body appears to be more akin to that of production, like a machine, than it does 
the language of body-person as a subject of gift.   
     Because Weiss‘s Platonism swallows and thus uses this temporal sportive body, 
this utility value transvalues the sportive body primarily into task. His telos compels 
his athlete to produce something that ―enables him to be self-sufficient.‖
180
 Weiss‘s 
athletic portrait excessively demands bodily functions because he construes his man 
of action as focusing on public and maximum results, progress, striving to win, 
victory, and achievement in order to ―set him over against the rest of men,‖ 
outdistancing all.
181
 What distinguishes his athlete is what he has constructed or built 
from his body. Weiss‘s athlete is like an ―acting machine‖ instead of an ―acting 
person‖ because it is the finished sportive product that his athlete constructs and that 
becomes the empirical standard for assessing physical excellence.
182
 Weiss‘s athlete 
gives his body not as a gift to be received and offered to others, but as a means to 
begin and complete the sportive contest unto himself. More precisely, since objective 
skills, training methods, and techniques bear the load of his means for achieving 
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excellence,
183
 his athlete‘s body speaks a language whose vocabulary, syntax, and 
grammar emphasizes instrumentalism and production.  
     Weiss‘s math metaphor contributes to this machine-like analysis. His quantitative 
and analytical attention, given to physical moves and acts, technique, methods, and 
training, obscures bodily dignity. The body is an object, a thing, at the service of 
Weiss‘s impersonal human excellence. He focuses inordinately on ―what part of us is 
involved in the movement‖ and pays less attention to the wholeness of the body as a 
gift to be received with wonder.
184
 Kretchmar adds that, since bodily movement 
expresses who the person is, to limit our understanding of it to the level of 
quantitative symbols defies the other equally rich descriptions that are aspects of this 
lived experience. Perhaps it is because Weiss feels that the body has not been 
adequately considered that the body dominates his exposition in his attempt to justify 
the body. He acknowledges that no athlete lives entirely in his body. This 
acknowledgment is intended to balance the attention given to the sportive body, yet it 
is his Cartesian dualism that overshadows how the mind subjects the body to its 
ideals. This is where my view patently differs from that of Dombrowski, who 
classifies Weiss‘s mind-body relationship as hylmorphism; however, even he 
recognizes Weiss‘s tendency to resign the athlete to merely physical excellence.
185
 If 
it were not for Weiss‘s metaphysical excursus coupled with his Cartesian 
assumptions and language, I would be inclined toward a different interpretation.  
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     Because of the ontological lack in the human person as a contingent particular, 
Weiss‘s view of the body is such that his athlete is more at the service of objective 
skills, rightly performed acts, and techniques—what John Paul II refers to as 
transitive action—than he is concerned with perfecting and completing the subject of 
those actions. Weiss‘s self-completion is more for the body than the other aspects of 
being human in sport; the external actions are the necessary means for achieving 
excellence. He points toward the results his body produces--sportive performances--
rather than to the dignity that, as an excellence, calls for special regard.  
Fallen, Redeemed and Glorified Body 
     Because John Paul II‘s description of the body follows the progress of 
redemption, his account takes into consideration the fallen, redeemed, and glorified 
body.
186
 I first explain three important implications concerning the fallen body before 
I conclude with the redeemed body.  
Result of Sin: Distortion, Doubt and Cult of the Body 
     The advent of sin introduced into the world what John Paul II calls the 
―fundamental disquiet in all human existence.‖ John Paul II says that this negative 
original experience is true for ―historical man,‖ or man after the fall. Following the 
biblical story, he holds humans responsible because the first sin gave birth to 
inordinate desire, or lust, which radically betrays the original experience that was 
God‘s plan.
187
 I mention a few of the more important effects of original sin as they 
bear on this thesis.  
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     First, original sin distorts how humans see and relate to reality. Man turned his 
back on and denied God‘s love when he was tempted to exchange the free gift of life 
and a relationship with Gift (God) for a lie.
188
 Instead of dealing properly with 
reality, a lie distorts how humans see and relate the natural to the supernatural, or the 
visible to the invisible. In effect, Adam and Even thought they could share dominion 
with God. Man became ―alienated from the Love that was the source of the original 
gift, the source of the fullness of good intended for the creature.‖
189
 The body is no 
longer an unquestionable witness or sign of the image of God. The image of God is 
imprinted on the body, but sin obfuscates this witness because the body now 
witnesses to the objective reality of sin. John Paul II explains that sin as 
concupiscence does not come from God as a fruit of the mystery of the good creation 
but ―from the world‖ as a fruit of misusing the body-person to eat disobediently from 
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.
190
  
     Second, since Adam and Eve were meant to realize God‘s love as a gift through 
the body shared with each other, original sin casts doubt on this gift. This original sin 
resulted in a shame (Gen.3.10) that makes it difficult to sense ―the human essentiality 
of one‘s own body . . . .‖
191
 The very body that God intended to function as sign of 
the person now hides because humans experience disintegration. There was ―a 
certain constitutive fracture in the human person‘s interior, a breakup, as it were, of 
man‘s original spiritual and somatic unity.‖
192
 This rupture in human identity means 
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that the gift of integration that God graciously created is lost. If this is true, then 
humans are no longer fully conscious of the meaning of the body. The original 
experience meant that Adam and Eve fully accepted and confirmed who they were 
via their bodies since ―the body, as the expression of the person, was the first sign of 
the presence of man in the visible world.‖
193
 In Genesis 3:10, nakedness now shows 
that this source of certainty about the meaning of the body is changed because this 
verse confirms ―the collapse of the original experience of the body as a sign of the 
person in the visible world.‖
194
 This nakedness frustrates the meaning that the human 
body communicates concerning the person. The dynamic unity is now a battle as the 
soul lacks communion and intimacy with the body. For a Christian ethic, it is 
important to note that the body is not the cause of sin because sin belongs to the 
spirit; however, because the inner and outer are so tightly related, the whole person 
experiences the fall.
195
    
     Third, if the body no longer properly signifies the person, then the body 
(nakedness for Adam and Eve) can be misperceived as an object for self-
gratification--an object to use, not to love. Rather than welcoming and accepting the 
other human being as a gift, a transmutation and reduction occurs, for other body-
persons can become objects for my concupiscence.
196
 Because of sin, the body is a 
tool instead of a visible sign for mutual self-donation. In particular, John Paul II sees 
this transmutation or objectification manifested in disordered sexual desire when a 
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person reduces the other person to a sexual object, use-value to satisfy sensual 
pleasure. When a person is thus objectified, the whole body-person is neglected, and 
the body is not understood as a sign of the invisible. In sport, objectification occurs 
when bodily attributes or goods are prized over the dignity of the whole person.  
     In his sport homilies, John Paul II recognizes this moral matter in sport as the cult 
of the body. Cult of the body is true when sportive performances do not respect the 
integrity and dignity of the compositum humanum. In particular, when the reality of 
who humans are is put to the service of worldly ideals (e.g., profit, perfectible body, 
winning-at-all-costs), bodily value is overturned and severed from its indispensable 
relationship to the soul.  
     John Paul II summarizes these deviations as a forgetfulness of the ontic goodness 




Unfortunately there are many signs, and perhaps they are becoming more 
evident, of a malaise that sometimes calls into question even the ethical values 
that are at the basis of athletic activity. In addition to a sport that helps people, 
there is another that harms them; in addition to a sport that enhances the body, 
there is another that degrades it and betrays it; in addition to a sport that pursues 
noble ideals, there is another that looks only for profit; in addition to a sport that 




Sport, however, becomes an alienating phenomenon when the performance of 
skill and physical strength results in idolatry of the body; when exaggerated 
competition leads to regarding one's opponent as an enemy to be humiliated; 
when the enthusiasm of fans prevents an objective evaluation of the person and 
events and, above all, when it degenerates into violence. A predominating 
commercial interest, moreover, can turn sports into a mere search for profit.
199
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Every care must be taken to protect the human body from any attack on its 




The above quotes represent the negative form of each of the three original 
experiences.
201
 Egoism and self-assertion mask original solitude in sport. Both of 
these are alienation, which not only refers to the body and to others, but because it is 
symptomatic of a deeper alienation, it also refers to God too, indicating idolatry.
202
 
The fear and shame that accompanied the first sin are re-narrated in sport when 
competition touches different concerns, thus resulting in violence and humiliation 
and degrading modern sport. Original unity is transgressed with the proclivity to use 
others, bringing division instead of unity. The contestant becomes an opponent, 
somebody whom another contestant must overcome at all costs in order to win. The 
game is reduced merely to a zero-sum outcome rather than functioning as a mutual 
striving toward the many excellences afforded by this test and contest. Athletic 
achievement overrides the other dimensions of sport, forgetting other energies and 
aspects of what it means to be human. Original nakedness stops at the body alone 
because now the body is a spectacle, a sensual object to obsessively observe or 
excessively display. The attraction to sport ends with the ideal sportive body, the 
very theory that Weiss appears to promote.  
     John Paul II attends to this attraction to the body when discussing his personalism 
in the artistic order.
203
 In particular, he addresses the ethical issue of encountering the 
―reality of the body‖ and ―experiences of the body‖ when the body is the subject of 
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works of art. His point is that how we look at the human body in art ―cannot be 
completely isolated in man‘s subjective consciousness from the “look” about which 
Christ speaks in the Sermon on the Mount when he puts us on guard against 
concupiscence.‖
204
 He deliberatively links aesthetics with ethics. Thus, how we 
portray the body, both in art and for this thesis in sport, is related to human dignity. 
Because the ethos of the body is inextricably linked to the body‘s ontological 
identification as the body of the person, when a sports contest cuts the human body 
off from its nuptial meaning—in general, the sincere gift of self of which God 
himself is the exemplar, and in particular, in spousal love to become ―one flesh‖— it 
offends the dignity of the body. The body signifies the gift of the person. How the 
athlete and institution of sport portray sportive bodies and how spectators look at 
these bodies becomes an issue germane to human dignity. If the body is objectified, 
then the interior structure of the person is hidden or veiled, which reinforces the 
rupture caused by original sin.
205
  
     John Paul II describes this misdirection as anonymity. Objectification strips the 
body from a particular person because it is no longer an intimate gift for 
communicating oneself to others in a sportive context. In sport, the adequate 
response to other body-persons is trust and acceptance. Trust lovingly furthers this 
test-contest so that a multiplicity of dimensions belonging to the person are 
developed and realized. Often, however, sport becomes a product in which sportive 
bodies are anonymously spread across different media, confusing the ethos of the 
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body with ethos of the image.
206
 The body then gets transferred ―outside of this 
configuration of interpersonal gift‖ and incorporated into a larger body with various 
ideologies and secular teleologies.
207
 This transfer in many ways is a transfiguration. 
These new contexts reorder this bodily reality as an ontic good to other intended 
ends. The body loses it concrete physicality as an unrepeatable body belonging to 
this or that athlete because now it is virtually everywhere, being watched by millions 
of others. It is now a subject of the institution of sport, of mass culture. Producers, 
photographers, and syndicated sports programs appropriate and reproduce it for 
many different viewers to know,
208
 albeit in a moral and spiritual climate that lusts 
arouse for ends quite contrary to the dignity of the human person. Athletes and 
viewers are engrossed not simply in entertainment or artistic value: because this is a 
human body, the encounter is moral.
209
  
     In the context of addressing pornography, John Paul II states that, when the 
dignity of the person is lost,  
the human body loses that deeply subjective meaning of the gift and becomes an 
object destined for the knowledge of many, by which those who look will 
assimilate or even take possession of something that evidently exists (or rather 
should exist) by its very essence on the level of gift—of gift by the person to the 




With its erotic longings and sensual bodies, sport can easily become prey to 
voyeurism. It becomes a spectacle, thanks to a climate that often fosters 
exhibitionism, because big business targets and markets to consumers‘ inordinate 
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lusts, which abound in ―historical‖ man. Like pornography, sport as spectacle 
oversteps the limits of shame through its shameless exploitation of the body in a 
dynamic and complicated manner.
211
 The integral truth about man is overwritten by 
the spectacle itself. The body is reduced ―to the rank of an object, of an object of 
―enjoyment‖ intended for the satisfaction of mere concupiscence.‖
212
 These athletes, 
whether they choose or not, become a spectacle without any fundamental contact or 
relationship with the viewers; therefore, what is exposed and uncovered is a body as 
object and does not fulfill the nuptial meaning of the body. Furthermore, John Paul 
avers that the body as spectacle violates the full truth of the object—the inalienable 
dignity of the body—and that it therefore fails to ennoble everything that is 
human.
213
 Certainly, the body is visible as an image on a screen or billboard, but it is 
disconnected from the person, so what is disclosed is not correlate to reality. Finally, 
the body becomes an object of production and is valued for its transitive action 
independent from the subject of those actions (intransitive action). I will say more 
about this distinction below. This production commodifies the sportive body because 
the body is sold and traded by the purveyors of sport at the expense of the person, 
thus sacrificing human dignity.  
     Weiss runs dangerously close to this reductionism and objectification with his 
preoccupation with the body, especially as he relates the athlete to others who 
equally if not inordinately prize the body—glamorous women, worldly successful, 
and the hero.
214
 Weiss gives priority to the sensible goods at the expense of a fuller 
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reality because the human person is not merely a perfectible body. Yes, Weiss claims 
that a healthy spirit should enrich whatever an athlete does; however, he never fully 
explains or develops what this means concerning the intellectual and moral goods of 
the interiority of man or how it comports with the reality of the dignity of the human 
person. 
Redemption of the Body  
     As I conclude this section, it is necessary to summarize and tease out a few 
important implications as they relate to Weiss‘s theory of sport. This dialogue with 
Weiss then includes the redeemed and glorified body, as well as other pertinent 
issues.  
     To begin, I interpret Weiss‘s mind-body relationship as essentially characterizing 
human existence after the fall. As noted in the last chapter, Weiss‘s theory of sport 
includes no original state of innocence or historical fall. This is important because 
Weiss confuses the order of sin with the order of creation. For a Christian ethic, 
following John Paul II, although sin wreaks havoc on the whole cosmos, these orders 
are distinct and separate. Our original human experience (Gen. 1-2) is the real 
meaning of life. Sin is alien to humanity‘s original goodness. Sin and evil, according 
to the Christian tradition, cannot be reduced to the good. Original sin explains why 
there is disorder between soul and body. If humans are ontologically good, then sin is 
a parasite, a corruption of goodness. What is wrong for Weiss just is--a fact of our 
existence. Since he identifies human nature with evil, he must ultimately lay the 
blame on God. He believes that humans, who are contingent creatures, are guilty 
simply because they exist. However, for a Christian ethic, sin or evil is not the way it 
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is supposed to be, so redemption or restoration is a correction, a healing of human 
persons and of the cosmos by Christ.  
     For Weiss, redemption eliminates the human person that his preferred future 
pictures. His recourse for overcoming this state of affairs is to look to another world 
for a cure, but the outcome is the loss of self, both body and soul. Weiss begins his 
anthropology with this fundamental flaw as a fact of our existence and views 
redemption as an attempt to flee or escape from with his Platonic ascent. 
Furthermore, Weiss‘s dualism deifies the mind because it claims that the mind by 
itself knows what is good and true. His ―mind‖ educates and directs the body because 
it is capable of discerning the excellent project intended for self-completion. His 
optimism concerning the mind‘s epistemic capacities is difficult to maintain if 
something is inherently wrong with our finitude. How is it possible to extricate the 
mind from its own problem? Weiss‘s epistemic confidence concerning moral 
knowledge grants the mind a power that human experience does not warrant. His 
―mind‖ is implicated in the fundamental flaw of human existence. Because of the 
inescapable confusion and misperception that result from man‘s fallenness, 
O‘Donovan questions a method of moral reasoning that does not hold a measure of 
epistemological guardedness.
215
 This is not say that Weiss‘s objectivism or moral 
realism are not without ontological grounds, only that human fallenness obscures this 
order to the human mind.  
     Because of this problem concerning the fall, a Christian ethic takes its epistemic 
confidence from the theological authority that God discloses the truth about man and 
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the moral order in and through his redemption of the world in Jesus Christ.
216
 What 
is man? Utilizing his phenomenological method with a reflection on Vatican II ten 
years after its opening, Wojtyla elaborates in Sources of Renewal on the centrality 
that Christ has for the Church, a centrality that Vatican II adamantly reinforces. 
―Christ…fully reveals man to himself and brings to light this most high calling‖ (GS 
22).
217
 It is God‘s definitive self-disclosure in Christ that a Christian ethic 
apprehends and that restores the true, proper value of man. The centrality of 
redemptive reality gives the ultimate answer to what or who human beings are. This 
plan of redemptive love is linked to the incarnation of God made man.
218
 Again, 
Wojtyla cites this truth from his favorite text in Vatican II (GS 22),
219
  
He who is the ‗image of the invisible God‘ (Col.1:15), is himself the perfect man 
who has restored in the children of Adam that likeness to God which had been 
disfigured ever since the first sin. Human nature, by the very fact that it was 
assumed, not absorbed, in him, has been raised in us also to a dignity beyond 
compare. For, by his incarnation, he, the son of God, has in a certain way united 




John Paul II deliberately draws on this link between incarnation and redemption 
because the restoration of man was the purpose of the incarnation, and restoration is 
accomplished only through participation in redemption by grace.
221
 The mystery of 
man becomes meaningful in the mystery of the incarnate Word.
222
 His embodiment 
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objectively reveals the love of the Father and heals the problem caused by original 
sin.  
     In the second cycle of TOB series, John Paul II further elucidates the relationship 
between the incarnation and redemption: 
Through redemption, every human being has received himself and his own body 
anew, as it were, from God. Christ inscribed in the human body—in the body of 
every man and every women—a new dignity, because he himself has taken up 





Because Christ in his body was given up for us, he has accomplished the redemption 
of the body.
224
 His incarnation and redemption vindicate the created order, human 
physicality. His death and resurrection secure for us as body-persons the possibility 
of functioning as God intended in the original experience. For ―historical man,‖ this 
dignity survived the fall; however, as a mystery of faith through the indwelling 
presence of the Holy Spirit, the in-breaking reality of the gospel epistemologically 
awakens and frees a Christian to affirm and more fully realize this great dignity.
225
  
     With respect to embodiment, redemption means, according to John Paul II‘s 
interpretation of 1 Corinthians 6, that ―man‘s ‗body‘ is no longer only; ‗his own‘.‖
226
 
He is no longer his own because he has this new living reality of the Holy Spirit who 
tabernacles in our bodies, which we were originally given by God. Of course, 
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because of how God originally made human persons, the Christian‘s man still is 
constituted as a personal subject. But now St. Paul means to show that the Holy 
Spirit is a ―further source of the dignity of the body…who is also the source of the 
moral duty that derives from such dignity.‖ Furthermore, because of the fruit of 
redemption--being purchased by God and indwelt by His Spirit--this new dignity 
enables a Christian to receive himself anew as a gift from God.
227
 In addition, this 
new creation as a gift is a new reality that gives rise to new obligations, as John Paul 
II sees in 1 Corinthians 6:13-20.  Because they have received this gift, Christians 
must not ―sin against their own bodies‖ (1 Cor 6:18). Christians must ethically relate 
to this new reality according to its true nature. They must shun any immoral use of 
the body. Keeping the body pure by treating it according to its new dignity radiates 
the glory of God in and through the body.
228
 Hence, moral duties come from such 
dignity.  
     As I have argued throughout this chapter, Weiss does not begin with this 
presupposition about dignity. Even where he assumes dignity, as explicitly stated 
four times in his book,
229
 either his concept of dignity is underdeveloped and lacks 
explanation and justification, or his organizing telic principle (excellence) is 
detached from what is means to be human. Weiss‘s Platonic ordering gives a sense of 
dignity that the athlete might develop more fully as he participates in bodily 
excellence, but it provides no clear sense of the dignity that humans already have as 
gift. John Paul II reminds Christian anthropology and Christian ethics that dignity is 
both a present actuality, because humans are made in God‘s image, and a future 
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potentiality, because eschatologically, humans are called to become the image of 
Christ and to more fully realize their moral dignity. For Weiss, the concept of dignity 
cannot do the kind of conceptual and ethical work that one might expect if there is 
more behind why we should or should not do certain actions. Since he does not 
explain who humans are, dignity in no way gives content or structure to what he 
claims is the goal of sport, bodily excellence. Thus, he claims excellence is the 
athlete‘s goal, but this goal may or may not be the true goal. In contrast, John Paul 
II‘s teleology is intimately connected to his metaphysic because the goal functions as 
an end of who humans in nature were intended to become. If humans are given 
natural dignity because they possess God‘s image, then we should strive to help 
others realize this good, both individually and socially.    
     How a person should treat his or her body depends on who humans are. Since 
bodies manifest persons, and since persons are given natural dignity, the constitutive, 
proscriptive rules and the sportsmanship rules of a particular sport should both 
properly relate to this reality. Weiss‘s explanation of moral duties is consistently 
grounded in the rules of the game, rules that determine how an athlete should 
function while she assumes this given role in sports.
230
 What is the basis for these 
rules? How do rules relate to the reality of being human?  
     John Paul II explains that the purpose of the human body is for the Lord, which 
means that ―every Christian must take into account in his behavior toward ‗his own‘ 
body and obviously also toward another‘s body…‖
231
 John Paul II‘s reference to 
another‘s body recalls the nuptial meaning of the body, for this new dignity directs us 
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to freely love the gift of other bodies. The fullness of this dignity is possible because 
of the redemptive reality that Christians were bought with a price (1 Cor 6:19-20); 
therefore, Paul exhorts Christians to glorify God.
232
   
     It is important to point out the John Paul II does not concern himself merely with 
an individual‘s own body. Why? These bodies are the Lord‘s, so cosmic and social 
implications follow. If they are the Lord‘s, then no matter the sphere, embodiment 
matters so much that human bodies either glorify God by bringing out the fullness of 
dignity in interpersonal relations, or they do not glorify him at all. Graham Ward 
interprets ―Lord‖ in 1 Corinthians 6 as a political title because this ―Lord,‖ not 
Caesar, is sovereign over these bodies.
233
 John Paul II intimates the cosmic 
dimension. He argues that the basis for this bodily behavior is the supernatural reality 
that, as a fact, affects every human being and ―permeates every sphere of reciprocal 
common life between human beings….‖
234
 This cosmic dimension presents a radical 
antithesis for Christians who play sport. Playing sport cannot be separated from the 
reigning politic, which demands that a Christian ethic inquire, ―What do the ‗lords; 
of sport want and intend? In what respect are these ends alien to the ‗Lord‘ of sport?‖ 
I explore this line of inquiry more in my final chapter when I address idolatry in 
sport, a moral matter specific to sport.  
 
Eschatological Body 
     In the third cycle of TOB, John Paul II looks at embodiment in the light of the 
eschaton. Eschatological man refers to a vision of man‘s future resurrection and 
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destiny. In this short series of addresses, John Paul II examines Christ‘s appeal to the 
resurrection when he responds to the Sadducees (Mt. 22: 23) because it relates to the 
body-person unity in the new heaven and earth. For the sake of this thesis, it is not 
necessary to rehearse the details of John Paul II‘s exegesis as it pertains to marriage 
because it is his conclusion that is important for the meaning of a Christian 
anthropology.   
     John Paul II states that the basis for a Christian faith in the resurrection is 
Scripture itself because Scripture witnesses to the power of the living God. The 
Synoptics (Mt. 22:24-30; Mk. 12:19-25; Lk. 20:28-36) testify to the future 
resurrection of the body and to the state of the bodies of risen human beings.
235
 
―Resurrection means restoration to the true life of human bodiliness, which was 
subjected to death in its temporal phase.‖
236
 For John Paul II, this new state in the 
―other world‖ (Lk. 20:35-36) means that ―man will keep his own psychomatic nature 
[hylmorphism].‖ He states if, this were not true, then the whole idea of the 
resurrection would be meaningless. Thus, the resurrection is not a disincarnation of 
man, but rather a ―spiritualization of his somatic nature.‖
237
 This spiritualization 
represents a new system of powers. Instead of the discord that plagues the body and 
spirit relationship for historical man, there will be a harmonious and reciprocal 
relationship between body and soul in communion with God and others. The 
redeemed body begins to testify to this communion in earthly life as it matures in 
personality.
238
 John Paul II states that ―the resurrection will consist in the perfect 
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participation of all that is bodily in man in all that is spiritual in him. At the same 
time, it will consist in the perfect realization of what is personal in man.‖
239
 
     Because of the reality of the resurrection, John Paul II affirms several truths 
concerning theological anthropology. These truths have a direct bearing on this 
thesis.
240
 First, contrary to Plato‘s idea, the body is not temporarily connected with 
the soul. Second, the body and the soul together constitute the unity and integrity of 
the human person. Third, if this harmonious and reciprocal relationship is the end 
state, then the earthly life in the redeemed body aims at this kind of relationship, both 
individually and socially, as a witness to this eschatological experience. He 
summarizes,  
. . . the truth about the resurrection clearly affirms that man‘s eschatological 
perfection and happiness cannot be understood as a state of the soul alone, 
separated (according to Plato, liberated) form the body, but must be understood 
as the definitively and perfectly integrated state of man brought about by such a 





Fourth, this reality is the definitive fulfillment of the human race where this ―other 
world‖ is God‘s world. His presence will completely fill it,
242
 thereby creating ―a 
wholly new state of human life itself.‖
243
 John Paul II would be the first to admit that 
the details are shrouded in mystery; nonetheless, this future human embodiment will 
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     The eschatological experience that John Paul II affirms is at odds with the 
sportive body that Weiss represents in his Platonic eschaton. Many of these details 
have been alluded to throughout this chapter, so I will address only a few here.  
     First, Weiss‘s ontological union is in reality formed between the effects of bodily 
performances and this divine ordering of excellence.
245
 The self is gone, and the 
body no longer exists. If the estrangement of the body was true while Weiss‘s athlete 
played on earth, then it is exponentially true in the afterlife. If anything exists from 
these excellent performances it is only a memory eternalized in the ideal of 
excellence.  
     Second, Weiss reserves this supposed union only for those who have identified or 
properly accepted their sportive bodies. Although each athlete participates in 
Being—the laws of existence—only those athletes who experience excellence are 
eternalized.
246
 Weiss‘s eschatological experience is reserved only for certain 
individuals—exclusively for the excellent athletes. (We must keep in mind that he 
uses ―individual‖ loosely in the eschaton.)  
     Third, John Paul II‘s anthropology considers not only the relationship that humans 
have to one another, but also the relationship specific to God himself. Thus, who 
humans are, along with their intended end, ultimately depends upon this relationship 
with God. If excellence is dependent on God, and if athletes live in pursuit of 
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excellence, then this promised, eschatological good in Jesus Christ—a good that 
redeemed man begins to participate in now and envisage because of the kingdom of 
God—radically alters our conception of what an athlete is attracted to and strives for 
in and through sport.
247
 If our relationship with God affects any notion of excellence, 
this relationship implies that we must consider such goods as bodily excellence in 
light of this eschatological reality. As John Paul II claims, this eschatological end is 
the definitive fulfillment. 
     If the resurrection is the fulfillment of the nuptial meaning of the body, and if the 
nuptial meaning of the body is a call to self-donate, to love, then this gift of love lies 
at the center of any human practice. Thus, contestants are viewed as friends because 
in this mutual (gift) exchange, the giving and receiving fosters dialogue and openness 
to others.
248
 The gift reminds contestants that this exchange is a cooperative activity 
in which all sportive interaction witnesses to the richness of being, the value and 
dignity, of the others.
249
 This sense of mutuality, which springs from the reality of 
gift, is for John Paul II an eschatological sign. When sport is played accordingly, it is 
―for the whole of society and a prelude to that new age in which nation ‗shall not lift 
up sword against nation‘ (Is. 2:4).‖
250
 He notes that mutuality must be recovered 
because it is a qualitative aspect that easily falls prey to the quantitative ideals that 
the laws of production and consumption use and manipulate. In particular, when 
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athletes acknowledge this gift and strive to reciprocate it, it becomes an activity 
grounded in a mutual quest toward excellence.  
     Fraleigh follows a similar logic to that of John Paul II, though without the 
theological justification and explanation. When excellence is not grounded in this 
mutual exchange between contestants, then Fraleigh envisages ―excellence not as a 
qualitative concept concerned primarily with how well the contest is played‖ 
between contestants of equal worth and value (as it should be according to Fraleigh), 
but instead as an ―inherently and numerically exclusive concept.‖
251
 It is the latter 
point that characterizes Weiss‘s logic of sport because excellence signifies or is 
measured by achieving maximum results and outdistancing all.
252
 Here Weiss 
appears to conflate excellence and winning, or arete and agon. Weiss adamantly 
holds that the agon characteristic of games should cause athletes to try, strive, and 
want to win. He states that a true athlete—one who pursues bodily excellence—must 
give himself to winning.
253
 Why is this? I understand that, for Weiss, the main 
criterion of sportive excellence is winning. Weiss equates winning with the obtaining 
of maximum results, which means that winning constitutes excellence. If this link 
between winning and results is true, then his athlete must give himself bodily to 
winning because the road to victory rests on this criterion of exhibiting excellence.
254
 
He claims that the objective of a game is the ability to produce results because 
sportive achievements are what differentiate the athlete from his opponent.
255
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     For Weiss, this objective of a game does not mean that all men accomplish these 
objective feats of sportive excellence; rather, it means that, because we in our human 
nature share this attraction or desire for excellence, we are able to discern these self-
evident truths of excellence as they are communicated in and through great 
performances. Nor does it mean that only the winners develop in this pursuit of 
excellence.
256
 Weiss observes that ―even the defeated gain from the game. They 
benefit from the mere fact that they have engaged in a contest, that they have 
encountered a display of great skill, that they have made the exhibition of that skill 
possible or desirable, that they exerted themselves to the limit, and that they have 
made a game come to be.‖
257
 Notice that, although the defeated achieve some gain or 
value, Weiss never indicates that they realize excellence because excellence is 
tethered to achievement. Why? 
     Weiss‘s athlete strives to stand alone because, according to Weiss, to excel is to 
gain superiority ―over against the rest of men.‖
258
 Therefore, the athletic goal aims 
toward an individual and thus exclusive achievement.
259
 Dombrowski concurs that 
Weiss‘s overall stance seems to commit him to accentuate winning and victory more 
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than other dimensions of sport.
260
 It is this perceived problem that Dombrowksi 
prudently remedies and fills out with the Greek ideal of kalokagathia.
261
 However, 
even if Weiss is guilty of overstating victory and under-developing other excellences 
(e.g., intellectual and moral), Dombrowski contends that, because Weiss does not 
view athletics as important as other pursuits in life, he deemphasizes winning in 
sport.
262
 I beg to differ. Because Weiss‘s eschaton presents the burden of eternity and 
immortality, this reality puts the mutual gift and exchange of this whole sporting 
activity at the service of or for the sake of an impersonal form of excellence, which 
maximal results represent.
263
 Weiss‘s eschaton dehumanizes athletic activity because 
his Platonic prime value of excellence is not a participation that affirms the value and 
dignity of the athlete, nor is the future predicated on mutual giving, for all that is left 
is the Form. Thus, the solitary self is neither completed nor perfected.  
     Because of the ultimate end of his story,
264
 Weiss recognizes, respects, and 
responds not to the full dignity of the human person, but narrowly to those who have 
achieved bodily excellence. He does not see the full truth of who humans are because 
his metaphysic offers a partial account of humanity, amplifying some dimensions 
while overlooking others.
265
 Because the indications of temporal excellence that 
Weiss observes in the natural world are ultimately calls of excellence from the ideal 
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world, this final end ultimately determines what is valued here on this earth. Thus, 
this final end does not affirm the full dignity and worth of human persons.  
 
Excellent Persons 
     Finally, my final criticism draws from moral theologian Servais Pinckaers, who 
helps develop another important implication when excellence is divorced from 
human dignity. Weiss‘s failure to consider the whole person gives rise to the 
temptation discussed below, especially since his end reduces bodily value and 
performances to utility value.  
     Pinckaers makes an important distinction with respect to a difference between 
ethics and art or technique.
266
 This broad distinction proves helpful for John Paul II‘s 
analysis of sport. Pinckaers refers to art in a classical sense as ―any production 
requiring special knowledge and aptitude,‖ such as the fine arts. Technique is more 
―associated with modern sciences and designates the entire field of practical 
applications based on scientific discoveries, notably instruments and machines.‖ 
Thus, when technique was used in a traditional sense, it ―meant a number of 
procedures combined to produce a determined result.‖ Pinckaers, for example, 
applies this distinction to the techniques comprising the movements in dance. Today, 
technique focuses on scientific applications, but the object is still production, a 
production culled from the constant search for the best methods. For example, in 
sport studies, the science of kinesiology, which includes physiology, biomechanics, 
motor learning, and motor control, is dominated by a focus on the empirical and 
relies on ―controlled studies, actual measurements and statistically significant 
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findings.‖
267
 The elite and professional athlete is routinely subjected to this scientific 
knowledge and ―expert systems‖ in order to employ the latest technology and 
information in his pursuit of excellence. William Freeman pleads that, although this 
information is helpful, it must not be separated from ethical concerns:  
Success in 21
st
 century sport should mean more than victory for whoever 
devoted the most time and money to sport. This obsessive approach to sport 
lessens the meaning of the achievement, because society is neither surprised nor 




Although a person can be an excellent businessman, a famous physician, or a superb 
college instructor, if he is divorced from moral considerations, he still lacks moral 
excellence.
269
 In many cases, success is conferred on others because their excellent 
skills or technique realize an achievement of some external good. The converse is 
also true: a morally upright person can lack technical or artistic talent. Pinckaers 
avers, ―Morality qualifies a person comprehensively: this individual is a just, 
courageous person. Art and technique qualify a person only partially, in the context 
of external activity: this individual is a good surgeon, a clever worker, a great 
musician,‖ or an excellent athlete.  
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     Herbert McCabe makes the same point with respect to sport itself.
270
 He 
distinguishes between the skills or habits necessary to produce a good result in sport 
and the dispositions or virtues that are needed in order to excel morally in life itself. 
Sadly, these two often are divorced. McCabe states, ―So while a skill or technique is 
directed to the excellence of the thing produced, a virtue [moral excellence] is 
directed to the excellence of the producer.‖
271
 This distinction parallels John Paul II‘s 
own distinction between the transitive and intransitive aspects of human action.
272
 
Concerning these two aspects of human action, he argues, ―Whatever we make in our 
action, whatever effects or products we bring about in it, we always simultaneously 
‗make ourselves‘ in it as well...We express ourselves, we in some way shape 
ourselves, we fulfill ourselves.‖
273
 Weiss‘s notion of excellence points more toward a 
thing produced and less toward the moral excellence of the performers. This neglect 
is to the detriment of human dignity. I have attested to this neglect repeatedly 
because the skills and results are objective measures for what constitutes excellence. 
However, it is only this kind of excellence that Weiss says will be eternalized. 
     A Christian ethic cannot leave excellence at the level of non-moral goods, such as 
excellent skills and technique, because non-moral goods are the transitive or 
objective aspect of an action that, in particular to elite sports, is governed by 
technical, economic, and physical laws. Again, the transitive dimension is only one 
aspect of human action; the other subjective dimension postulates that ―the primacy 
                                                 
270
 Herbert McCabe, O.P., God Still Matters, ed. Brian Davies, OP (London: Continuum, 2002), 192-
194. 
271
 McCabe, God Still Matters, 193.  
272
 This distinction serves as the basis for his encyclical on work. See John Paul II, On Human Work: 
Encyclical Laborem exercens (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1981).  
273
 Karol Wojtyla, ―The Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis,‖ in Person and Community, 
266.  
   204
of the person [is] over technology, because the person is both origin and end of work 
[sport].‖
274
 For John Paul II, the norm for excellence begins and ends with the 
dignity or personal value of the human person. As long as sport has other human 
beings as its object, this norm binds a sportsperson to treat persons for who they 
really and fully are. Thus, John Paul II‘s personalism re-orders any kind of ranking 
so that ―sport is at the service of man and not man at the service of sport, and 
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BEHOLD THE MAN!: CHRIST AT THE CENTER OF SPORT REALITY 
 
Aim of Inquiry: Direction of chapter 
     Let me begin by explaining what are and are not my reasons for consulting 
Bonhoeffer‘s ethical vision. I do not intend to compare and/or contrast Bonhoeffer 
and John Paul II along conventional Lutheran and Catholic lines of theological 
reasoning.
1
 I do not seek to interrogate the Catholic vision of the Christian life 
according to problems raised in the Reformation. Undoubtedly, important differences 
exist between the two especially in regard to their assumptions about ethics and 
methods of moral reasoning.
2
 However, for this thesis, they offer different voices that 
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I consult based on the merit of their own distinctive emphases and strengths. By 
mutually informing a Christian ethic, the two voices together resist any kind of 
expectation that Christian ethics is a monolithic reality.
3
 Neither do I suppose that 
together these two men adequately describe all that appears as theological ethics. 
Dramm emphasizes that in Ethics, Bonhoeffer ―was not concerned with erecting an 
edifice of thought that was in harmony with itself in all respects, and certainly not 
with giving us a perfect set of ethical precepts.‖
4
 It is unfair to expect an entire ethic 
either of these two men or of this thesis, especially since my proposal has from the 
beginning been a modest (not comprehensive) attempt to fill the lacuna on 
theologico-ethical reflection on sport. Therefore, I intend to continue the constructive 
nature of my thesis by considering the significance of Bonhoeffer‘s Christological 
basis for sport and thus how it contributes to a theological ethic for sport. 
     The task for Christian ethics with John Paul II in the last chapter was to extend the 
discussion of important anthropological matters in sport, i.e., matters concerning 
human excellence and dignity, to Christian ethics. John Paul II‘s anthropology is the 
basis for his moral theology. Thus, the bridge from Weiss as philosopher to Wojtyla 
as philosopher was ―natural‖ in the sense that moral reflection consists of using 
reason to attend to the truth about man and these indications of order, excellence. 
However, in response to the decisive influence and direction of the renewal of 
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Catholic moral theology subsequent to Vatican II,
5
 John Paul II equally reckons the 
role of faith when reflecting on lived experience.
6
 Wojtyla faithfully considers the 
truth about man not only from experience or a natural meaning,
7
 but also,  
The dignity of the human person finds it full confirmation in the very fact of 
revelation, for this fact signifies the establishment of contact between God and 
the human being. To the human being, created in ―the image and likeness of 
God,‖ God communicates God‘s own thoughts and plans. But this is not all. God 
also ―becomes a human being;‖ God enters the human drama of human 





Wojtyla assuredly asserts that ―we must turn to theology and draw upon the full 
content of revelation‖ for it is ―from above‖ that we obtain a fully adequate 
interpretation both of moral norms and the human being.
9
 In fact, because theology 
unveils this truth concerning ourselves and God, methodologically it demands that 
Christian ethics does ―moral theology in strict connection with dogmatics.‖
10
 In the 
last chapter, my analysis of John Paul II‘s Theology of the Body demonstrated this 
aspect of his methodology. This work functions as theological discourse, which as a 
source supplements and critiques other convictions and sources of moral judgment 
instead of ignoring or remaining distant from them.
11
 Moreover, his personalism is 
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taken up into and developed according to revelation, Christ, which means it is a 
Christological personalism. His favorite text from Guadium et spes (22) attests to this 
fact; the truth about the human person is only fully revealed from the vantage point 
of Christ.
12
 Curran concurs that John Paul II‘s moral theology links 
anthropocentricism and theocentrism together.
13
 This link proves important for this 
thesis as whole because Christian ethics unapologetically focuses on what God has 
revealed concerning humans. Furthermore, Cessario argues that ―to include nature 
and natural law in Christian ethics does not make life-in-Christ an afterthought for 
Roman Catholic moral instruction. On the contrary, Jesus stands at the centre of 
every Christian life.‖
14
 This decided emphasis on Christ and revelation forms a 
connection to Bonhoeffer, who begins and ends his Ethics on the reality of the 
revealed Christ.  
     With Bonhoeffer, my theological task continues, but my theological reflection 
turns on an important motif pertaining to Bonhoeffer‘s starting point for ethical 
reflection. My inquiry is concerned with Bonhoeffer‘s Christological basis for 
Christian ethics, directing particular attention toward interpreting how his 
Christological realism values penultimate activities, such as sport. My goal is not to 
offer a complete treatment of Bonhoeffer‘s ethic.
15
 I intend to focus on the above 
and, where necessary, to develop some of the general theologico-ethical 
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presuppositions and implications. I will attempt to draw from and discern the 
possible trajectories in and the significance of Bonhoeffer‘s concrete ethic as a way 
forward for thinking about sports in a North American context.
16
 Bonhoeffer‘s own 
presuppositions and intentions open my thesis to consider different questions and 
answers as they relate to modern muscular Christianity in America. My task in this 
chapter is more specific to the existing evangelical theological assumptions in 
America and in sport ministries—modern muscular Christianity—about how sport 
and faith relate, which is a concern I raised in my introduction. My task is consistent 
with Bonhoeffer‘s Ethics because one of his main concerns as a theologian of the 
church was to help Christians reconceptualize social life, thus preparing them for 
new ways about their relationship as the church to public life.
17
  
     In this first section, my goal is to exposit three core elements of Bonhoeffer‘s 
ethical thought. The second section follows from Bonhoeffer‘s ethical thought in 
relation to a major theologico-ethical problem in modern muscular Christianity, 
namely, dualism—how to relate sport and Christianity.  
 
Christological Basis for Ethics 
     What is distinctive about Bonhoeffer‘s posthumous Ethics is not merely that it is a 
Christian ethic.
18
 For Bonhoeffer, the conceptual foundation for the ethical problem 
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Human beings were never intended to know good and evil, the first principle of non-Christian ethical 
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begins with Jesus Christ, who defines the good. Instead of beginning ethical inquiry 
with either a virtue-based system or an action-oriented system, Bonhoeffer radically 
asserts in his chapter ―Christ, Reality and Good‖ that a wholly other ethical question 
must be considered: ―What is the will of God?‖
19
 He begins here, as influenced by 
Barth,
20
 because the nature of ethics presupposes a decision about ultimate reality, 
which for Bonhoeffer turns on revelation. The other two systems of ethical inquiry 
are concerned primarily with being good and doing good, respectively. If one of 
these systems is the point of departure, then this starting point has substituted 
something other than God for ultimate reality. It presupposes that something 
creaturely or contingent is ultimate. For a Christian ethic, this presupposition is 
tantamount to idolatry because it blurs an ontological distinction between Creator 
and creature. In order to avoid this categorical mistake, Bonhoeffer conceptualizes 
reality (Wirklichkeit) in terms of Christ.
21
 He claims that, for a Christian ethic, these 
other realities, namely self and action in the world, ―are embedded in a wholly other 
ultimate reality, namely, the reality of God the Creator, Reconciler, and 
Redeemer.‖
22
 For Bonhoeffer, all other realities cohere in the reality of God as 
revealed in Christ. Christ is the interpretative key for his whole ethical inquiry. What 
                                                                                                                                          
reflection, so any attempt to do this grasps at reality independent of God, living from their own origin, 
a consequence of the godless choice to eat the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. 
The only way to recover this original unity with God is in Christ who lived by the will of God. A 
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believers no longer stand between good and evil but free and unified to discern and do the will of God 
(Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 316-317.). Cf. Stephen Plant, Bonhoeffer (New York: Continuum, 2004), 77-91, 
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follows then, according to Bonhoeffer, is that ethical reflection and deliberation in 
this world takes on a whole new character (Gestalt).
23
  
     Ethics for Bonhoeffer is not divorced from theology,
24
 so any talk about values or 
standards must be understood in light of God because he is the origin and goal of 
goodness.
25
 Bonhoeffer inquires what meaning goodness would have without God. 
He answers that, ―since God, however, as ultimate reality is no other than the self-
announcing, self-witnessing, self-revealing God in Jesus Christ, the question of good 
can only find its answer in Christ.‖
26
 The ethical and theological come together in the 
reality of God in Christ because Christ is the revelation.
27
 Therefore, ethical 
reflection does not begin with the world apart from this reality because this 
beginning would privilege the self or something from the world as more basic than 
the reality of Christ. This inversion follows the original consequence of disunity 
when humans erected themselves as the creator and judge of reality and, hence, of 
goodness. Bonhoeffer argues that, in the New Testament, this disunity is overcome in 
Christ, by rediscovering unity; this is the ground, ―the point of decision‖ belonging to 
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an ethical experience.
28
 The origin of the good for a Christian ethic is grounded in 
the reality of God because God is the ultimate reality in all that exists.
29
 Thus, the 
ultimate and decisive question for Christian ethics for Bonhoeffer is, ―With what 
reality will we reckon in our life?‖
30
 
    This reality of God carries a Christian ethic to God‘s answer, which is revealed in 
Jesus Christ.
31
 It is only this revelation that answers the ultimate question and that 
allows a person to truly live. The bases for ethics are not some timeless principles but 
the concrete person and work of Jesus Christ. In other words, because of Jesus 
Christ, the world is reconciled and this new, in-breaking Christological reality is the 
ontological ground for a Christian ethic.
32
 Nothing in this created world stands 
outside the reality of Jesus Christ. For Bonhoeffer, the Lordship of Christ takes up 
the entire created world. To talk about the good then is language that refers to the 
real--the concrete reality located in Jesus Christ. Thus, what is good corresponds to 
reality as disclosed in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. According to 
Bonhoeffer himself,  
In Jesus Christ the reality of God has entered into the reality of this world. The 
place where the questions about reality of God and the reality of the world are 
answered at the same time is characterized solely by the name: Jesus Christ. God 
and the world are enclosed in this name. In Christ all things exist (Col. 1:17). 
From now on we cannot speak rightly of either God or the world without 
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     Since Christ has taken and embraced the reality of the world into himself, 
Rasmussen explains that Bonhoeffer‘s Christological realism establishes an 
―ontological coherence of God‘s reality with the reality of the world.‖
34
 For 
Bonhoeffer, the radical nature of the Christ event redescribes all of reality, so any 
understanding of what is real must now be read in the light of Christ‘s reconciliation. 
There is no other reality apart from this. The reality of Christ is what Bonhoeffer 
calls to be actualized.
35
 Christological realism means that any judgments of value or 
obligation apart from the Christocentric understanding of all reality are distortions 
and abstractions.  
 
Ethics as Formation 
     If Jesus Christ is the cornerstone for Bonhoeffer‘s ethics, then it implies that the 
pivotal inquiry becomes ―Who is Christ for us today?‖
36
 For Bonhoeffer, the answer 
to this question for Christian ethics is how Christ becomes real in this world.
37
 
Bonhoeffer uses repeatedly the phrase ‗Ecce Homo‘ as a fitting admonition to how 
Christian action should behold the form of Christ over those who tyrannize, accuse, 
and despise humanity.
38
 Bonhoeffer aims at a concrete ethic so that this question is 
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―about how Christ may take form among us today and here.‖
39
 Because this is a 
concrete ethic, Bonhoeffer claims that it is futile to search for a generalized or 
abstract ethic that attempts to apply what is good once and for all.
40
 Yet, Bonhoeffer 
realizes that there are some difficulties with this inquiry: ―What do ‗among us,‘ 
‗today,‘ and ‗here‘ mean?‖
41
 Because these terms and the concept of formation itself 
are important, I will explain this concrete ethic briefly. 
     Rasmussen argues that, although there are two separate treatments for how 
Bonhoeffer discusses moral action, in the end there is a single method:
42
 
―‗conformation to Christ‘ (Gleichgestaltung) and action in ‗accordance with reality‘ 
or ‗with due regard for reality‘ (Wirklichkeitsgemasessheit).‖
43
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     Focusing on the ―formation‖ (Gestaltung) motif because of its primacy in his 
methodology,
44
 Bonhoeffer explains that, 
the Holy Scripture speaks of formation in a sense that at first sounds quite 
strange. It is not primarily concerned with formation of the world by planning 
and programs, but in all formation it is concerned only with the one form that 
has overcome the world, the form of Jesus Christ. Formation proceeds only from 
here. This does not mean that the teachings of Christ or so-called Christian 
principles should be applied directly to the world in order to form the world 
according to them. Formation occurs only by being drawn into the form of Jesus 
Christ, by being conformed to the unique form of the one who became human, 
was crucified, and is risen. This does not happen as we strive ‗to become like 
Jesus,‘ as we customarily say, but as the form of Jesus Christ himself so works 
on us that it molds us, conforming our form to Christ‘s own (Gal. 4:9). Christ 
remains the only one who forms.
45
    
 
Taking Galatians 4:19 as Bonhoeffer‘s biblical cue, we can understand that 
formation is a transformative, dependent process in which Christ is responsible to 
give and draw thinking, acting humans into conformity with himself.
46
 Furthermore, 
this form—what a person is to participate in as true reality—is clearly and concretely 
constituted as three essential components belonging to the person and work of Christ: 
Jesus Christ the Incarnate, the Crucified, and the Risen.
47
 More specifically, a 
Christian ethic receives its form and unity in the dynamic interplay of this threefold 
structure pertaining to the person and work of Christ. Rasmussen instructs that the  
unity lies in conforming to the Gestalt Christi in the given time and place and 
finding the fitting response there (sachgemaess); that is, determining whether the 
conforming action is one of ‗incarnation‘ (affirmation and cooperation), 
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     Bonhoeffer continues that formation is not merely about individuals, but primarily 
about Jesus Christ taking form in His church. Bonhoeffer constructs his argument 
from the corporate reality of the church as the body of Christ with this formation 
happening ―vicariously and representatively as a model for all human beings.‖
49
 
Bonhoeffer qualifies, however, that the church is not so much a model as it is a 
witness to humanity‘s true form. It bears the form meant for all people, ―which 
belongs to it [the world], which it has already received, but which it has not grasped 
and accepted, namely the form of Jesus Christ that is its own.‖
50
 According to 
Bonhoeffer, this qualification puts the focus fundamentally on the sole form of Jesus 
Christ with the church acting as a piece of humanity in which the centrality of the 
Christ-reality is concretized. The church is not to be concerned with some religious 
or social strategy or world-formation, but rather, it is to exist as the form of Christ in 
his church in the world, whose interests and actions now help her neighbors to be 
human beings before God—preserving the real human being.
51
 Thus, the church 
contextualizes and realizes the reality of Christ‘s form in space and time.
52
 
Therefore, ―among us,‖ ―today,‖ and ―here‖ indicate not merely a theological 
context, but they also point to the historical, definite context of our decisions, tasks, 
experiences, responsibilities, and encounters, in which Christ takes form.
53
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     In summary, Rasmussen informs us that Bonhoeffer‘s methodological procedure 
first inquires about the indicative, ―What is the real?‖
54
 The second inquiry takes up 
the imperative, ―What action on my part would be in accord with reality?‖
55
 The 
objective of Christian ethics is then to realize the revelational reality of God in 
Christ.
56
 That is, the form that Christ takes corresponds to what is real ―because 
reality itself has a chistocratic structure.‖
57
 Bonhoeffer emphatically claims that the 
subject matter is ―God‘s reality revealed in Christ becoming real among God‘s 
creatures.‖
58
 For Bonhoeffer, the ―ultimate importance‖ is that this reality show 
―itself everywhere to be the ultimate reality.‖ This reality demonstrates for a 
Christian ethic that the source of its ethical concern is for God to be known as the 
good.
59
 Bonhoeffer continues that ―the question of the good becomes the question of 
participating in God‘s reality revealed in Christ.‖
60
  
     Since the task for Christian ethics is to wisely and responsibly discern how God‘s 
people should conduct their lives in reality so shaped, an immediate problem occurs 
when this one reality is forgotten or confused regarding conceptual clarity or 
Christian living ―so that there could be other realms of this world which are not 
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primarily relevant ethically, and have in the first instance nothing at all to do with 
this one.‖
61
 According to Bonhoeffer, Christians have at times not affirmed Christ as 
the center of life and existence, which resulted in a divided reality. I now turn to 
Bonhoeffer‘s rejection of this thinking because it holds important implications for 
how Christians relate to sport.  
Two-sphere Thinking 
     Because God in Christ accepted and reconciled the reality of the world with the 
reality of God, Bonhoeffer‘s comprehensive vision of reality entails that there is no 
such thing as reality as a whole split into two parts.
62
 Bonhoeffer‘s concept of reality 
has critical implications for theological thinking.
63
 Working from this ―unified 
perspective on the God-world reality‖, Bonhoeffer mounts a spirited polemic against 
dualism,
64
 ―two realm‖ (Raum) thinking.
65
 If any kind of division of reality is 
admitted between the sacred and profane, supernatural and natural, and Christian and 
unchristian, then Bonhoeffer states that ―the concern of ethics becomes the right 
relation of both parts to each other.‖
66
 Huber adds that this concern is the main 
consequence because it evades an integral understanding of reality by locating the 
central conflicts of human existence between the reality of God and the reality of the 
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world instead of within reality itself.
67
 In other words, instead of reckoning the 
dynamic unity of the reality of God and the reality of the world as established in 
Christ, each of the two realms claims a law unto itself, thus leaving the two standing 
side by side, mutually exclusive. The two realms become ultimate static opposites 
bumping, warring against, and repelling each other.
68
  
     Bonhoeffer explains that at different periods of church history—especially in his 
time with a misunderstanding of the Lutheran doctrine of the ―two kingdoms,‖ which 
precluded German Christians from opposing Hitler‘s tyranny and the National 
Socialist regime—the church has been guilty of granting different spheres or orders 
of the world an autonomy against the ―law of Christ‖ that ―deeply contradicts both 
biblical and Reformation thought.‖
69
 This autonomy is wrong. I will elaborate on this 
confused relationship as a bridge to addressing a primary problem in modern 
muscular Christianity and sport. 
     Bonhoeffer addresses this theme of the two realms in terms of his Christology. If 
all reality is drawn into and held together in Christ (Col. 1:17),
70
 then this division of 
reality is a direct attack on Christ. Bonhoeffer states that 
In all of this the concern of Christ becomes a partial, provincial affair within the 
whole of reality. One reckons with realities outside the reality of Christ. It 
follows that there is a separate access to these realities, apart from Christ. 
However important one may take reality in Christ to be, it always remains a 
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For Bonhoeffer, the only reality that exists is Christ; therefore, when Christians 
partake in Christ, this reality embraces the reality of God and the world. ―In Jesus 
Christ the reality of God has entered the reality of the world.‖
72
 This participation 
leaves a Christian relationship standing not in one or the other space but in both at 
the same time. It is only in this sphere that the form of Christ is realized.
73
 If Jesus 
Christ is to be the center of life, this dualism must be rejected.  
     Bonhoeffer explains that, if we allow this unity to identify one realm with another 
(e.g., the natural with the supernatural or the revelational with the rational), we draw 
an erroneous conclusion.
74
 Like Luther, Bonhoeffer sees the two realms polemically 
related so that they dynamically relate in the Christ-reality, ―and that means only as 
accepted by faith in the ultimate reality.‖
75
 Furthermore, this unity precludes any 
kind of static independence or opposition of principles. Instead, they dialectically 
witness to their common reality, unity in the reality of Christ.
76
 Again, this witness is 
predicated on Bonhoeffer‘s consent to Chalcedonian Christology. Bonhoeffer states 
that,  
Just as in Jesus Christ God and humanity became one, so through Christ what is 
Christian and what is worldly become one in the action of the Christian. They no 
longer battle like eternally hostile principles. The action of the Christian instead 




According to Bonhoeffer, deity and humanity are united in Christ—the two natures 
are one—while they are also differentiated at the same time. In the same way, his 
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Christological approach inextricably unites the reality of the world and the reality of 
God but never denies their difference. That means, a Christian belongs ―completely 
to Christ, one [she] stands at the same time completely in the world.‖
78
 
     Dualism, therefore, denies God‘s revelation in Jesus Christ.
79
 Bonhoeffer notes 
that the wish for some has historically been ―to be ‗Christian‘ without being 
‗worldly,‘ or [to] wish to be worldly without seeing and recognizing the world in 
Christ.‖
80
 The first wish causes a person to abandon the world and seek God, 
whereas the second causes him to abandon God and embrace the world in an attempt 
to build the kingdom of God on earth.
81
 It is important to remember that it is Christ 
as Creator, Reconciler, and Redeemer who affirms the reality of this world. I will 
discuss this further in my final chapter in relation to the ―Natural Life,‖ which is 
another important concept in Ethics.  
 
Modern Muscular Christianity: Two-Sphere Thinking about Sport 
     Bonhoeffer‘s Christological basis for Christian ethics critically addresses the two-
sphere thinking in modern muscular Christianity. Modern muscular Christianity, or 
what Frank Deford labeled ―Sportianity,‖ operates from a bifurcated vision in order 
to relate sport and faith in the evangelical community.
82
 Regardless of which sphere 
they originate from in order to justify their engagement with and in sport, both 
wishes neglect the reality of Christ, which embraces all of life. This bifurcated vision 
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or split raises a host of questions: How has ―Sportianity‖ split reality into two parts? 
Where is the central conflict of human existence between the reality of God and the 
sportive world? How do these realities repel and bump against each other when this 
reality is reckoned outside the reality of Christ? How does this split deny God‘s 
revelation in Jesus Christ? How has sport (reality of the world) been justified as a 
sphere that exists ―in and for itself‖? How has modern muscular Christianity yielded 
ethical criteria for sportive life to the symbolism of modern sport? In this section, I 
take an extended look at two-sphere thinking in modern muscular Christianity and at 
how Bonhoeffer‘s ethical thoughts on this matter expose some serious problems 
regarding how Christians often relate to and inhabit sport.  
     Although modern, evangelical, muscular Christianity is arguably a rebirth of 
Muscular Christianity,
83
 my primary aim does not concern its origin, relation to 
Victorian Muscular Christianity, or history, but rather its theological justification for 
how it relates to sport. Even if, as Ladd and Mathisen argue,
84
 modern muscular 
Christianity lacks an explicit, developed theological foundation, it still seeks some 
form of justification, which I contend is theological and bifurcated. Hoffman iterates 
that this neglect from Christian intellectuals ―has not kept in-the-pew Christians from 
deeply held beliefs and notions about sport and its relationship to the Christian life. 
These find expression in a kind of layperson‘s Sportianity, a set of assumptions that 
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are guaranteed to surface when Christians discuss sport and faith.‖
85
 What lies 
behind these attempts to relate sport and Christianity is an effort to reimagine sport in 
the Christian life, an effort that Hoffman capably criticizes and attempts to repair in 
Good Game: Christianity and the Culture of Sport. However, in his effort to redress 
this problem, Hoffman in the end falls prey to the same misunderstanding on how the 
reality of sport and the reality of God partake in Christ-reality. I address Hoffman‘s 
form of dualism in the final section of this chapter.  
     In the mid-nineteenth century, Muscular Christianity helped forge this link 
between sport and religion.
86
 However, because of its preoccupation with a healthy 
body and manlinesss,
87
 modern muscular Christianity (notably in the form of sport 
ministry in North America) sought an alliance or compatibility between sport and 
Christianity, which Ladd and Mathisen argue is represented by five essential 
elements:
88
 1) pragmatic utility, 2) meritocratic democracy, 3) competitive virtue, 4) 
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heroic models, and 5) therapeutic self-control. Each of these elements serves as 
evidence of the dualism that grounds modern muscular Christianity, and they ground 
ethical thought in a dualistic principle that is divorced from Christ-reality. I will not 
attempt to evaluate fully each of the elements, but as will soon become clear, they all 
assume some form of dualism. This dualism is rather straightforward, and I follow 
others for the descriptive part of my argument, although my evaluation is unique to 
Bonhoeffer, specific to his critique of two-sphere thinking.  
 
The Nature of the Problems 
     Modern muscular Christianity primarily values sport for its extrinsic, instrumental 
effectiveness. Mathisen claims that modern muscular Christians instrumentalize sport 
insofar as their method of engaging this world operates from their faith-based 
commitment to communicate the gospel. Sport is co-opted or used as a vehicle to 
save souls; it is used for evangelistic purposes.
89
 However, this use-value 
presupposes that since sport appeals to the masses as something that people value, 
we should organize our engagement around the very ideals that attract sport 
enthusiasts. How is this use-value dualistic? 
     The evangelistic goal is construed as the sacred realm since the gospel 
proclamation attests to what is ideal; conversion is the goal for Christian engagement 
in the public sphere. Thus, sport is subordinate as a means ―to recruit and promote 
religious beliefs and organizations.‖
90
 Mathisen and another sociologist, Jay 
Coakley, identify numerous religious sport organizations—special purpose 
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groups
91
—whose mission statements and practices verify this functional approach, 
which assumes a symbiotic relationship between sport and religion. For example, the 
National Christian College Athletic Association (NCCAA) states ―that athletics are a 
means to an end; not an end in themselves.‖
92
 The sport ministry of Athletes in 
Action overtly claims that they exist ―[to] build spiritual movements everywhere 
through the platform of sport so that everyone knows someone who truly follows 
Jesus.‖
93
 Ashley Null refers to this approach as ―Ministry through Athletes‖ because 
ministries that mold their strategies around this ethos look to sports to do three 
things:
94
 1) to reach as many people in the world for Christ as possible through 
massive global interest in sports; 2) to present the gospel in terms understandable to 
the experience of the sportive audience; 3) to convince the audience that Christianity 
offers them something that they desire. The key that explains, both for this and for all 
the five essential elements, why Christianity and sports are compatible is found in 
what Mathisen identifies as an ―elective affinity.‖ That is, a kinship is forged 
between sport and religion so they can share certain functions and benefit each other 
in this symbiotic relationship.
95
 Mathisen concludes that a grand spiritual purpose, 
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namely, the enhancement of the gospel and saving of souls, can be inferred ―in the 
elective affinity between evangelical Christianity and modern sport represented by 
these five elements...‖
96
 He also cautions against interpreting this relationship as an 
exact symbiosis because the benefits are not shared equally; in fact, this relationship 





     Since modern muscular Christianity hinges the value of sport on its effectiveness 
as a vehicle for proclamation and conversion, it essentially localizes concerns for 
what is good in sport--its potential for good consequences. What at first appears to be 
sport used for religious purposes is subtly religion made attractive because of the 
attention given to sport. In Victorian Muscular Christianity, participation in sport had 
inherent value;
98
 modern muscular Christianity does not depart from this core 
distinctive, but it looks to the platform that sport affords for the sacred results of 
evangelism and conversion. Oriard surmises that the twentieth-century marriage of 
sport and gospel in North America with groups like Athletes in Action is 
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fundamentally different than its forebears. He claims that ―the shift from justifying 
sport in the nineteenth century by appeals to religion, to promoting religion by 
appeals to sport, reveals much about the changing status of both sport and religion in 
America in little more than a century.‖
99
 Sport as a secular space is essentially 
neutral, which provides an inroad for gospel proclamation, religious engagement in 
this sphere. The concern clearly is how to relate the gospel, the Christian or sacred 
sphere, to this sportive sphere.  
     When we follow the trajectory set by Bonhoeffer‘s rejection of two-sphere 
thinking, we discover a few reasons why this is problematic. To begin, the appeal to 
sport is fundamentally misplaced. Modern muscular Christianity begins with the 
reality of sport existing alongside the church. Sport is a reality of this world that 
exists autonomously from Christ, and when it bumps against the spiritual sphere, it 
becomes a separate space with the potential to herald the gospel. Bonhoeffer 
characterizes this thinking ―as an ever-progressing independence of the worldly over 
against the spiritual.‖
100
 It is precisely the ideals of sport, i.e., success, winning, and 
cultural relevance, that make it a likely candidate for proclaiming the gospel. When 
sport existence was not conducive to the agenda of muscular Christianity in the early 
twentieth century, America witnessed a retreat, or what Mathisen coins a 
disengagement, of evangelicals from this social arena.
101
 The net effect today, with 
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religion‘s current engagement of sport, is that sport becomes instrumentally a 
credible access to sharing the gospel. Mathisen explains that in this case, it is sport 
itself that gives cultural acceptance and a mythical certitude to Christianity‘s ethical 
and religious value.
102
 The reality of God is now dependent on, if not subordinate to, 
this creaturely medium. Ironically, the spiritual activity of evangelism is unrelated to 
the actual sport. 
     Since it does not value and locate social life in the reality of Christ, modern 
muscular Christianity does not begin with a decision of faith concerning ultimate 
reality but with the value of sportive reality as its goal. Evangelicals in North 
America reengaged sport because ―sport redefined its niche as part of the American 
way of life in the post-World War era,‖ and thus, ―evangelical religion was quite 
happy to re-establish its ties.‖
103
 Mathisen concludes that this alliance between the 
two was cemented primarily because evangelicals ―rediscovered the conversion 
value sport possessed and subsequently adapted it for their purposes, built their own 
institutional structures, and created a rhetoric to support their activity—thus moving 
                                                                                                                                          
values and structures of an institution rapidly moving in a different direction‖ (Ladd and Mathisen, 
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significantly beyond their muscular Christian ancestors.‖
104
 The hopes of modern 
muscular Christianity are pinned on its action in the world in order to help sport 
become good. Mathisen notes that, historically in America, both periods of 
engagement (nineteenth century and post-World War II) ―adapted an existing myth 
that sport intrinsically could make the good of society better, once they realized that 
sport also had great potential for enhancing their revival and conversion goals.‖
105
  
     As a movement, Muscular Christianity patently endorses a faithful ―Yes‖ to the 
ideals of sport as its starting point, but it lacks any developed theological rationale 
for why it should inhabit and value sport. Sport is merely accepted as a viable 
candidate for pitching Jesus to others. Sport can leverage the power of the gospel to 
improve the conditions of the world rather than a radical concern that God alone is 
good; thus, the church witnesses to this sportive reality.  
     For Bonhoeffer, Christ is relevant because he became man; therefore, relevance 
has already been created. Modern muscular Christianity‘s axiology builds from what 
it perceives is good. Bonhoeffer epistemologically rebukes this axiology because ―all 
things appear as in a distorted mirror if they are not seen and recognized in God.‖
106
 
God‘s self-disclosure is the turning point or pivot for properly perceiving and 
discovering the deeper realities of activities like sport. To be more clear, if Christ is 
the real, then this aspect of dualism begins with the self and what the world deems as 
valuable, which for Bonhoeffer is an illusion. This illusion searches ignorantly for 
how sportive actions relate to positive outcomes. How can we know? This search is 
pragmatism. Consequences become the ethical criterion for engaging the world of 
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sport with the gospel.
107
 Bonhoeffer argues that this is a vulgar understanding of 
reality ―because it requires nothing less than complete surrender to what is at hand, 
given, accidental, and driven by temporary goals in any given time. It is unsuited 
because it does not recognize ultimate reality and so surrenders and destroys the 
unity of the good.‖
108
 According to Bonhoeffer, I should not surrender to what effect 
my action might have in or on the world, but rather, I should surrender myself to the 
fact that there is only one final reality—the reality that God is already present in the 
culture of sport. Therefore, I am responsible to this one final reality.
109
 Bonhoeffer 
does not relocate this Christ-reality in something else or in the future, but in the 
reality of the world that we currently know. This reality has been drawn and held 
together in Christ.  
     Modern muscular Christianity is bent toward justifying its own message, but it 
does so on the terms of sportive ideals and attraction. Hauerwas contends from 
Bonhoeffer that this same kind of apologetic tactic is in step with Protestant 
liberalism because it correlates its message to the criterion of relevance or 
acceptance.
110
 Both Protestant liberalism and modern muscular Christianity try in 
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earnest to locate some point of contact in cultural or human experience to help others 
make sense of the gospel. For modern muscular Christianity, the purpose of this 
method of correlation is to secure a place for the Christian message in sport.
111
 
Thanks to numerous changes in culture and sport, muscular Christianity began in the 
1950s and 1960s to take ―advantage of the populist, folk-religious status of sport 
within the cultural acceptance of the religion of the American way of life. They 
realized what an alliance with big-time sport might accomplish for their social status 
and their evangelistic purposes.‖
112
  
     Another reason that dualism is problematic is that this posture toward the reality 
of the world falsely accepts sport as a neutral medium. Because this stance assumes a 
functionalist theory, its enlistment of sport to enhance the gospel demonstrates 
ignorance toward sin. In contrast to the disengagement that occurred in the early 
twentieth century because of the perceived social and moral vices misdirecting sport, 
modern muscular Christianity endorses numerous myths about sport, values that 
seemingly create an affinity between sport and religion. However, this endorsement 
overlooks the fact that modern sport more often hold interests for the powerful and 
wealthy and rarely for the form of Christ in the world--Christ who is there for 
                                                                                                                                          
in the 1950s and 1960, as argued by Mathisen, is that sport ―took on the characteristics of a folk 
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others.
113
 Whether they are conscious of it or not, when sport ministers use the 
platform of sport, they work from a network of beliefs and values that are derived 
from a particular culture entrenched in a way of thinking that can be inimical to the 
gospel.  
     Hoffman captures this problem of endorsement well. He notes numerous 
problems that should stop evangelicals from pandering to big-time sports as a means 
for making the gospel relevant.
114
 My intent is merely to list a few to prove that, 
while there certainly are positive effects of sport, there are also equally negative 
effects; thus, this platform is not morally neutral. Sport systemically is beset with 
problems, such as the epidemic of injuries, the increase in violence, the effect that 
long-term participation has on the body, racism, sexism, drug scandals, criminal 
exploits, and the logic of big-time sports that the extrinsic goods of the business 
justify the means.
115
 Because of the secularity of sport, its perceived neutrality has 
caused the proponents of evangelical muscular Christianity opt ―for an individualistic 
ethical response, with little consideration that somehow these evils may be built into 
the very structures of modern secular sport.‖
116
 This individualistic ethic has 
precluded muscular Christianity from bearing a prophetic witness to the social and 
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moral corruption in the structures of sport.
117
 Deford first drew popular attention to 
this failure of modern muscular Christianity when he wrote,  
No one in the movement—much less in any organization—speaks out against 
dirty play, no one attacks the evils of recruiting, racism or any of the many other 
well-known excesses and abuses. Sports owns Sundays now, and religion is 




     Mathisen contends that this focus on the personal, moral, and behavioral norms is 
due to the elective affinity that sport and religion have found in terms of conservative 
moral positions. This affinity certainly is neither a fixed nor a perfect fit, but sport, as 
represented by the NFL, NBA and NCAA, and religion appeal to audiences who 
largely accept cultural conservatism.
119
 The two can co-exist and share this secular 
sphere when together they socialize the kind of values that constitute good American 
citizens: self-sacrifice, loyalty, mental toughness, learning from and enduring 
hardships.
120
 If modern, evangelical, muscular Christianity were to address other 
social vices, such as discrimination and racism, perhaps, it would risk offending the 
powerbrokers of modern sport and severing what (at least for now) seems helpful in 
advancing the gospel.   
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     Because of this perceived neutrality, Christ is not recognized as Lord of sportive 
reality. But because Jesus Christ has entered the reality of this world, ontologically a 
prophetic (and political) witness corresponds to the fact that Christ has judged these 
social evils in the crucifixion. Modern muscular Christianity not only fails to begin 
from a Christocentric reality, but, because of its duality, it also puts the church at the 
margins instead of claiming the center, the reality incarnated, judged, and redeemed 
by Christ.
121
 To address only the personal, moral sins is a pietistic impulse that 
denies both the Lordship of Christ and a full proclamation of the gospel to the world. 
Furthermore, in a manner reminiscent of a Constantinian social imagination, modern 
muscular Christianity attempts to forge a partnership with the institution of sport so 
that Christianity can be accepted and live at home with the world.
122
  
     The irony is sobering because modern muscular Christianity has made the gospel 
its sole focus without realizing its compromise. Bonhoeffer charges that compromise 
becomes an option when Christians have not learned how to live in but not of the 
world. Bonhoeffer develops this false solution in connection to the problem of how 
to relate faith in the here and now in his chapter ―Ultimate and Penultimate 
Things.‖
123
 I will say more about this in the next chapter. Compromise occurs when 
the gospel is divorced from a penultimate sphere, such as sport. Modern muscular 
Christianity compromises by not permitting the ultimate to threaten and subvert the 
status quo of the penultimate of the sport ethos. In fact, the penultimate becomes 
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absolute because sport sets the agenda for how the gospel will use this platform. 
Whenever Christians in church history have followed the spirit of the age, they have 
inevitably compromised their witness to the reality of Christ—incarnation, 
crucifixion and resurrection—for ideals and power in the public square. In principle, 
I see a relationship between German Christians who compromised the ultimate by 
preaching an Aryan gospel and modern muscular Christianity who proclaim a 
similarly compromised sport gospel. Both exchange the true gospel for the gospel of 
accommodation.  
     Coakley claims that modern muscular Christianity ignores ethical and social 
problems based on the primacy of faith. ―This means that faith is given priority over 
charity in the organizations and that salvation is linked with accepting Christ into 
one‘s life rather than with doing good works alone.‖
124
 Faith is not based on ultimate 
reality but on the demands and priorities determined by the sacred sphere, a sphere 
that attends to the inner life. This inward turn is pietism once again. Bonhoeffer‘s 
ethic interprets this isolation of the gospel from public moral issues as allowing the 
whole arena to be ―governed by the autonomous nature of the world. Things 
Christian belong to a special ecclesial, religious, or private domain in which alone 
they can be rightfully exercised.‖
125
  
      In summary, these different examples of dualism in sport, which on the surface 
appear to be mutually exclusive, ―have in common that they understand the Christian 
and the worldly as principles, which means independently of the fact of God‘s 
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becoming human.‖
126
 This split tears the possibility of Christian existence between 
the two spheres. Bonhoeffer says that, when this flawed view of reality is embraced, 
we are left with only the following options. Giving up on reality as a whole, 
either we place ourselves in one of the two realms, wanting Christ without the 
world or the world without Christ—and in both cases we deceive ourselves. Or 
we try to stand in the two realms at the same time, thereby becoming people in 
eternal conflict. . . an eternally indissoluble conflict [for Christian existence], 
which practical action is never able to overcome, and by which it will be ground 
down.
127
   
 




     Mathisen further notes, as another reason for why two-sphere thinking is 
problematic, that sport is a system based on ―meritocratic democracy.‖ This means 
that ―individuals are accepted and evaluated on the basis of their own decisions and 
performance.‖
129
 Sport mirrors a dominant value of the American dream. That is, 
individual hard work and discipline become the kind of virtues that demonstrate 
ability and enable athletes to achieve success and merit acceptance. This sort of basis 
has benefited some who, although they were excluded from certain opportunities 
based on arbitrary standards, experienced some degree of acceptance by their public 
performances because of the opportunities afforded by sport.  
     Bonhoeffer shatters such pretensions because this meritocratic value stands apart 
or outside the reality of Christ, thus functioning legalistically. To appeal to 
achievements, work, or, in this case, merit as a standard or norm for evaluating the 
goodness of a person is a serious aberration according to Bonhoeffer. This appeal 
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focuses primarily on the work of the self as primary, because the self decides how its 
works best contribute to and justify the self.
130
 What are some more problems and 
implications associated with this skewed anthropology? 
     First, meritocracy is a myth founded by individualism. Bellah helps provide the 
social analysis that explains the soil that grows meritocracy. This quest to define 
oneself by decisions and performance takes the form of utilitarian individualism. 
This form yields a self defined by success because it prizes personal achievement and 
advancement.
131
 According to this understanding, sport becomes a social sphere in 
which athletes try to make something of themselves; they try to stand out on their 
own. The elective affinity is the putative merit because significance is gained by 
human effort. However, Bonhoeffer holds this way of thinking to be perverse 
because ―it tears apart what is originally and essentially one, namely, the good and 
the real, the person and the work.‖
132
 What is good, the actual sportive 
accomplishment or the person? Bonhoeffer refers to the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 
7:17), where Jesus himself uses the organic metaphor of a fruit tree to teach that it is 
not the work or the person that is considered good, ―but that only the two together, 
only both as united in one, are to be understood as good or bad.‖
133
     
     Meritocracy as an operant creed of American sports
134
 attempts to justify the 
worth of a human being by reckoning his abilities and talents. Yet, plenty of people 
achieve great things while at the same time living dishonorably. The individualism 
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inherent in meritocracy is flawed because it is anthropologically dualistic. According 
to Bonhoeffer, goodness considers the entire reality, not merely an aspect, namely, a 
demonstrable work issuing from a person. ―Rather, good is reality, reality itself seen 
and recognized in God.‖
135
 Furthermore, what God judges as real in regard to human 
beings is that they are indivisible wholes, ―not only as individuals in both their 
person and work, but also as members of the human and created community to which 
they belong. It is this indivisible whole, that is, this reality grounded and recognized 
in God, that the question of good has in view.‖
136
  
      Related to the above discussion, utilitarian individualists overlook the fact that 
this comparative enterprise relies on a social human context. Or, as indicated in the 
last quotation from Bonhoeffer, that these athletic performances are a part of a 
created athletic community. This bifurcation of reality again results in a truncated 
view of the human being as a social being. The only solution is to participate in 
ultimate reality, the reality in which all other realities are embedded, namely, Christ-
reality. This reality reveals what is good and acceptable, the will of God.
137
  
     To conclude this section on how the elective affinity between modern muscular 
Christianity and American sports reveals different aspects of two-sphere thinking, I 
will briefly mention how the remaining essential elements mimic this conceptual 
framework of two-realms. The acceptance of ―competitive virtue‖
138
 that is akin to 
the sport ethos as a value that Jesus himself demonstrated in his victory over the 
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forces of evil is another example not only of folk theology but also of 
accommodation. In this case, Jesus is transformed into the Jesus of sport culture in 
order to biblically justify how Christianity and sport relate and fit together. Hoffman, 
Krattenmaker, and Mathisen marshal many examples from the stories of 
contemporary evangelical, muscular Christians to prove this point. For example, 
Orlando Magic basketball executive Pat Willaims claims,  
The language of victory in sports is identical to the Christian faith. . . . Think 
about what it takes to be a great athlete: discipline, hard work, sacrifice, 
selflessness, teamwork, respect, trust, loyalty, humility, influence. All those 





Besides the fact that these kinds of statements disclose ignorance and an inadequate 
understanding of theology, Mathisen explains that this accommodation occurs 
repeatedly because 
in public settings they talk about what they know best—the world of sport—and 
use symbols and rhetoric of that world. Typically, they attempt to add some 
spiritual principle or theological insight which is often misguided, if not clearly 




     In short, the use of competitive virtue as an essential element, like the other 
elective affinities, is disloyal to the reality of Christ. It breaks free from the reality of 
the incarnation--that Christ is relevant--and exchanges it for symbols and images that 
are selected on behalf of the sports culture because that is what is regarded as highest 
and best. A harmony or fittedness, according to the quote above, is found by 
interpreting Jesus in light of the dominant sport culture. This interpretation is 
deceptive because modern muscular Christians would be the first to announce that it 
is Christ they seek, yet what they obtain is the world without the true Christ. Carter 
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reasons that, when Christ legitimizes culture—because he is viewed more as a 
symbol of the dominant forces of a particular culture—then  
he [Christ] can become a symbol of anything. A symbol points to something 
other than itself; otherwise it would be the thing signified, rather than a symbol 
of it. What a symbol means is socially constructed, at least in part, by common 
agreement. What was previously understood to be a symbol of one thing can 
become a symbol of something quite different. [This type] uses Christ as the 
symbol of whatever that culture deems to be the highest and best, whether that is 
liberal individualism or blood and Volk. . . .In the modern West, Christ has been 





For modern muscular Christianity, Christ is transmuted into a symbol, which 
Bonhoeffer claims essentially ignores Jesus Christ and thus is an abstraction.
142
 
Furthermore, he views abstract thinking as dangerous—though the goal is to do the 
will of God—because the Jesus that is extolled is the fulfillment of oneself in the 
place of what is real.
143
 This exchange is idolatry.  
     When determining what is good or valuable about sport, this same disastrous 
exchange of the reality of God for the reality of sport holds true for the remaining 
two essential elements of modern muscular Christianity: ―heroic models‖ and 
―therapeutic self-control.‖ It is believed that, since sport provides the predominant 
context for who and what heroes are, having a hero who is a Christian sportsperson 
demonstrates Christianity‘s relevance.
144
 The concept of self-control is 
psychologized as a helpful trait that carries over from sport to Christianity and back 
again. These essential elements are again used to justify Christianity to sport; they 
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are an appeal, an elective affinity, to what sport and the Christian religions share in 
common.  
     In the final section, I want to more closely examine a research study that further 
illumines this problem of two-sphere thinking. This research study helps to give a 
thicker description of the problem. My interaction with this study further 
corroborates my above evaluation and analysis, and more importantly, it teases out 
some important implications concerning how Christians think about and relate to the 
sportive world.  
Research Study: Christian Athletes and the Culture of Sport 
     From the research of others,
145
 Coakley hypothesizes a model that further 
demonstrates the options and conflicts that materialize for many who try to relate 
their core Christian convictions to power and performance sports.
146
 His hypothesis 
and Stevenson‘s own conclusions are helpful because they demonstrate the recurring 
problem of two-sphere thinking for many Christians who try to relate sport and 
religion. He contends that power and performance sports are the dominant sport 
forms today. That does not mean that all sports are organized in the same way, only 
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that many sports seem to fit a model that is organized along the characteristics of 
power and performance.
147
 Coakley proposes that doubts may arise from the acute 
conflict between religious convictions in the context of sport, where athletes are 
confronted with violence, intimidation, self-promotion, and the aggressive pursuit of 
personal success.
148
 From this research,
149
 Stevenson finds three basic ways that 
Christian athletes who represent an evangelical muscular Christian group used their 
faith in dealing with and relating to contemporary sport. Though Coakley and 
Stevenson largely agree on the three general ways that Christians relate to sport, I 
follow Stevenson‘s options because his study serves as the empirical research for 
Coakley and others.
150
 Where I do include Coakley, it is because he helps clarify a 
result or description. Below, I present each option or strategy and then demonstrate 
how each one attests to the compartmentalization internal to two-sphere thinking. 
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The kind of dualism that becomes apparent vacillates between a metaphysical 
dualism (how the different groups see reality) and religious dualism (how they use or 
relate faith to the world).
151
  
     One option is to cope with the apparent conflict by conforming to the dominant 
sport ethos (discipline, self-denial, and sacrifice).
152
 These athletes (one third of the 
thirty-one athletes) evaluate such values as winning, achievement, and success 
according to the normative expectations and values of the accepted ethos of sport.
153
 
They align their faith with those foci that apparently yield the good that demonstrates 
Christian faith in this sphere. As Christians, their faith zealously commits them to 
legitimize their interaction with sport as if this faith commitment moved sport to the 
sacred realm.
154
 Stevenson records that this move from faith to sport was a particular 
interpretation of Christianity ―that gives precedence to a notion that living a ‗truly‘ 
Christian life and giving ‗true‘ worship to God means giving one‘s all in whatever 
situation one happens to be. It is giving oneself and whatever talents and abilities one 
has fully and enthusiastically to God.‖
155
 If a person who does not know Christ 
competes for the sake of sport values, this group competes even more 
enthusiastically for the same values because competition is ultimately referred to 
God. They conceptualized this as giving 100 percent, winning for the glory of God, 
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and maximizing their earthly potential. What was interesting about this commitment 
was that it allowed these athletes to justify playing through pain and suffering 
because of their faith in an exemplar Christ. Both Stevenson and Coakley conclude 
that these athletes‘ beliefs about God center on God being in total control and giving 




     The previous is a clear example of giving autonomy to the realm or space of sport 
because one assumes that this reality lies outside the reality that is in Christ. It does 
not lie outside in that it does not relate to the reality that is in Christ, but in that the 
reality of God affords space to sport when sport enthusiastically adopts those values 
that appear compatible to the Christian ethos. When these athletes‘ Christian 
existence bumped against the sport sphere, the two repelled each other, giving the 
secular priority in deciding what is good. Stevenson notes that this relating of the two 
never really questioned the sport ethos and somehow dramatically increased these 
athletes‘ responsibility to sport, since God gave them their talents.
157
  
     For this group of athletes, there does not appear to be a battle over which realm 
wins because the worldly realm‘s values determine how the two will be held 
together. Their ascetic emphasis (e.g., self-discipline, sacrifice, self-denial) moves 
them from sport reality to God because God is most glorified when these kind of 
earthly values are maximized. However, according to Bonhoeffer, if reality as a 
whole is unified, there is no movement from one to the other in order to justify one‘s 
existence because Christ already embraces, owns, and inhabits the reality of sportive 
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culture.
158
 In fact, these athletes‘ attempt to appreciate the world of sport is 
misguided because sport as a part of the worldly reality only receives its validity 
from the fact that God in Christ has fully committed himself to this world.
159
 
Furthermore, since sportive reality is accepted in Christ, these athletes‘ aim of 
competing for God or Christ is myopic because Christ is already there. It is not 
necessary to try to lift sport to a higher sacred plan; it is already one reality in Christ. 
A Christian‘s effort or power does not make some reality sacred, nor does it form the 
bridge between the two spheres.  
     The direction of responsibility for this group of athletes is individualistic in that 
they organize their concern around how they can maximally glorify God. There are 
two problems with this.  
     One problem, for Bonhoeffer, is that the subject of any action presupposes a 
responsibility for others.
160
 Christ-reality is the fact that God in Christ is there for 
others; thus, witness is to the shape of this concrete form in sport and not to some 
abstract principle such as God‘s glory.  
     A second problem is that the focus for this group can be reduced to sportive deeds 
because these deeds become the measure of God‘s power. They are committed to 
successful performances because such performances make God publicly known. 
What are beheld are not real human beings, but those who have proven themselves 
worthy to stand before God. They compete for God and for Christ. Stevenson calls to 
our attention that it becomes their sacred duty to try their best to win but to win ―at 
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any cost‖ because winning is directed to the highest good, God.
161
 When the self and 
her success are aggrandized, then ―the majority fall into idolizing success.‖
162
 What 
is good is a successful effort, giving it your all. The same criticism applies to the 
second group because some standard of modern sport, such as winning or success, is 
identified as the means for promoting God. Bonhoeffer charges that, when success 
becomes the norm for people, ―they become blind to right and wrong, truth and lie, 
decency and malice. They see only the deed, the success. Ethical and intellectual 
capacity for judgment grow dull before the sheen of success and before the desire 
somehow to share in it.‖
163
 Stevenson reports that one of the ways that some of these 
athletes manifested this drive toward successful efforts was a willingness to play 
while hurt, risking more injury. Furthermore, ―if using your talents to the maximum 
means hitting people, hurting people, intimidating or fouling people—well that too 
can be perceived to be ‗for Christ‘.‖
164
 Again, we see a moral compromise that these 
athletes justified in the name of success and winning. Because ethics begins and ends 
with Christ, then this compromise is a compromise of Christ. Bonhoeffer claims that 
only in the cross of Christ do we behold the true form of Christ, a human being 
accepted, judged, and awakened by God to a risen, new life.
165
 If this is true, then a 
Christian athlete is free to inhabit sport, not to secure what appears to be exclusive to 
the winner, but to experience the reality of God‘s unlimited love and grace. Christian 
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athletes confess this reality because in Christ they are real humans, free to be who 
they really are in sport without attempting to justify themselves. Does this mean that 
strength and success do not matter? 
     I believe that Bonhoeffer would affirm this group‘s emphasis on the natural life. 
This group appears to recognize something invigorating about the exercise of bodies, 
the use of power and strength, that recovers the natural life. Unlike some Protestants, 
Bonhoeffer does not denigrate or condemn creaturely physical life, nor does he 
consign it to a neutral value. His Christocentric understanding of reality causes him 
to claim that, because Jesus said ―I am the life‖ (John 14:6; 11:27), Jesus binds all 
thoughts about life and transforms the inquiry from what is life to who life is--a 
particular and unique person. That is, true life is ordered to Jesus Christ.
166
 This life 
comes from without. Christ takes up all that comes into being—in all that comes into 
being he was life (John 1:4)—and by faith he uniquely becomes the source of life for 
a Christian because of the word of the gospel.
167
 If Jesus Christ is the origin, essence, 
and goal of all life, then Jesus‘ life is a ―Yes‖ ―to what is created, to becoming to 
growth, to flower and fruit, to health, to happiness, to ability, to achievement, to 




     Burtness avers that Bonhoeffer‘s life-affirming philosophy
169
 means  
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then the results of one‘s action are extremely important. It is a gift to have the 
strength and to be able to exercise the power by which one registers some 
success at accomplishing what one sets out to do. . . If we embrace the natural, 
which is open to Christ, we ought not to be surprised if our actions are 





     Since Christ-reality embraces the world in itself,
171
 cultural activities, such as 
sport, find God at the center; however, this reality includes both strength and 
suffering. In Christ, the two are held together; therefore, to worship one over the 
other betrays two-sphere thinking. The responsible life exercises real humanity—
success, strength, humility, surrender
172
—in the service of others in sport.    
     On a personal side, Bonhoeffer‘s concern for the whole of reality-life was evident 
in his childhood and sports. His twin sister, Sabine, commented that he would 
become so engrossed in his games that he would be oblivious of heat and thirst.
173
 
―Dietrich liked to win at games, in fact he played with passion, but he was absolutely 
fair where others were tempted to cheat.‖
174
 Emmi Bonhoeffer adds that, ―He 
[Bonhoeffer] showed the same intensity in playing music, or games, whether tennis, 
ping-pong, up-jenkins or boccia; he played to win, but was a good loser.‖
175
  
    A second way that the athletes in Stevenson‘s study chose (fifteen of the thirty-
one) to use their faith was to pragmatically accommodate those problems (e.g., 
winning; social status; relationship with team, coaches, and opponents; and social 
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expectations of them as athletes) present in their sport culture.
176
 This group further 
substantiates Mathisen‘s point concerning the essential element of pragmatic utility. 
As athletes, they continue to assume the legitimacy of the sportive ideology along 
with sport practice itself. This accommodation is an accepted player ethos. In sport, 
just as any other role in life, an athlete accepts role-specific duties and operates 
―within these athletic expectations in as ‗Christian‘ a manner as possible.‖
 177
  
Whereas the first group concentrated on ascetic aspects of sport in order to glorify 
God, this group makes moral decisions based on the situation‘s given role and norms 
and then interprets the sportive norms within the Christian ethical framework. For 
example, according to one interviewee, retaliation in sport is wrong because the rules 
explicitly prohibit it and because you as a Christian should follow the Sermon on the 
Mount by turning the other cheek.
178
 In addition, some athletes within this group 
focused on how sport offered an ideal platform for professing their faith to others--
Christian evangelism. Again, a functional valuation guides decision-making for these 
athletes.  
     My critique here is limited because I have already addressed this problem under 
pragmatic utility, the first essential element of modern muscular Christianity. If the 
worldly triumphs, though under the illusions of God‘s glory for the first group, then 
in their attempt to stand in the two realms at the same time, the second group of 
athletes experiences eternal conflict.
179
 Stevenson reports that certain feelings, for 
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example, worry or guilt, frustrated how these athletes related faith to sport. One 
athlete said, 
It‘s a constant battle. Because to really excel [in soccer], [you] use many 
different methods of achieving things that are not right. There‘s so many things 
you do that are against the rules, that you do when the ref‘s not looking, to better 
your advantage in a situation. . .I feel awful afterwards but there‘s things that 
you do that are very acceptable in the soccer community. And it‘s like, where do 




The constant battle and worry are symptomatic of two-sphere thinking. These 
athletes give up on reality as a whole. By keeping reality partitioned, they have the 
reality of sport and its laws on the one hand, and the reality of God on the other. This 
is where they draw the line of separation. However, their underdeveloped theological 
thinking, which is a trait of evangelical muscular Christianity, causes the role of an 
athlete to dominate and normalize how the two-spheres relate. 
     Other athletes chose to play the game by considering the right course of action 
according to their intentions or motivations. Stevenson observes that language about 
the ―right attitude,‖ which referred to whether their heart was in the right place, 
governed how they related to sport.
181
 One football player said, ―I love hitting 
people. . . [but] I think if you have the right focus. I don‘t think there‘s any problem 
whatsoever. If you are right with God when you are playing, I don‘t see there‘s any 
problem at all.‖
182
 Bonhoeffer asks, 
What right do we have to stay with inner motivation as the ultimate phenomenon 
of ethics, ignoring that ―good‖ intentions can grow out of very dark backgrounds 
in human consciousness and subconsciousness, and that often the worst things 
happen as a result of ―good intentions‖?
183
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According to Bonhoeffer, this inward turn in search of God‘s will stops at an 
arbitrary point. The good is identified with some ready-made internal standard that is 
abstracted and severed from reality.
184
 These athletes fail to embrace the whole 
reality because their right attitudes constitute only part of reality, forgetting 
consequences, relationships, and actions. For some of them, winning ―at all costs‖ 
becomes a motivation to the glory of God. Because the good for a Christian ethic is 
the reality revealed in Jesus Christ, these athletes traffic between the two-spheres and 
invoke the spiritual sphere only to arbitrary, individual, or cultural standards.  
     Rejection of elite sport was a third approach that some athletes took in their 
attempt to relate faith to the dominant culture of sport. Three of the thirty-one 
athletes experienced some serious ethical problems with and objected to the norms of 
sportive culture; hence, they found it difficult to continue their participation in 
competitive elite sports. These athletes were unable to reconcile their faith with the 
overwhelming problems endemic to elite sport. How could Christian existence 
inhabit this sphere with ways and means that appear to conflict with Christianity? For 
them, ―a central imperative of their Christian faith was that its values are to be the 
predominant values in their lives and are to be totally integrated into all of the 
various aspects of those lives.‖
185
 The difficulty for them is how to bring the right 
perspective to sport. If God makes ultimate claims on a Christian‘s life, then to them, 
sport can no longer hold the place it once did in a Christian‘s life. God must be given 
a high priority, and if he does, then a Christian must rank and reprioritize how to 
think about and relate to sport. Stevenson notes that this mindset led these athletes to 
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an ability to critique the sport culture.
186
 However, this critique took a while before it 
resulted in a withdrawal. Stevenson reports that, at first, these athletes attempted to 
compromise by trying to live in both spheres; they attempted to maintain both their 
Christian identity and their athletic identity. They did this by adopting the second 
groups‘ strategy of attempting to play sport as Christians with the right motivations 
and even by attempting the first groups‘ ascetic emphasis. However, this insoluble 
conflict between spheres was insurmountable. This attempt to live in both spheres 
was short lived, as recorded by one participant: she felt guilty and uneasy because the 
two spheres held values and practices that were antithetical to one another. This guilt 
eventually led these athletes to withdraw from elite sport competitions and to either 
look for sport contexts that did not compromise their values or to retire. Stevenson 
adds that this process of compromise and withdrawal was chock-full of confusion, 




     The third group of athletes experienced an inability to reconcile their Christianity 
and sport. Though at first they followed the two-sphere thinking of the second group 
by trying to stand in the two realms at the same time, they eventually wanted God 
without the world of dominant sport. I believe that Bonhoeffer would be the first to 
admit to this struggle; however, the struggle present in the reality of sport is not an 
ultimately static opposition. That is, these athletes do not have to choose between 
sport and Christ. If so, that would imply that these two are mutually exclusive and 
statically independent. Certainly, sport as a reality of the world behaves polemically; 
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however, this polemic tension proves this reality‘s existent relation to Christ; 
therefore, it witnesses to the common reality that sport and the Christian share in the 
unity of Christ-reality.
188
 Furthermore, these problems prove the validity of the 
gospel for sports. The reality of the gospel certainly means that we must examine the 
institution of sport; however, sportive reality is not beyond gospel proclamation and 
living. God has accepted these athletes as reconciled and judged, and it is the 
responsibility of Christians (the church) to offer to this reality the form of Christ in 
order to responsibly shape this mandate of culture in Christ. To play sport in Christ 
means to love sport enough that you stay with this worldly reality, a reality that 
points to the ultimate. 
     Bonhoeffer, further addresses this way of relating Christianity to this world in the 
vocabulary of penultimate and ultimate. I will discuss this more in the next chapter 
regarding how the tension between the two properly unites reality, and I will suggest 
what this means for sport. In particular, the attitude of this final group is what 
Bonhoeffer calls radicalism. Radicalism takes many faces, but for these athletes, it 
correctly brought the necessary critique to the ethical problems of the dominant sport 
culture. Bonhoeffer recognizes this kind of attitude as one that correctly utilizes the 
paradigm of the crucifixion. Yet, because it rejects modern sport by virtue of its 




     The radical solution is one of the extreme positions that people take when trying 
to resolve the relationship between the penultimate and ultimate. The ultimate is the 
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event of a sinner‘s justification because nothing is greater than a life justified before 
God by the ultimacy of this word.
190
 However, this final word is preceded by the 
penultimate, ―some action, suffering, movement, intention, defeat, recovery, 
pleading, hoping—in short, quite literally a span of time at whose ends it stands.‖
191
 
For Bonhoeffer, the penultimate prepares the way because all must go through it; 
therefore, the penultimate remains in existence in order to hear the ultimate word. 
This distinction between the two is eschatological: the ―things before the last‖ exist 
for the sake of the ―last things.‖ Bonhoeffer clarifies that it is because of the final 
importance of the ultimate that we must consider the penultimate.
192
 He provides an 
example for how Christians can address tragedy and despair both penultimately and 
ultimately, and he adds that this ―particular case holds for countless other situations 
in the daily common life of Christians. . .‖
193
  
     Since this distinction between the two is true, let me consider a concrete example 
in sport. Sport is played in juxtaposition to the completely serious situations of world 
poverty, environmental disasters, economic woes, etc., and uselessness stands next to 
daily ethical issues. The non-serious is beside the serious. Nevertheless, sport as a 
form of play is part of the created reality that witnesses to the goodness of creation, 
which goodness the incarnation affirms. Sport as a penultimate experience teems 
with gifts and joys. Though it is easily burdened with sin (and the ultimate gospel 
truths judge this misdirection), it still exists as a way to the ultimate. Yes, it will 
eventually be annulled, but for now it must be preserved. Jesus Christ as human 
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wants such activities because they confirm real humanity; simultaneously, Jesus 
Christ the crucified judges fallen creation, and Jesus Christ the resurrected calls a 
new creation into a life where the goods of sport may be restored. What this means 
for sport is that Christians must responsibly prepare the way in this created reality or 





overworked man needs play, the mediocre man needs excellence, the sluggish man 
needs the strength and order characteristic of sport, and the burdened adult needs the 
childlike freedom experienced in sport. All of these are characteristics of sport that 
the ultimate accepts and empowers since they are token gifts and conditions of what 
it truly means to be human. Bonhoeffer strongly asserts that, if life is deprived of 
such goods that are unique to what it means to be human, then the justification of 
such a life by grace and faith is obstructed, if not impossible.
196
 In anticipation of the 
coming of the Lord, Christians should prepare the way by being human and being 
good because this way shows respect for the very reality that Christ assumed and 
ultimately fulfils.
197
 Therefore, the way for the word takes this preparation seriously, 
not as a precondition for the arrival of the ultimate, but because ―in Christ the reality 
of God encounters the reality of the world and allows us to take part in this real 
encounter.‖
198
 This dynamic way is how the penultimate relates to the ultimate.  
     In comparison, radicalism sees only the ultimate; therefore, a complete break 
severs it from its relationship to the penultimate. Since the third group of athletes 
                                                 
194
 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 157-159. 
195
 I contextualized the example Bonhoeffer provides for the applied area of sport (Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 
163.).  
196
 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 160.  
197
 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 159, 165-166. 
198
 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 159. 
   256
sees the penultimate and ultimate as mutually exclusive (or as Stevenson says, 
antithetical), they neglect to come to terms with the penultimate because they 
absolutize the ultimate.
199
  Stevenson surmises that there was conflict because ―they 
did not always find it possible in practice to give full expression to their 
Christianity.‖
200
 Christianity, as they interpret it, is absolutized. Thus, what is at issue 
is the Christian life, which according to Bonhoeffer is not the real matter because 
seriousness has to do with Christ alone.
201
 The Christian life means integration; 
however, they regard integration as impossible, so they reject sport because the two 
cannot commingle for fear of contamination and impurity. Integration, for these 
athletes, starts with how to relate Christianity and sport rather than with Christ. Their 
two-sphere thinking occurs in terms of their version of Christianity and less in terms 
of Christ-reality, where God‘s reality and human reality become one. Consequently, 
their radicalism causes them to think that they are preserving Christianity while they 
are in fact forfeiting the very temporal existence that the ultimate cares for and about 
as preparatory for the ultimate. If Jesus Christ holds all reality, then it is only through 
him that anything will be preserved. Furthermore, what essentially bothers them is 
not so much Christianity, but their own relationship with God. Stevenson‘s 
interviews record personal growth—private personal piety, individualism, a me-
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     These modern muscular Christians so desperately want to live out their 
Christianity. However, because they do not know how, their rejection of sport is a 
hatred of the very embodied existence that sport penultimately affirms. One of the 
interviewees believes that the priority of being more with God is the one thing she 
can hold on to even if she leaves sport. This Gnostic tendency is not what it means to 
be a human, but if it were, according to Bonhoeffer, the very God she wants is 
excluded.
203
 The real God is found in Christ, who as the God-man resolves this 
relationship between the ultimate and penultimate.  
     In summary, any attempt to relate or make Christ and the reality of the world 
commensurate, regardless of the form, results in ―the destruction of the world 
reconciled in Christ with God.‖
204
 Feil asserts that this tragic result proves that, 
whatever the attempt, in the final analysis all the forms are identical, ―no matter 
whether they are called secularism and provincialism, compromise and radicalism, 
secularism and enthusiasm, or Cultural Protestantism and monkhood.‖
205
 Feil 
continues, saying that these different forms ―attempt to explicate Christian faith and 
the understanding of the world on the same basis or at least in a one-sided fashion 
either by affirming the world or negating it, a negation which in the end becomes a 
one-dimensional affirmation of the world.‖ Furthermore, this identity is apparent 
empirically in their bondage to the world.
206
 Modern muscular Christians become 
more like the world because their two-sphere thinking precludes their conformity to 
the form and reality of Christ.  
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     If two-sphere thinking misses the mark on how the church should integrate her 
thoughts related to the (sportive) world, how should a Christian integrate her 
commitment to the ultimate amid the penultimate of sport? This inquiry gets at the 
heart of the issue that Christians in sport have struggled to understand. The dialectic 
tension between this-worldly affirmation and other-worldly orientation appears to 
break when a Christocratic structure of reality is neglected. Before I proceed to the 
next chapter to address how Bonhoeffer helps a Christian ethic to positively value the 
penultimate desires and joys experienced in sport, I want to turn to Shirl Hoffman, 
who attempts to integrate sport and Christianity. However, his attempt still reflects a 
fragmented vision of sport: two-sphere thinking or dualism.  
 
Shirl Hoffman: The Enduring Problem of Two-Sphere Thinking 
     In Good Game, Hoffman states that ―how Christians, and especially evangelicals, 
have managed to live in these two diametrically opposed worlds, even to the point of 
harnessing one to serve the other, is the focus of this book.‖
207
 At least initially, this 
opposition continues what Hoffman and Higgs have concluded for some time: there 
appears to be a fundamental incompatibility between Christianity and sport.
208
 For 
Hoffman, the relationship between sport and Christianity is mired in conflict between 
two worlds. His description of the problem frames it as a dilemma between two 
different worlds. But what kind of dilemma is it? Would not this dilemma be true for 
a relationship between Christianity and the world of business, music, medicine, etc? 
What does Hoffman mean by diametrically opposed worlds? Obviously, they are not 
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truly diametrically opposed, or his solutions toward the end of the book would 
undermine his initial thesis. Along with many others, Hoffman recognizes that 
intellectual neglect—―the scandal of the evangelical mind‖
209
—dominates the 
religious-sport discourse and thus reinforces the problem of how to relate sport and 
Christianity. Because of this intellectual problem, modern muscular Christianity, as 
evidenced above in my own analysis, has often preached a worldly gospel, a gospel 
of accommodation that blindly apes the model of sport from the dominant culture.
210
 
This accommodation is how some have tried to relate the two. In effect, it mirrors the 
culture in which it is embedded.
211
 What is Hoffman‘s solution? Let us consider his 
theological strategy for addressing this problem of how to relate sport and 
Christianity.  
     Hoffman claims that 
thinking Christianly about sports means locating it not in the body or in the aims 
and purposes of institutions [sport], or even in evangelism, but in the Christian 
imagination, a point far removed from its typical placement in the arsenal of 
instrumentally useful things. The intellectually curious Christian will find 
himself or herself engaged at a level not commonly reached when thinking about 
sport: the symbolic, the aesthetic, the ritualistic, and the religious.
212
 
    
I argue below that Hoffman goes in this decisive theological direction as a riposte to 
the disoriented evangelical muscular Christians who sought an unholy alliance with 
sport, thus leading to accommodation. As noted by Feil‘s interpretation of 
Bonhoeffer‘s two-sphere thinking, this accommodation is a one-dimensional 
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affirmation of reality. In order to avoid these religious and ethical problems, which 
Hoffman critically and capably covers in his book, he identifies the good ―direction‖ 
of sport with certain play elements of the structure of sport.
213
 He locates and reads 
what is sacred about sport in the distinct play elements of sportive reality, while he 
locates what is evil in sport in (as he interprets them) other, inferior elements of the 
sportive structure. This isolation of the different aspects of sport forms the basis of 
his dualism. For Hoffman, the antithesis is not merely ethical, but structural, located 
in how he divides sport reality itself. The language of his methodology is important.  
     Hoffman directs us to the Christian imagination.
214
 His explanation about this 
imagination is terse. I sense that he wants to talk about Christian aesthetics, which 
bears an important relationship to epistemology, anthropology, and ontology. This 
aesthetic mode of knowing engages aspects of reality specific to symbols, rituals, 
aesthetics, and religion. According to Hoffman, this imaginative reflection is capable 
of ―gleaning the spiritual fruits sports have to offer.‖
215
 What he means is that 
Christian imagination permits us to know intellectually what is religiously significant 
about play experiences that can manifest divine reality. This experience and method 
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of engaging with sport is what is missing in evangelical muscular Christianity.
216
 
Moreover, his description of the object of this imagination is more precisely that of 
the intellect that apprehends what is sacred or religiously significant concerning 
sport.
217
 Without this Christian thinking, which he later calls Christian worldview,
218
 
we are liable to adopt other myths or imaginaries that hold us hostage to this-worldly 
concerns and values. However, when we rightly employ the Christian imagination 
about sport, sport can become, as described by Hugo Rahner, holy play, something 
sacred that is a rehearsal or gesture of that future eschatological reality—playing 
fully embodied before God. In short, what he loves about sport is the ―essence of the 
sport experience,‖ which is the sacred reality that pierces through this world ever so 
palely as an echo or gesture.
219
 The true riches of what sport has to offer are its 
spiritual benefits.
220
 As will become clear, he deposits all the play elements of sport 
in this sacred realm because they make sport acceptable to the Christian worldview 
as a symbol of religious expression—a sacred category.
221
 How does he conceive 
this? 
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     In his final chapter, Hoffman determines to offer a tentative theological answer 
that reimagines sport within a Christian worldview.
222
 That is, he contemplates a way 
to conceptualize sports and their relationship to the Christian religion. He organizes 
his answer around a number of defining criteria for how to relate Christianity and 
sport: leisure, play, autotelic, and symbolic sport.
223
 Hoffman begins with a standard 
discussion of how sport differs from other areas of life. Though the necessary and 
sufficient conditions are debated and, thus, are neither entirely satisfactory nor 
certain, I do grant that a number of characteristics of sport make it distinct and 
separate (in a relative sense) from other human endeavors.
224
  
     I believe this starting point is important not merely for definitional purposes, but 
also because it permits Hoffman to rescue the best elements of sport from the 
negative elements of modern sport (e.g., excellence achieved through dedication, 
hard work, pushing bodies to limits, sport dominated by work, sport highly organized 
and specialized).
225
 He organizes sport around those elements of play that 
structurally point to the sacred. He believes that ―realizing the best that sport has to 
offer is highly conditional upon human enactments that, in their intent and 
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expressiveness, symbolize the spiritual realities toward which they point.‖
226
 In 
effect, he splits the reality of sport into two parts with a hierarchy: play is more 
important than the characteristics or elements specific to modern sport‘s organization 
of sport because it is what is sacred. He ethically values leisure, for example, because 
it appreciates and is grounded in the sacred sphere. By implication, the other 
elements in sport are morally dubious because their sustenance is drawn putatively 
from the secular. He continues his theological reasoning: 
At leisure, released from the crushing demands of daily life, the Christian has a 
few moments of freedom to shed the camouflage of natural man, to polish up the 
imago Dei, to regain spiritual balance, and to recover a sense of who he or she 
really is. For Christians ineluctably wedded to the world, leisure is the opportune 
time for enlarging, not their own ambitions or an already outsized appetite for 
entertainment, but their spiritual visions. If it indeed is true that inside every 
furrow-browed, culture-constrained, work-manipulated Christian, there is a more 
ethical, sensitive, radiant, vibrant, joyous, worshipful Christian trying to get out, 
one would logically expect this latent side to appear in its most splendid form 




     Hoffman believes that leisure expresses the deepest and freest desires of the 
heart;
228
 therefore, he consecrates this aspect of sport because it is integrally related 
to worship, which is a spiritual framework. In fact, he dogmatically asserts that, 
when played in this sphere, sport helps others to recover their spiritual identity.
229
 He 
follows other Catholic writers (Johan Huizinga, Joseph Pieper, and Hugo Rahner) to 
corroborate his claim that sport is justified and valued religiously by turning to those 
play elements that correlate it to the sacred realm.
230
 Again, I believe this division is 
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necessary for Hoffman to be able to justify his starting point as a way of relating 
these two distinct realities that modern sport has torn apart. That is, if sports today, as 
Guttmann argues,
231
 are not related to the transcendent, then Hoffman‘s origin is an 
attempt to put sport back together by identifying the true riches that are spiritual.
232
  
     Remember, Hoffman earnestly rejects any justification of sport based on 
instrumental reasons or extrinsic goods. He declares that utilitarian justification 
based on secular ideals and goods has dominated the Christian imagination 
throughout church history. He is also reacting to the ―Protestant model‖ of sport in 
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which the criterion of work judges what is successful in different spheres.
233
 
According to Hoffman, the church got it right during the medieval age because it 
valued games as religious experiences by focusing on their spiritual realities. By 
using this example, Hoffman suggests that this way of valuing sport should be 
normative for Christians today. This return to some pre-modern period as if it was 
the halcyon day of sport follows Pieper.  
     Beyond this criticism, Hoffman goes on to follow Guttmann‘s thesis that what the 
Romans began, modern sport intensified--namely, the break between sacred and 
secular. Once the religious rationale was absent, the shift to such characteristics as 
quantified human achievement and records occurred. He concludes that 
the dislocation can‘t be blamed only on forces external to religion. Christianity‘s 
insistence on denying sport‘s appeal to the human spirit, subverting it with 
external objectives, may have played a greater part in achieving distance 




Therefore, Hoffman‘s goal is to convince the Christian community that sport has 
religious significance because it is a religious experience. To heal the breach, he 
selects specific aspects of sport that he contends are religious or sacred. Sport 
deserves our attention because it is a matter of the spirit, the religious or sacred 
realm. In his estimation, he must reform sport this way because evangelicals have left 
sport in the secular, morally neutral realm of the body divorced from the soul. That 
is, evangelical muscular Christians are guilty of a split-vision of life because they 
conceive sport as non-spiritual. He explains this mistake as dualism because 
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evangelicals have falsely relegated sport to what they perceive as the secular, neutral 
realm, the bottom tier—the body compartment.
235
 Hoffman‘s corrective, however, 
puts the solution for properly valuing sport in a different tier, the upper tier. Hoffman 
employs Nancey Pearcey‘s elementary explanation on dualism as a critique of 
modern muscular Christianity;
236
 however, he himself takes over the upper tier as his 
starting point to justify sport as religious and spiritual. He maintains dualism. By 
keeping his explanation and warrant for sport primarily to the spiritual realm, he 
misses and/or minimizes other important areas that are equally significant for a total 
understanding of sport from a Christian worldview. If modern muscular Christians 
ran too close to the earth, he soars above in the higher realm. Sport as worship, 
religious experience, or sacred becomes the origin, purpose, and grounds for 
defending Christian involvement in sport: the sacred stands over the natural.
237
 The 
irony here is subtle because Hoffman points to the inherent dualism that has 
precluded evangelical muscular Christians from properly relating to sport; however, 
in the end, it seems that he allows the pendulum to swing to the other side to locate 
sport fundamentally in the higher realm of the sacred, which is equally a mistake and 
an example of dualism. Instead of the non-spiritual side eating up the spiritual,
238
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which has historically been true for evangelical muscular Christianity, Hoffman‘s 
dichotomy desiccates and enervates materiality. Hoffman has erred in the opposite 
direction from modern muscular Christianity. 
     Two other examples serve to support my claim. First, in a recent Christianity 
Today essay, a summary of Good Game, Hoffman claims that sports ―fundamentally 
appeal more to our spirits than to our physiologies. . . . [it is this religious expression 
which] may signal their proper place in the created order.‖
239
 Here we have evidence 
not only of a value dualism but also of a metaphysical dualism. He clearly focuses on 
what part of us is involved in sport.
240
 How can sport appeal more to the spirit unless 
some dualistic image of human existence is accepted? For Bonhoeffer, the sensuous, 
perceptual, and kinetic movement of the body participates just as much in the whole 
person as the other (immaterial) human dimensions. As willed by God, the body 
intrinsically bears the rights and dignity of the whole person and thus needs to be 
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Christ-reality reconciles (Kretchmar, Practical Philosophy of Sport and Physical Activity, 109-111).  
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respected and preserved.
241
 ―Bodiliness and being human [Menschein] belong 
indivisibly together.‖
242
 Bonhoeffer includes the whole person as an end itself; thus, 
the body has a right to joys and pleasure just as much as do the spirit and soul. In 




     Second, in a much earlier essay, Hoffman again locates sport as play in an entirely 
different realm: 
By positioning sport within the family of activities called play we acknowledge 
that sport is more than perspiration and heart rate and muscle endurance; it 
impacts the human spirit and gives access to untranslatable expressions of the 
soul. There is a world of difference between the experience of hitting a golf ball 
or running a mile or serving a tennis ball and the mundane experience of 
repairing broken pipes. Plumbing is a useful and important activity that can be 
performed to the glory of God, but there is nothing inherent in the experience of 
fitting pipes together that quickens one‘s imaginative impulse or sharpens one‘s 
spiritual vision. If this distinction between these two vastly different realms of 
human experience is denied, any attempt to integrate sport with Christian 




In this example, Hoffman draws a hard and fast dichotomy between work and play in 
order to make the argument that play, unlike work (because work is more utilitarian), 
appeals to our imagination and spirituality in a manner radically different in kind 
from those more earthly, mundane kinds of activities, such as plumbing.  
     Johnston claims that this method of configuring sport/leisure/play and work is a 
―Leisure-oriented-unilateral‖ model. It is consistent with a Greek model, which 
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divorces work and play by denying the efficacy of work.
245
 Hoffman does not appear 
to deny plumbing some value, yet he clearly understands this practice as inherently 
devoid of imaginative impulse and spiritual significance. According to Hoffman, 
what makes sport unique is that the play element impacts the human spirit in a 
radically different way than do physical activities, such as plumbing. This occurs 
because Hoffman has drawn a line, if but a fine one, between the physical (even 
mundane) and the spiritual. The human spirit is the ―part‖ that he singles out as the 
key to differentiating sport from work. When compared and analyzed in this dualist 
manner, physical, manual behavior is insufficient and inferior to play. Play realizes 
and expresses something that is off-limits to plumbing. Why deny these other goods? 
In reality, the human maker and player is just as present in plumbing as in sport, 
although each practice uniquely and dynamically accents a diverse plurality of 
goods. A plumber‘s trade requires hand-eye coordination, artistic judgment, and 
creative imagination to handle different kinds of materials and negotiate corners and 
angles while joining, welding, fitting, and crimping pipes. This ―mundane‖ activity 
appeals equally to the whole person unless we assume some kind of vertical 
hierarchy that artificially identifies some part of the person, and the experience itself, 
as the inherent element for determining its sacred nature. Hoffman‘s dualism requires 
that he rearrange the thick, rich, and diverse state of affairs of reality—human 
behavior and experience—not only in general, with this plumbing example, but also 
in sport, where other equally important aspects of sport (e.g., physical prowess, 
physiology, striving for excellence) are slighted or reduced in importance.  
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     Furthermore, this example suggests another dichotomy that assumes other 
sources‘ arguments and paradigms. Hoffman‘s emphasis on play as an ―attitude‖ is in 
keeping with Pieper‘s view that leisure is a contemplative and spiritual attitude,
246
 a 
condition of the soul for ―steeping oneself in the whole of creation‖.
247
 Pieper, who 
follows Aquinas‘ division of human life into vita activa (servile arts) and vita 
contemplativa (liberal arts),
248
 holds that leisure is associated with man‘s spiritual 
capacity. If this is true, then leisure is the more valuable because these contemplative 
kinds of activities fulfill the highest promise in man—that of being truly human.
249
 
The higher calling of this ―attitude‖ rules over not only human life in general but also 
the sportive life in particular because it is located vertically in the upper tier of the 
spiritual.
250
 Hoffman claims that the spiritual (upper tier) is the ideal state to which 
Christians should aspire and that ―at most, sports are a spiritual response, a way of 
expressing the remarkable feelings of spiritual activity.‖
251
 Hoffman, according to 
the Scholastic ethos, maintains the primacy of leisure or play because leisure or play 




     In his final chapter, Hoffman‘s subheading ―The Spiritual Footing: Sport as Play 
(and its subsequent content) brings this dualism even more into view. If I interpret 
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him correctly, play as his lodestar is the organizing assumption that gives meaning to 
sport because of the metaphysics of the spiritual. This spiritual ―footing‖ is his first 
principle because he begins with and from this a priori split of reality. He states that 
play experiences ―have a way of riveting our being, transporting us to a different 
time and space, and affirming a different order of existence.‖
253
 Certainly, this mode 
of comportment is unique phenomenologically when compared to non-recreational 
stances; however, this criterion appears to function metaphysically because play 
carries us (maybe even upward) to a different order. That is, it is different in kind 
because it is in a different realm. Play strikes a chord at the core of our being because 
like begets like. Hoffman adds that this play element has ―a spark of eternity,‖ which, 
according to Berger, points beyond itself to a ―supernatural justification.‖
254
 Thus, 




     Once again, Hoffman locates his justification ultimately in the transcendent realm, 
which explains ―how sport fits into the Christian experience. . . .‖ Play is at the core 
of the sport experience because it bears kinship with the human spirit and, therefore, 
with its religious significance. More precisely, this kinship puts it in the sacred 
realm. This realm is where autotelic leisure and play experience belong, for ―this 
alone is sufficient reason for the Christian‘s involvement [in sport].‖
256
 With 
Hoffman, the church has come a long way because he has superbly demonstrated that 
the play element of sport is sacred, yet this sacred justification comes with a price. 
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Critique 
     What do I mean by this charge of dualism? Unlike some versions of dualism, 
Hoffman‘s view does not advocate cultural withdrawal or accommodation. Rather, 
he combats these two options as unfaithful, although he calls for a line to be drawn 
between the sacred and secular aspects of sport.
257
 Because sport as play is located in 
the higher sacred realm, this metaphysical description predicates an ontological 
dualism.
258
 This dualism is two-fold.  
     Hoffman draws a line within the human person between spirit and body. This line 
then causes him to organize sport according to those elements that inherently fit or 
appeal to one or the other parts of his hierarchy. Furthermore, he draws his line 
between the play elements of sport that are good and innately bent toward the sacred, 
divine reality, and the aspects of sport that are lower (e.g., cathartic release, sweat of 
our brow, diligence, effort, physiology, winning, rewards) and inferior by nature 
because of his assumed separation. By isolating and separating these aspects, which 
together make up the whole of sportive reality, he values some aspects while 
simultaneously devaluing others. In all fairness, I do not believe this to be some kind 
of radical Gnostic dualism, but his language and descriptions attribute a higher value 
to those aspects and experiences of sport that are in the sacred realm, and they even 
privilege the soul/spirit. Specifically, he situates all the play-leisure elements in the 
sacred because this sacred realm is what gives sports its religious significance. He 
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then posits that all that is warped belongs to the secular either because of its work-
oriented emphasis or because it is located in a lower realm.
259
  
     His division of reality is most clearly evident when he organizes a list of binaries, 
which compares how he and modern muscular Christianity assign value to each of 
the pair, as aspects of sport. ―The concrete trumps the symbolic; doing, 
accomplishing and struggling are favored over mystery, joy, feeling, transport, and 
spiritual insight.‖
260
 He faults evangelical Christians for this ―trumping‖ of the first 
over the second in each pair. His criticism implies that one is more important than 
the other. If modern muscular Christianity tips the scale toward the seriousness of 
sport, he appears to assign greater value to the play elements of sport because they 
evidence our spiritual essence, which is religiously significant. Each member of the 
pair bumps against and repels each other in the dialectical serious-nonseriousness 
nature of sport. For both Hoffman and evangelical muscular Christians, it appears 
that the dialectic is torn asunder based on their tendency to assign values and rank to 
each pair, which creates a hierarchy.  
     Perhaps an even better example of this dualism occurs when Hoffman explicitly 
pits ―power and performance sports‖ [PPM] against a ―pleasure and participation 
model‖ [PP] of sport. ―The PPM is characterized by antagonistic relationships, 
aggressive domination of opponents, excellence achieved through dedication and 
hard work, the setting of records, pushing bodies to human limits, rigid selection 
systems based on ability, and hierarchical authority structures.‖
261
 The PP ―values 
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active participation over watching, enjoyment through personal expression, health 
and well-being, democratic decision making, and interpersonal support rather than 
hardnosed competition.‖
262
 Notwithstanding the debate over whether these 
characteristics of PPM and the problems in sports are straightforwardly causal (a 
conjunction that Hoffman suggests is true),
263
 Hoffman incorrectly assumes that what 
is true for all of the PPM is therefore true for each of the parts of the PPM. However, 
the problems in the PPM cannot be attributed to some of the parts unless, like 
Hoffman, one overly simplifies by assuming that organized competitive sports are 
always constraining and guilty of ―ikishness‖.
264
 In fact, attribution is a complex 
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229. 
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dynamic and dramatic relationship between personal, socio-cultural, spiritual, and 
institutional conditions. For these conditions, it is difficult to know exactly what is 
causing the problem unless you again lump everything that is alienating about sport 
under one convenient polemical model, such as PPM. I take three aspects of the PPM 
as my example. Excellence, dedication, and hard work are just as spiritual and 
directed toward our true end as Christians as these other elements and goods native 
to the sport experience and player, respectively. My second and third chapters 
defended these other elements and goods with Paul Weiss and John Paul II. 
Furthermore, excellence and hard work are fruits that can arise from a proper 
response to the gospel. Sport performances can be a testimony of a plurality of 
excellences (i.e., personal sacrifices, strenuous efforts, courage, intellectual and 
physical skills) that cannot be reduced to the PPM. Hoffman‘s use of this PPM 
unnecessarily ties goods, such as excellence, to domination and alienation. Hoffman 
even offers Pedro Zamballa as an example of an athlete who expressed personal 
sacrifice and courage while playing in the context of PPM. Pedro Zamballa is a 
counter-example that defeats his own thesis.  
     I concede that some of the other characteristics of PPM (e.g., aggressively 
dominating an opponent, defining the body as machine, defining the opponent as the 
enemy) are morally wrong, but these characteristics are not the same as the other 
parts. Furthermore, because of this faulty division, Hoffman poses a false dilemma 
when he claims that ―only someone with a severely skewed view of the gospel taught 
by Jesus and the apostles would conclude that the worldview of the PPM better 
exemplifies the gospel‘s fundamental core than the pleasure and participation 
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model.‖
265
 Hoffman oversimplifies the problem and leaves us with only these two 
models, suggesting the PP as the true model. Again, there is nothing intrinsic to some 
of the parts of the PPM that preclude them from Christian deliberation and action. As 
it stands, PP over PPM is a hypothetical hierarchy that requires much further 
justification. In summary, Hoffman reacts to modern muscular Christianity‘s 
overvaluation of the seriousness of sport with his own overvaluation, which lends 
itself to a grading of what is best or ideal in sport. PP is best because, in his 
explanation, it corresponds more to the spirit or the sacred.  
     Hoffman has the opportunity to redress this problem when he places and reads 
sports in a theological context according to the Christian narrative. He chooses 
eschatology, what he calls the ―myth of eternity,‖ and creation, what he refers to as 
the ―myth of God at play in creation.‖ Both of these doctrines function as his control-
script or beliefs to ―give life to sport and offer a center for thinking about it in a 
Christian context.‖
266
 I will concentrate on the first of these two.  
     Hoffman‘s eschatological understanding of the human player strangely hurts, 
rather than helps, any misperceptions about his dualism. His explanation of eternity 
seems to be more distant and under-realized, a preferred future that lies ahead. He 
defines this myth as ―the Christian hope that the end of the present life is but the 
beginning of an eternal life in heaven spent with God and fellow believers with 
incorruptible bodies and everlasting joy. . . .‖
267
 Note how the newness of the eternal 
life begins after this present life, which implies that the way we sport and play now 
only vaguely anticipates this future reality. He speaks of play in the here and now as 
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a ―signal‖ (Berger), ―imitation‖ (Rahner), and ―echo‖ (Lewis) of the true play that we 
will experience in the eschaton. Certainly, there is a tension between the ―already‖ 
and ―not yet‖ experience. Horton explains theologically that this tension is an 
eschatological dualism not to be confused with an ontological dualism.
268
 
Ontological dualism draws a line, a sharp line for Hellenistic dualism, between the 
temporal, mutable earthly realm and the heavenly, eternal, perfect realm. Hoffman 
claims that sport on earth ―reflects‖ or at best imitates a vision of eternity.
269
  
     I believe this dualism for Hoffman has him characterize the eschaton as the true 
world versus the apparent world. His conflicted world, an unbearable tension, forces 
him to hook sport as a cultural activity to the highest order, which rips this tension in 
two and leaves us with two different realms, thus creating dualism. At the conclusion 
of his book, he envisions Christian sport as an opportunity ―for recovering our 
spiritual centers of gravity and for rehearsing spiritual truths, keeping in mind that 
our games are but dim images of the real game that will begin when this world has 
been left behind.‖
270
 His eschatology tips more to an otherworldly cosmology, 
especially since he depends on C. S. Lewis and Hugo Rahner to justify his 
description of this heavenly reality. Indeed, he quotes from Weight of Glory,
271
 in 
which Lewis conceives reality Platonically.
272
 That is, like Plato, Lewis makes sense 
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of the natural in reference to the sacred realm. Walker argues that Lewis‘ Platonism 
―assumes that the spiritual realm is the primary reality, in a hierarchical sense, over 
the natural world, though not against it. . . .‖
273
 This means that, for Lewis, material 
reality was ―a diminution of spiritual reality, the symbol of it, an etiolated world.‖
274
 
Hoffman follows this same Platonic reasoning when he proclaims that ―tennis is not 
eternity and baseball is not heaven, but they may bear a symbolic relationship to the 
real thing lying outside of our immediate experience.‖
275
 He goes on to apply 
Lewis‘s concept directly to sport, with sport in the here-and-now functioning as a 
shadow of the real thing. According to Hoffman, this is sport‘s purpose in the 
Christian life!
276
 Moreover, Rahner‘s argument, of which Hoffman gives only an 
excerpt, advances a Platonic mysticism because he understands play as a preparation 
of and a reach for a release from our bodily and earthy burdens.
277
 Therefore, 
Hoffman‘s myth of eternity construes reality dualistically, which diminishes the 
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earthly reality that his player‘s purpose is to know and feel on sports fields. Christian 
athletes play to recover their spiritual identity and participate in spiritual truths.
278
  
     Hoffman‘s ontological dualism also thins and depletes the richness of the material 
play medium as an embodied practice, because this medium awaits and hopes for the 
real, restored play experience. If it lacks a realness and fullness, its ontic goodness, 
which a robust doctrine of creation affirms, is cast in doubt. This dualism undermines 
his second myth as well, for what kind of creation does this God play in and with 
(Prov. 8) in light of ontological dualism?
279
 Furthermore, dualism means that both 
the player and the sport experience lack substantive value, and that this lack of value 
instrumentalizes this earthly pursuit as a mere rehearsal. He runs the risk of 
repudiating those highly physical, earth-situated (bodily) elements of sport (e.g., 
physical prowess, hard work, dedication, competition, excellence) along with the 
very play experiences he most values, and hence the human person as well. If he 
were trying to overcome and distance himself from the ascetic problems of 
evangelical muscular Christians (because in his reasoning the ascetic problems are a 
misdirection of sport), then his lack of preciseness in places leaves the reader 
wanting to know how to integrate the sweaty, sensual, erotic, competitive, and 
strenuous aspects of sport.
280
 Therefore, Hoffman‘s whole thesis is turned on its head 
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because, while he complains that evangelical muscular Christians instrumentalized 
sport by accommodating the gospel, his own Platonic leanings demean and 
instrumentalize this worldly reality as a mere gesture of what is to come. When his 
athletes run, they only dimly feel God‘s pleasure.  
     According to Hoffman‘s myth of eternity, the location or space of this future play 
is in heaven. What happened to Revelation 21, where John envisions a new earth? 
Hoffman‘s restoration includes only individuals in redeemed bodies before God. 
What about the smells, sights, tastes, and touches affected by our intimate contact 
with the materiality of this good earth where we run, glide, jump, bump, and holler as 
players? What about the ―streets,‖ the ground where we will meet each other as 
God‘s children who will play freely (Zechariah 8:5)? This material reality is where 
we will meet God, and it is in the new earth that we will communally celebrate the 
fullness of new life. This physical stuff textures and informs our Christian 
imaginations because, as embodied beings, we enact and perform rituals in and on a 
solid world that is given and redeemed by God. This material problem in the 
eschaton is another real-time implication of his ontological dualism.  
     If both the future and the beginning of the Bible‘s plotline are in question, then 
what about the center of salvation history? Jesus Christ the human being entered 
created reality, not a pale imitation. What kind of human being was he if dualism is 
true? With dualism, the incarnation itself confirms a reality that is thin or that lacks 
something instead of affirming creation and the form of real humanity that we are to 
                                                                                                                                          
defines play since this sacred element is essential to his salvation of sport. Granted, identifying and 
defining what is competition is very important, but I sensed less rigor on his part when defining and 
developing the concept of competition than his theoretical consideration of the concept of play. For 
example, what is the difference between the moral values that come from competing in sport and 
moral values that are intrinsic to this concept? This gets at the relationship between metaphysics and 
ethics which Hoffman‘s treatise on sport stopped short of.  
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become in Christ.
281
 The ―myth of Christ‖ is sorely missing in Hoffman‘s work. It is 
because he does not unify divine reality and sportive reality in Christ that I turn to 
Bonhoeffer.  
     In the next chapter, I will begin with Bonhoeffer‘s Christ-reality in order to 
redress this acute problem of dualism and to offer a modest way forward on how to 
think Christocentrically about the relationship between sport and the Christian faith. 
Bonhoeffer‘s Christ-reality incorporates believers into an in-breaking reality where 
this newness has already appeared. As depicted by his ultimate and penultimate 
framework, Bonhoeffer‘s eschatology structures the inescapable tension between this 
world and the next in Christ, for only in Christ is this tension resolved. Bonhoeffer‘s 
duality, not dualism, keeps our feet immediately close to the penultimate ―natural 
life‖ so we can enjoy sport as a contrapuntal desire of human life, a melody to be 
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     In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to interpret and understand certain 
features of modern sport from the perspective of theological ethics. This thesis is not 
a comprehensive audit of sport. I have tried to cull from a few exemplars of the 
Christian tradition who might instruct us on how to think about and inhabit sport 
faithfully. In tapping this living tradition, I have drawn specifically from Augustine, 
John Paul II, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Each of these three serves as a theological 
guide to establish some important categories that a theological ethic should contend 
with for the Christian tradition. In particular, I have organized this thesis around a 
few of their primary motifs so as to use them as heuristic tools for critical inquiry—
to examine basic assumptions upon which others ground their judgments and 
interpret sport—and core convictions concerning this world and how Christians 
imagine and relate to this form of life as an embodied, penultimate good.  
     In this final chapter, I endeavor to bring all three voices to bear on moral matters 
related to integration and disintegration in the sphere of sport. First, I continue where 
I left off in the last chapter concerning dualism and modern muscular Christianity. I 
repair this problem of integration with Bonhoeffer‘s ultimate and penultimate duality 
so a Christian sportsperson is free to enact the gospel in this cultural activity of sport.  
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     Second, Augustine‘s commitment to God gives meaning to and coherence for 
how a Christian should regard or value goods, sport in this thesis, for the sake of the 
highest good. With Augustine, I want to extend my moral reflection on perhaps the 
most debilitating moral matter in modern sport, i.e., the inordinate loves of politics 
and money, which damage sport and its true, intended end.  
     Third, I conclude this thesis with John Paul II, who proposes that 1 Corinthians 
9:24-27 is a moral paradigm for how we integrate our faith in sport. John Paul II‘s 
conclusion envelops this whole thesis, for his framework capably repairs the folk 
theologizing endemic to modern muscular Christianity as a way forward for how 
Christians envision sport theologically.    
Ultimate and Penultimate: A Paradigm for Integration 
     For Bonhoeffer, the unity of reality is true because ―In Jesus Christ the reality of 
God has entered the reality of this world.‖
1
 Bonhoeffer believed that, in order to 
think and speak correctly about either God or the world and to live faithfully in this 
world, one must do so in Jesus Christ. ―The question about the Christian life, 
therefore, will be answered neither by radicalism nor by compromise [forms of two 
realm thinking]; Jesus Christ himself decides and answers it . . . . [it is] resolved only 
in Christ.‖
2
 His Christological grounding for all of life is the reason why he rejects 
the doctrine of two realms (Raüme). Any splitting of reality into sacred and profane, 
natural and supernatural, etc., leaves a Christian schizophrenic, torn between dual 
citizenship.
3
 Unlike modern muscular Christianity and Shirl Hoffman, the Christian 
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2
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life does not search for answers below or above or look to either the secular or sacred 
as its justification because the world is already reconciled by God in Christ.
4
   
     Although he recognized this unity in Christ, Bonhoeffer was not naive about the 
ambiguity and tensions between the Christian and the world, living in but not of the 
world. However, instead of talking about the sacred and secular as two opposing 
spheres, Bonhoeffer constructed a way forward with his language of the ―ultimate 
and penultimate.‖ These categories, according to Burtness, ―are ways of structuring 
the duality of the whole of creation under sin and grace.‖
5
 Bonhoeffer claims that this 
duality properly structures and relates creation to redemption and time to eternity, 
thus keeping the integrity of faith in God.
6
 Wüstenberg analyzes that this duality 
does not ―describe certain spheres, empires, or kingdoms. Instead they are categories 
that describe events both theologically and in terms of political reality.‖
7
 Thus, 
Christ-reality confirms a connection between theology and public life; it unifies the 
tension between the two. Let us review briefly Bonhoeffer‘s teaching on the ultimate 
and penultimate in order to set up my further analysis and its accompanying 
implications for how to relate the two.  
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Ultimate: Explanation and Implications 
     Bonhoeffer wrote his chapter ―Ultimate and Penultimate Things,‖ along with a 
few other chapters of Ethics, while staying at the Benedictine monastery of Ettal 
(1940-1941).
8
 In these chapters, Bonhoeffer sought to recover or rediscover the 
natural for the sake of the gospel, which the natural for Protestant thought had fallen 
into discredit, contrary to Catholic moral theology.
9
  
     According to Bonhoeffer, the ultimate is the event of justification of a sinner by 
faith and grace alone because in this event the origin and essence of all Christian life 
are consummated. ―Here the length and breadth of human life are concentrated in 
one moment, one point: the whole of life is embraced in this event.‖
10
 What occurs in 
this event is something ultimate; the word of God bursts in as His compassion and 
mercy to a sinner, which frees us to recognize and properly relate to God, others, and 
ourselves. This whole event is true and real when Jesus Christ comes to a person; 
therefore, a person is justified by grace and faith alone.
11
 Let me expand upon what I 
initially described in the last chapter so this construct and its implication can allow 
me to further critique modern muscular Christianity and to provide a way forward on 
a few other problems.  
     If justification is the ultimate,
12
 it is ultimate in two senses: qualitative and 
temporal. First, the qualitative sense means that justification  
                                                 
8
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involves a complete break with everything penultimate, with all that has gone 
before; because it is never the natural or necessary end of a way already pursued 
but rather the complete condemnation and devaluation of that way; because it is 
God‘s own free word that can never be forced from God by anything 
whatsoever; therefore it is the irreversibly ultimate word, the ultimate reality. It 




What Bonhoeffer means is that all creaturely methods or means—deeds or works—
are rejected and condemned in their attempt to achieve the ultimate. The Christian 
message is about costly grace because both the content and the goal of the message 
are Christ himself; therefore, all examples, whether moral, pious, heroic models or 
biblical figures, are excluded once and for all as a method or means of justification. 
―Faith is not a method, however, but the gift of God.‖
14
 O‘Donovan adds that it is 
this final word that preempts all human judgments about human achievement and 
worth. When this final word is forgotten, Christians often turn to penultimate 
standards, such as subjective experience or successful and sustained efforts, in order 
to justify or appraise their works. God‘s judgment is ―apart from works‖ (Rom. 
3:28); justification is only what has been done and accomplished in Christ.
15
 What 
does justification mean existentially for many athletes who anxiously perform to 
prove themselves before multiple tribunals? In the final part of this section, I follow 
Bonhoeffer‘s justification construct in order to demythologize this modern form of 
self-justification.  
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     Second, justification is ultimate in a temporal sense. Therefore, some span of time 
with its concomitant experiences (e.g., actions, suffering, movement, intention, 
defeat, recovery, pleading, hoping) literally precedes it as the penultimate. Only what 
is under God‘s judgment now during this time of grace can hear this ultimate word 
because after this time of grace, the ultimate breaks off the penultimate. It is during 
this earthly trek that God graciously interrupts and puts an end to any human striving, 
any planned or calculable method of self-justification.
16
 
     One of the persistent problems with modern muscular Christianity has been its 
evangelistic methods. Undoubtedly, Bonhoeffer‘s paradigm of penultimate and 
ultimate accepts this group‘s emphasis on gospel preaching since we are responsible 
to proclaim God‘s good news. This is a non-negotiable New Testament function for 
God‘s church. Part of preparing the way for the word is proclaiming the gospel. As 
will become clearer below, this aspect of preaching the gospel as penultimate activity 
is absent from Hoffman‘s theological offerings of how gospel proclamation relates to 
sport. In fact, he says that sport is not constitutionally suited to proclaiming the 
gospel. For modern muscular Christianity, however, what is troublesome for this 
thesis is that they conflate form and function or what Bonhoeffer says about the use 
of method.  
     Mathisen describes this problem as the way in which modern muscular 
Christianity regularly uses and organizes outreaches around professional or celebrity 
athletes who attract crowds because their audience identifies with them.
17
 Hoffman 
adds that this method is analogous to marketing because these athletes sell the gospel 
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like a product.
18
 For many Christian groups, this appears to be an obligatory model; 
thus, it might suggest to their audiences that this method is how you reach the 
ultimate: become like person X so you can have a personal relationship with Jesus 
Christ. The form overwrites and usurps the authority and content of the gospel itself. 
Hoffman contends that, with its marketing orientation, sport evangelism ends up 
pitching (intentionally or not) the Christian faith, not on the merits of Christ‘s work, 
but on the strength of their own status, performances, and success.
19
 Stone argues 
that, when this method is true, the logic of the market instrumentalizes the church‘s 
comprehensive witness with external ends, such as power, influence, church growth, 
accomplishment, effectiveness, and success. These external ends then function as 
evaluative measures for the practice of evangelism.
20
 The worldly means 
compromise the ultimate. For Bonhoeffer, this method misconstrues the relationship 
between the penultimate and ultimate. He rejects any kind of Lutheran or Pauline 
method as self-made ways to attain the ultimate word because this method suggests a 
necessary continuity between the penultimate and ultimate. Bonhoeffer claims that 
the ultimate, as God‘s grace, severs any kind of natural tie between itself and the 
penultimate: ―it is never the natural or necessary end of a way already pursued but 
rather the complete condemnation and devaluation of that way.‖
21
 Therefore, he 
summarizes that ―no method leads to this end [justification by faith and grace alone]. 
Otherwise the gospel would lose its price, its value. Costly grace would become 
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cheap.‖
22
 When method becomes a ministry‘s focus, the gospel is cheapened and 
exchanged for relevance and credibility.  
Extreme Options: Radicalism and Compromise 
       The duality of the ultimate and penultimate leads Bonhoeffer to describe two 
unethical, extreme ways of resolving this tension: radicalism and compromise. 
Bonhoeffer states,  
Both wrongly absolutize ideas that are necessary and right in themselves. The 
radical solution approaches things from the end of all things, from God the judge 
and redeemer; the compromise solution approaches things form the creator and 
preserver. One absolutizes the end [ultimate], the other absolutizes what exists 
[penultimate]. Thus creation and redemption, time and eternity, fall into an 





From my last chapter, where I first introduced these false options, and from the 
discussion at the beginning of this chapter, it is apparent that Bonhoeffer rejects both 
extremes because ―both attitudes are equally opposed to Christ; for the concepts that 
are here set up against each other are one in Jesus Christ.‖
24
 Both of these false 
attempts juxtapose the ultimate and penultimate so as to make them mutually 
exclusive. For the first, Christ annihilates and stands as a foe to everything that is 
penultimate; for the second, the penultimate stands as its own law with its own 
inherent rights, leaving it unthreatened by the ultimate.
25
 Moreover, both of these 
false options misrepresent Christ because their dualism divides Christ into ―judge 
and redeemer‖ and ―creator and preserver,‖ respectively. That is, both positions are 
―opposed to Christ,‖ which leads Bonhoeffer to argue for and affirm a duality in 
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Christ. ―There is only the God-man Jesus Christ who is real, through whom the 
world will be preserved until it is ripe for its end.‖
26
 
Penultimate: Explanation and Implications 
     Bonhoeffer believes that it is for the sake of the ultimate that he must talk about 
the penultimate. How the two of these relate ―is not just a single case but basically 
the entire range of Christian common life . . . .‖
27
 What is the penultimate? 
Bonhoeffer explains that, 
It is all that precedes the ultimate—the justification of the sinner by grace 
alone—and that is addressed as penultimate after finding the ultimate. At the 
same time it is everything that follows the ultimate, in order again to precede it. 
There is no penultimate as such, as if something or other could justify itself as 
being in itself penultimate; but the penultimate becomes what it is only through 
the ultimate, that is, in the moment when it has already lost its own self-





Manoussakis interprets this relationship between the two not merely in terms of the 
penultimate being a temporal indicator, as in prior to sequentially, of the ultimate, 
―but rather a relational one. . . . it exposes the inner relation—a relation of 
interdependence and reciprocity—between God‘s creation and God‘s kingdom.‖
29
 
This inner relation sets the ultimate-penultimate duality as tantamount to the 
eschatological duality of the kingdom being already here and not-yet. Manoussakis 
presents the penultimate as already ―impregnated by the ultimate things-to-come, 
which, since they are already to be found in the penultimate, that is, in the things-
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themselves, are not only to-come but also already here.‖
30
 Or, as I understand it,
31
 the 
ultimate suffuses and mixes with penultimate earthly activities in the here and now. 
Bonhoeffer ultimatizes the penultimate.
32
 This eschatological duality has an 
immediate implication for how Hoffman misconstrues sportive reality in the present.  
     Hoffman‘s myth of eternity seemingly opposes this dialectic unity in Christ 
because his ontological dualism diminishes the fullness of sport and play in the here 
and now. This kind of rendering of eternity is opposed to Christ. Only in Christ is 
this tension resolved. In Jesus Christ the resurrected, God ends death and calls a new 
creation into life. Bonhoeffer instructs that the form of Christ is God giving new life: 
‗The old has gone.‘ ‗See, I am making all things new.‘ The resurrection has 
already broken into the midst of the old world as the ultimate sign of its end and 
its future, and at the same time as living reality. Jesus has risen as human; so he 
has given human beings the gift of resurrection. Thus human beings remain 
human, but in a new resurrected way that is completely unlike the old. To be 
sure, those who are already risen with Christ will remain, until they reach the 
frontier of death, in the world of the penultimate to which Jesus came and in 
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which the cross stands. Even the resurrection does not abolish the penultimate as 
long as the earth remains; but eternal life, the new life, breaks ever more 




The newness and future restoration of sport as play is something, according to the 
trajectory of Bonhoeffer‘s duality, that Christians ―truly‖ participate in now, not only 
in the blessed state when this world has been left behind.
34
 Christ the incarnate does 
not simply affirm play as a gift and right of the natural life,
35
 but Christ the 
resurrected renews these goods for humans; they are opened up and directed toward 
the ultimate. The penultimate is the object and the context of the drama of Christ‘s 
redemption. The beginning of God‘s kingdom is now in Christ in the world; it is not 
some ―gesture‖ pointing to the afterlife. The penultimate is not a way station. In 
Christ, the natural life becomes the penultimate, which is directed toward the 
ultimate. By participating in Christ, we encounter the penultimate experience of 
sport. Thus, what demands our attention while we contest is our full humanity, not 
how it ideally witnesses with our spirit as a playful, celebrative act, to the sacred 
realm. 
     Since this participation in Christ occurs now, this implies that sport as play is not 
intended to carry the kind of favored expectation that transports and lifts us to divine 
reality. For Hoffman, this divine reality is the religious direction and potential of 
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sport. As explained above in reference to Hoffman, what points us to the divine 
reality are ideals with the penultimate (earthly realm) itself mediating ideal 
experiences of human play. Bonhoeffer rebuts this kind of reasoning: ―In Christ the 
reality of God encounters the reality of the world and allows us to take part in this 
real encounter. . . . Christian life is participation in Christ‘s encounter with the 
world.‖
36
 To abstract the play elements from the sportive experience and to treat 
them as the fundamental characteristics that function as a window to the (ideal) next 
world is a Platonic kind of justification. Hoffman attempts to integrate or make sense 
of play on earth in reference to the sacred realm, which for him belongs 
eschatologically to the future. The eschaton appears to be a realm for Hoffman, not 
an eschatological age, because he views this future eternal realm as failing to affirm 
the fullness of our play experience now on this earth. Hoffman sees what is 
―fantastic‖ about the eschaton as a world transformed, but his attention under-
realizes those goods that are truly possible in this world.
37
 Bonhoeffer indicates that 
this kind of reasoning is a cousin of radicalism because Hoffman‘s ―not-yet‖ 
disparages the fullness of creaturely existence in time.
38
 Furthermore, since Hoffman 
places so much weight, as far as justification, on the myth of eternity, he borders on 
absolutizing this eternal, sacred criterion, which for a Christian ethic tears apart the 
unity of the Christ-reality by pitting one aspect against another. This, too, is 
radicalism. The fragile balance between the ultimate and penultimate is broken. 
Hoffman‘s player is uncomfortable or at odds with the created world because he only 
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dimly reflects what is real. Hoffman‘s ―eternity‖ does not bring us into real contact 
with what it means to be a true human as we play in the here and now. The move for 
Hoffman is from man to God through such ideal play experiences, whereas for 
Bonhoeffer, it is from God to man in Christ so man can experience his true humanity 
as he plays, works, parents, etc.
39
 The shape of sport as human play and its future 
goods are already at work in humans because the ultimate interpenetrates the 
penultimate. This emphasis on our humanity is important because the penultimate 
aims to address human life.   
     Bonhoeffer speaks of the penultimate as directing our attention to prepare the way 
concretely toward two aims: being human [Menschsein] and being good [Gutsein].
40
 
Because it is the human being that is justified, it is imperative that the penultimate be 
protected and preserved for the sake of the ultimate.
41
 If human life is deprived of the 
goods or conditions necessary for it to flourish, it harms the ultimate, the reception 
and hearing of the final word of God, and justification by faith and grace alone. For 
Bonhoeffer, preaching the gospel and preparing the way for the word are necessary 
in order ―to care for the penultimate in order that the ultimate not be hindered by the 
penultimate‘s destruction.‖
42
 It is the church‘s immeasurable responsibility as a 
mission to this world, something that Christians are not released from even though 
Christ makes his own way when he returns, to do what it takes to remove with 
compassion those hindrances or conditions that make it difficult to receive God‘s 
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grace and to believe. Bonhoeffer reasons that this preparation is necessary because 
the word itself demands it, since the word‘s claim is for a free and smooth way, and 
because Jesus Christ himself desires to come to all people.
43
 A few important 
implications follow from this summary of the penultimate. 
     First, preaching the gospel is both a penultimate, human activity, and an ultimate, 
God-directed action. Since God alone creates faith, faith comes from the reality that 
God in Christ acted freely to demonstrate his mercy toward sinners.
44
 Liguš 
summarizes that the preaching of the Gospel ―is considered penultimate because in 




     Second, preparing the way for Bonhoeffer is Christian social responsibility.
46
 
Though this activity must not be equated with the preaching of the gospel, 
Bonhoeffer nevertheless perceives it as an inseparable task given to all who know 
about the second advent of Christ.
47
 Clements interprets this as ―if divine grace is to 
be preached to man, humanity must at least be preserved in all its aspects—physical, 
mental, social and cultural—for the reception of that word.‖
48
 This social 
responsibility corresponds to the very reality of this world that Christ encountered 
and reconciled. What this means, once again, is that how we relate to sport is 
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preached (Keith W. Clements, A Patriotism for Today: Love of Country in Dialogue with the Witness 
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (London: Collins, 1986), 59.).  
47
 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 160-161.  
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determined by Christ‘s form--the form in which we are called to participate in the 
church‘s encounter with the world. When this social responsibility is neglected in 
modern sport, in particular in North America, then a variety of personal and social 
circumstances can deprive sportspersons from conditions that are consistent with 
being human in sport and that therefore harm the ultimate.   
     Sports, like other areas, is a space often overrun with beliefs and practices that can 
encourage abuse, exploitation, and injustices, all of which disgrace and humiliate 
sportspersons at all levels of sport. These conditions, as well as the formative habits 
that inculcate a host of vices, are often tethered to the extrinsic demands and goals of 
big business and bureaucratic institutions. Extrinsic demands contest with the goods 
necessary for a human to flourish in sport. Playing sport, like other basic goods, 
constitutes who humans are; thus, when the concomitant goods are neglected or 
overvalued, human lives and communities are affected.  
     Some of the main hindrances to preparing the way concretely toward the two 
aims—being human and being good—for this penultimate activity are the 
following:
49
 lack of adequate sport facilities for kids in urban and rural areas, 
equipment costs and fees related to having the opportunity to freely play a particular 
sport, untrained coaches, nutrition, diet and lifestyle problems in sport, over-
emphasis on winning, performance-enhancing drugs, commodification and 
commercialization, violence and injuries to the body, other deviant forms of behavior 
                                                 
49
 See Coakley, Sports in Society, 96-523; David L. Shields, Brenda Light Bredemeier, Nicole M 
LaVoi and F. Clark Power, ―The Sport Behavior of Coaches, Parents, and Athletes: The Good, The 
Bad and the Ugly,‖ Journal of Research in Character Education 3, no. 1 (2005): 43-59. Cf. United 
Nations UNOSDP, ―Sport for Development and Peace: The UN System in Action,‖ United Nations, 
<http://www.un.org/themes/sport> (accessed 22 June 2010). My point is not to scrutinize the morality 
of these problems but only to list them as proof of the complexity of the problems related to this 
penultimate activity. 
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in practices and games (e.g., cheating, bad sportsmanship, trash-talking), sexism, 
racism, etc. Hoffman commendably points to these problems in Good Game. These 
systemic conditions and individual problems, which of course mirror many of the 
same disorders in society, can alienate sportspersons, thus socializing debilitating 
effects for those in sport. For Bonhoeffer, to address such social conditions is part of 
the coming kingdom of God—it complements evangelism, which as social outreach 
struggles to help people become human and preserve the integrity of the 
penultimate‘s social order.
50
 As God‘s church, engaging the world this way frees 
believers to be about worldly activities because it is for the sake of the ultimate that 
Christians must attend to the penultimate.
51
 Bonhoeffer, however, warns against any 
misunderstanding that the goal is to get the world in order prior to people becoming 
Christians. The New Testament witnesses to the fact that what is at stake is the 
coming of Christ. Preparing the way is grounded in the gospel. If justification is the 
final word, how might justification paradigmatically embrace a Christian athlete‘s 
own life and identity as she plays, contests, and performs in this penultimate activity?  
The Gospel and Christian Identity in Sport
52
 
     In his own parodic manner, Umberto Eco examines and exposes such everyday 
life ―texts‖ as sport.
53
 Eco reflects that 
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There is one thing that–even if it were considered essential–no student 
movement or urban revolt or global protest or what have you would ever be able 




As a European, he is referring to soccer, but the same could be said for North 
America, whether it be college or professional baseball, American football, or 
basketball. Sport, according to Eco, has emerged as a social phenomenon (in the 
experience and minds of the fans) that conceptually connects it with what it truly 
means to be human with and in society. Thus, Eco concludes that ―Sport is Man, 
Sport is Society‖—Homo Sportivus.
55
 Eco is highlighting the circus-like behavior of 
the fans as spectators who articulate this ―Maximum Cement‖ between sport, man 
and society.
56
 However, the actual drama of competition (for the spectators are 
responding to something) is a practice where the logic and values from its wider 
cultural and institutional context often govern actions and even shape the personal 
identity of the contestants.
57
 From an Augustinian viewpoint, this dynamism of the 
practice and its rituals, in this particular context, orders and disorders our loves. I will 
say more about this in the next section. Unfortunately, ―the value system in high-
performance sports often encourages overconformity to a set of norms or guidelines 
that athletes use to evaluate themselves and others as they train and compete.‖
58
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 Coakley, Sports in Society, 168. I might add to Coakley that it is not as if there is some monolithic 
value system germane to sport. What he means is that sport as they are often played in the West, in 
particular in America, are played according to the logic and norms of a wider network, socio-
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domination, and technological control (Coakley, Sports in Society, 110.). The double character of 
sport is such that the nature of sport consists not only of its formal characteristics (e.g., play, rules, 
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Sport sociologist Jay Coakley explains that this sport ethic is an overconformity to, 
unqualified acceptance of, and unquestioned commitment to the values, norms, and 
goals of sport itself.
59
 What often follows is that their identities become habituated to 
this logic and thus cemented in sport itself, Homo Sportivus. According to Coakley, 
athletes who most commonly adopt this sport ethic are those ―athletes whose identity 
or future chances for material success are exclusively tied to sport,‖ because ―self-
identification becomes lodged within sport.‖
60
 Hughes and Coakley maintain that 
―the role of the athlete (player, climber, skier, runner, etc.) becomes extremely salient 
to a person‘s identity.‖
61
  
     Theologically, this confusion concerning identity and overconformity is not 
merely an ethical, sociological, and psychological problem, but it is also a desperate 
attempt at self-justification, which is a theological problem.
62
 Jüngel helps us to 
                                                                                                                                          
goals, competition, skill, excellence, physical prowess) but a wider network of values which a 
Christian ethic must consider in deliberation. Sports are sites and social constructions which have a 
relative autonomy (See Steenbergen and Tamboer, ―Ethics and the Double Character of Sport,‖ 49-
53.).  
59
 Robert Hughes and Jay Coakley, ―Positive Deviance among Athletes: The Implications of 
Overconformity to the Sport Ethic,‖ Sociology of Sport Journal 8, no. 4 (1991): 307-309. 
Overconformity is one of the extreme options with underconformity representing the other extreme 
type of deviance. Both types our grounded in different personal and social dynamics that constitute, 
organize and situate this practice.  
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The tension is that a person‘s identity does determine his or her actions while at the same time what a 
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understand the terminology of justification and what justification means for the 
contemporary person. He claims that ―to justify something, to justify oneself, to be 
justified—these are primary life-processes that occur daily.‖
63
 When a person 
justifies her life, her whole being as a whole, she asserts that her life has meaning. 
This worldly life process, the act of justification, takes place before some authority, 
whether that be before others, an institution, or myself, as ―an event which summons 
me before a forum.‖ The nature of life, a condition of our contingent humanity, is 
such that we exist before these kinds of forums, i.e., athlete before his teammates, 
spectators, coaches, media, sponsors, and so on. In these events, a person experiences 
himself ordered to appear before someone. We exist in relation to others, and our 
responsibility to ourselves is a responsibility before others. Behind this justification 
is a longing that is bound up with the reality that a person desires approval; this quest 
is innate because the person depends on it.
64
 ―The will to justify ourselves springs 
from this fundamental anthropological need for approval.‖
65
 The problem with this 
drive is that it can never satisfy perfectly finite and fallen standards and sources of 
approval before these different tribunals.  
                                                                                                                                          
person does, the practices that form and shape identity, comprises who he or she is. Plant explains 
from Bonhoeffer‘s Sanctorum Communio that this change in identity occurs primarily when a human 
is addressed personally with God as the ultimate Other (Plant, Bonhoeffer, 58-69.). Therefore, for a 
Christian ethic, it is important to understand the theological problems related to moral identity. Human 
sin spoils, due to the curvature of the self, and misdirects this particular form of life as self-
justification. Justification is God‘s revelation to know what is wrong with self and this world‘s 
formation in order for Christians to responsibly practice and represent the concrete form of Christ in 
human relationships.  
63
 Eberhard Jüngel, ―On the Doctrine of Justification,‖ trans. by John Webster, International Journal 
of Systematic Theology 1, no. 1 (March 1999): 28. I follow Jüngel‘s description of this phenomenon of 
self-justification throughout this section.  
64
 For an argument that organizes this image as homo faber (i.e., man who makes or fabricates his 
world and himself), see Brian Aitken, ―Sport, Religion, and Human Well-Being,‖ in Sport and 
Religion, Shirl Hoffman, ed., (Champaign, IL.: Human Kinetics, 1992). Cf. Sam Keen, An Apology 
for Wonder (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). 
65
 Jüngel, ―On the Doctrine of Justification,‖ 29.  
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     In sport, self-justification is an attempt to travel the road of sport as a means to 
achieve worth and value, an attempt to justify a person‘s life through something 
other than faith in Christ alone. Though this road definitely precedes the ultimate, it 
is not able to traverse and realize this goal of justification. But God‘s final word of 
justification puts an end to this achievement-oriented quest for finding one‘s true 
identity. Bonhoeffer reiterates that ―my life is justified only by that which belongs to 
Christ and never by what became mine.‖
66
 Justification breaks any connection from 
the penultimate to the ultimate as if the ultimate is the realization or ―crowning‖ 
achievement of what was begun on this earth in particular to sportive performances.
67
  
     All of this is not to say that participation in sport does not afford us considerable 
insights into and tacit experiences of self-understanding and personal identity. Again, 
these embodied experiences and skillful movements are intrinsically satisfying and 
reveal much about our humanity. Nor does it imply that a sport is less important 
when compared to other activities, for that would be dualistic. However, even if a 
person experiences deep play--those moments of spiritual transcendence and playing 
in the zone--or the enriching challenges and tests that confront the human player, all 
of these already participate in Christ because ―God and the world are enclosed in this 
name.‖ Any flattening of these experiences, as a kind of immanentism, ignores that 
this reality for a Christian ethic is conceived in the light of Christ.
68
 In Christian 
theology, the ultimate is the source of value, form, and meaning for what is true, 
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good, and beautiful. Again, Christ-reality is not equivalent to the sacred realm, for 
the sacred realm describes something that is abstract, whereas Christ-reality is 
concrete and infiltrates the penultimate. For Bonhoeffer, the ultimate renders 
intelligible the best and worst of penultimate experiences because in Christ, ultimate 
reality is revelation. A person understands the parts in light of the whole, which the 
part depends on our relation to God‘s revelation.
69
 Or, as Jüngel proclaims, this 
―confession of Jesus Christ comes to be a truth that illumines human existence…so 
procuring for them the truth of their own life and liberating them from their living 
falsehoods.‖
70
 Let me explain in more detail why the ultimate is important and what 
immediate implications it holds for a Christian sportsperson.
71
  
     First, justification is the foundation of Christian identity and action. For 
Bonhoeffer, the whole of life is captured in this event of justification.
72
 Justification 
as the ultimate is his point of departure for the Christian life. The gospel of Jesus 
Christ gives rise to Christian ethics.
73
 It is a response to the Christian gospel. Instead 
of beginning with some mode of comportment or stance, such as play or excellence, 
as a part of the natural life, the Christian life grounds its understanding of life in this 
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world according to the gospel. One might object that this rendering of the gospel 
burdens sport as play with ethics and that it subsequently hinders the freedom of 
sport. When we believe that justification is extrinsic to sport itself, we diminish the 
play experience itself. However, to hold such a belief is to misunderstand Christian 
ethics and human action in general. The extreme position of compromise seeks to 
divorce the play world from the ultimate, wanting the penultimate to retain its 
inherent rights so that the ultimate is kept beyond daily life.
74
 The gospel is not some 
add-on to life so that when we play sport, we play to witness to those goods extrinsic 
to sport. This understanding appears to be how modern muscular Christians have 
understood it since they so easily allowed sport to conscript religion for its ends and 
values. On the contrary, the gospel is life. For Bonhoeffer, through the mediation of 
Christ, the ultimate takes seriously the penultimate ―in its own way.‖
75
 The 
relationship between the ultimate and penultimate are not mutually exclusive since in 
Christ incarnate, crucified, and resurrected exists an essential unity. As I presented 
above, the ultimate suffuses or impregnates the penultimate.  
     The starting point for Christian ethics is not the goal or the duty of the ethical act 
(doing or becoming good), but the presupposition of human acts themselves.
76
 That 
is, as exposited in the last chapter and applied directly to this chapter, all human 
actions—which sport as play does not escape—are embedded in the reality of Christ. 
Thielicke explains that the ethical act
77
 ―proceeds from the fact of justification as 
accomplished and given. . . . it [the ethical act] is simply and expression of the prior 
                                                 
74
 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 154.  
75
 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 168. 
76
 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 47-51. 
77
 I include all of sports and life because we inescapably are moral beings so all acts are either 
pleasing or displeasing to God.  
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fact of justification.‖
78
 Therefore, in Christian ethics, human actions are not 
evaluated merely by the logic of a practice (what tasks are to be performed in order 
to preserve the goods internal to sport). Rather, they are fundamentally determined 
by the promise of the gospel as a gift that is already given.
79
  
     The gospel as the final word enables us as humans to understand the authenticity 
and freedom of sport. We come to Christ in child-like faith, and, like a child in her 
freedom, we enter sport truly free. Again, this move is from God in Christ to man; 
therefore, in the form of Christ, athletes manifest this reality as ultimate in the 
sportive form of life.
80
  
     Moltmann argues similarly that a fundamental change must first occur in a 
person‘s being: ―What man is in his ground precedes what he does and manifests 
itself in his actions. His deeds do not change him fundamentally.‖
81
 Instead of 
inhabiting the penultimate of sport and trying to measure up to its tribunal—its laws 
of success and worth based on an alternative logic—the gospel deconstructs the 
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Bonhoeffer. Here I lay stress on the direction from being to doing.  
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alternative logic of this move because the gospel is something given to us, a gift we 
freely receive. God in Christ comes to us in new life.
82
 The unconditional word of 
acceptance reverses the relationship between doing and being so that a sportsperson 
demonstrates her new identity by playing freely. She is no longer under the duress to 
perform and to prove herself or seek approval. For the Christian sportsperson, free 
works in sport (i.e, exercising strength and skills, competing with and against others, 
playing, seeking goals and excellence, etc.) can flow forth as an expression or fruit of 
gospel liberty.
83
 Note, however, that play is reconciled to Christ because this worldly 
reality is directed toward him; thus, where there is perversion, Christ crucified 
rebukes these forms of alienation. In summary, justification as the final word 
encounters a person‘s entire life so that now the ―Christian life means being human 
[Menschsein] in the power of Christ‘s becoming human, being judged and pardoned 
in the power of the cross, living a new life in the power of the resurrection.‖
84
  
     Without question, the act of playing sport is a practice that affords players fecund 
experiences of freedom phenomenologically, regardless of their relationship with 
Jesus Christ. Yet, a person outside of Christ is not free in her identity. Thus, even if 
she plays under the best conditions that sport might offer, play is penultimate, so it 
pales in comparison to the grace and freedom that the final word offers salvifically 
and, hence, existentially. In other words, to participate fully and freely in what sport 
as a practice offers becomes a reality in Christ. The ultimate renders intelligible what 
is good and right about sport. Because of the power from above, the ultimate 
disposes a person to abandon oneself to responsibly enjoy the natural joys of the 
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body. These penultimate joys, which are valued for their own sake, are also ―signs of 
the eternal joy that is promised human beings in the presence of God.‖
85
  
     A second reason for why justification is important for Christian identity and 
action is that justification as the final word counters any man-made attempts to 
justify, validate, or authenticate an athlete‘s identity and existence by performing 
(winning). Central to human identity and the search for human meaning is the 
question, ―who am I?‖
86
 Under the value system of modern sport (although it does 
not occur in all sport as it is played, nor is it a necessary feature of sport), the athlete 
is tempted to use another human being as a mere sporting thing (an IT) to achieve a 
win for his self-worth. According to Bonhoeffer, when another human being is used 
as a mere thing, the natural life is misused; thus, this misdirection is unnatural.
87
 This 
misdirection eventuates in human beings becoming things, commodities, or 
machines. I explore this disorder in relation to our loves in more detail below with 
my discussion of Augustine‘s ethical thought. Instead of directing the penultimate to 
being human and being good, we witness humans severed from the natural life. The 
natural in this specific order of life is arbitrarily destroyed.
88
 Theologically, for 
Bonhoeffer, this misuse of the natural means that sport as a penultimate activity is 
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neither respected nor taken seriously. Only the final word exposes this perversion as 
the destruction of the penultimate.  
     Third, as a justified sinner, when I choose any temporal or penultimate mode to 
determine my identity and worth or to find favor, I am anathematizing the true gospel 
for an alternative gospel. The good news is the justification of the sinner by grace 
and faith alone, which ―cannot be grasped by anything we are, or do, or suffer.‖
89
 
Moreover, every sport ―work‖ that is employed as an ultimate means for finding 
acceptance and value not only pours contempt on the sufficiency of Christ‘s work for 
the redeemed sinner, but also personifies unregenerate thinking. Today, our 
technocratic-western ethos contoured in the dogma of sport apotheosizes this 
compulsion for personal achievement. Jüngel responds to this impetus in modern 
man by pronouncing it to be sin: ―Amongst the worst human failures is the desire to 
realize oneself alone through one‘s good acts….‖
90
  
     Fundamentally, the gospel is a paradigm shift that reinterprets reality and renews 
an athlete‘s perspective to realize that the quest is over and that I am now right and 
valuable by faith in Christ. It is the unconditional nature of this event of justification 
and its application that has always frustrated the world, especially those who believe 
that their works or winning should determine their standing or identity. As Hughes 
and Coakley argue, the norm for this sportive ideology identifies the ―real athlete‖ as 
striving for distinction through this obligatory quest of ―seeking to improve, to get 
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better, to come closer to perfection,‖
91
 all ―…because real athletes are a special group 
dedicated to climbing the pyramid, reaching the top, pushing limits, excelling, and 
exceeding or dominating others.‖
92
 What lurks primarily in the moral ontology of 
these real athletes is an agency that is actualized by what they do, their works of 
righteousness. Works righteousness is incompatible with and condemned by the 
doctrine of justification. In good Lutheran form, Bonhoeffer reverses the moral 
inertia of humankind as exacerbated by this ideology in sport, which believes that it 
is by doing that our being is found acceptable and right. A wedge is driven between 
sport works and the self-realization of the athlete. In summary, contemporary 
Lutheran theologian Oswald Bayer contends for the priority of God‘s grace in that, 
―it is neither justifying thinking nor justifying acting, neither contemplative nor 
active righteousness. It is a passive righteousness.‖
93
  
     Since it is God‘s work alone that interrupts and severs an athlete from associating 
her identity with her deeds, there now exists a new mode of being with and in Christ 
toward the world of sports. A few practical implications follow from this new 
identity.  
     First, the athlete to herself, as addressed by God‘s revelation, is not evaluated as 
―real‖ because of her usefulness in this limited role as an athlete. An athlete‘s worth 
is not increased through her role and action in sport. Perhaps, this false equation is 
one of the reasons for the social problems and personal struggles that often plague 
professional athletes or coaches after they have formally retired from competition.  
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Some research suggests that retired, highly competitive athletes experience a kind of 
―social death‖ because they have lost either their membership in the winning class or 
their opportunity to authenticate their selfhood through sport.
94
 Instead, the core 
identity of what it means to be human is grounded in Christ; it is a new union as 
derived from God‘s undeserved gift. This new reality is constant and true before, 
during, and after competition. God is the objective standard, and my acceptance is 
based on his unconditional love. I have been liberated from any self-made law, sports 
norm, or good work as the source of my identity. Under this reality, competition is 
no longer fraught with the anxiety or despair of whether today an athlete will earn or 
lose her selfhood based on her performance or lack thereof. Athletes now live life 
Coram Deo. Their historical existence has been radically renewed, so their playing 
space and time are altered, transformed into a sanctuary before the face of and in the 
presence of God.  
     Second, if an athlete as a new creation no longer lives under the tyranny of self-
actualization (saving self), she is freed to responsibly inhabit sport and to 
cooperatively relate to others in sport. Or, as Bayer reasons, this new kind of life 
means the agent is not ―condemned to success,‖
95
 fabricating meaning and value via 
successful performances, often at the expense of others. Certain moral and non-moral 
goods, ordinarily extrinsic, were formerly perceived as scarce; thus, the presence of 
others posed a threat. But now, this self-securing orientation is mortified by the event 
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of justification.
96
 Being in Christ unfetters athletes‘ wills from the self-entrapment 
that deceptively biases them to use and to disrespect others in an attempt to break 
free from this bondage. These dehumanizing tendencies, as illustrated in sport, are by 
faith killed in Christ. The fruit of righteousness is a new-found freedom to assume a 
cruciform posture toward others (opponent, teammate, etc.) because this earthly 
contest is a game concerning skill, play, and other human excellences, not identity. 
Freedom allows athletes to ―live outside themselves in God‖
97
 in order to live 
objectively and other-regarding, which opens them up to the privileged duty to bless 
and serve others. In other words, with nothing to lose metaphysically or existentially, 
contestants are free to share in the test of competition and to encounter the other as 
an authentic human being. Justification implies that a Christian athlete no longer 
enters the sport arena to get, to use, or to prostitute the system and other participants 
of sport.  
     When competition
98
 as a mutual quest is interpreted through the doctrine of 
justification, it is substantively grounded in an ―I-Thou‖ relationship rather than the 
―I-It‖ relationship that arises from neglect to and violation of the orders belonging to 
this world.
99
 This dynamic union or relationship with God in Christ exchanges a 
utilitarian ethic for a Christian ethic, for actions corresponding to the form of Christ, 
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which is God‘s initiation toward us in Christ. These actions witness to the reality of 
the penultimate, which aims at helping others be human and be good. In summary, 
Christian athletes greet others not as a foreign enemy against whom they are battling 
for the high ground, but as fellow image-bearers with whom they are contesting on 
this good day, on this good field, at this (kairos) time before God.  
       Third, a slight variation of the above, the values system of modern sport often 
causes the ―real‖ athlete to strive for distinction by securing accolades, trophies, 
money, and other rewards as proof of their winning status and identity. Justification 
unmasks the illusion that extrinsic goods, such as fame, prestige, honor, or rewards, 
determine my identity. Instead of viewing rewards as a temporal evaluation of a 
performance,
100
 these athletes invest them with symbolic capital as evaluative 
markers of their personal identity. Thus, they are governed by these markers as they 
try to perform for the sake of these tangible benefits or rewards. Justification as the 
final word demythologizes this local narrative by exposing the wrong beliefs, 
motivations, and practices. When Christian sportspersons (and church) transfer their 
trust, affections and allegiance from sport (or whatever the earthly form) to Christ‘s 
redemptive work, they inhabit sport with nothing to lose.  
     Fourth, justification brings a correction to Hoffman‘s short-sighted proposal for 
sport. More precisely, this article of faith serves to complete Hoffman‘s 
underdevelopment of the gospel. But this underdevelopment only proves my point 
that Hoffman‘s theological strategy is lacking in how he reimagines the relationship 
between Christianity and sport. The gospel, as I argued above, lies at the center of a 
Christian ethic. As described in my chapter on Augustine and reinforced with the 
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doctrine of justification, humans are divided selves in a division that only God‘s final 
word can overcome. Hoffman remarkably chronicles the symptoms of the human 
predicament as narrated in the practices and logic of modern sport because these 
symptoms get at or help to detect what is wrong with sport. However, he looks 
vaguely and intermittently to the nature of the gospel and its implications for sport; 
thus, he emphasizes practically a different starting point.   
     Hoffman proposes that ―the first step toward a well-played game will come when 
Christians appreciate the death-grip that big-time sports have on sports played at any 
level and when they recognize how this can snuff out the spiritual potential of 
sports.‖
101
 His focus and starting point is on the practice itself since this is where 
both evangelical muscular Christians and the institutions have instrumentalized the 
goods of sport, thus extinguishing its true spiritual end. It makes sense that he would 
begin from here and would try to repair their ruins. He wants to restore its internal 
goods, that is, its play elements. He later recommends moral education that is 
consistent with a focus on right practices and with how the context informs and 
forms character and the goods native to sport. Evangelical athletes should spend 
more time ―studying the social and ethical dynamics of sport‖,
102
 should consider the 
debauched moral climate of the games,
103
 should keep games from becoming an 
exercise in self-interest,
104
 and should develop and organize games around an ironic, 
serious-non-serious attitude so that sport achieves its desired affectivities.
105
 
                                                 
101
 Hoffman, Good Game, 282.  
102
 Hoffman, Good Game, 284. This list is meant to be representative of the fact that for Hoffman the 
emphases is on communal practices and hence an ethic of character.  
103
 Hoffman, Good Game, 285. 
104
 Hoffman, Good Game, 145-165, 286. 
105
 Hoffman, Good Game, 276-279, 288, 291. 
   313
Certainly, the role of community practices and virtue are important for a Christian 
ethic. Hoffman presents certain sport exemplars (e.g., Pedro Zamball, Andrea Jaeger, 
2002 FIFA match between the bottom ranked teams in the world ranking) whose 
humility and good sportive deeds prepare the way of being human and being good. I 
would add that, for a Christian ethic, the form of Christ being manifested in sport is 
the good, and thus this Christ-reality constitutes God‘s specific way of liberating 
sportive life. Furthermore, it is of no small consequence when virtuous behavior is 
manifest in sport, even if difficult.  
     Hoffman‘s strength is his prophetic call to inveigh against ―competitive excess, 
violence, objectification of opponents and riotous spectators.‖
106
 A Christian ethic 
cannot allow sport to remain as it is, for not attending to sport cares not for the 
penultimate, and it risks hindering the ultimate. Hoffman‘s solutions and 
pronouncement fight against the strongholds that the institutions of sports have had 
on the penultimate. His work proposes concrete ways to intervene in the visible 
world of sport. These ways and means impede the individualism, the retarded social 
conscience, and the pragmatic gospel of modern muscular Christianity. Hoffman‘s 
focus on social practices and conditions is not unique; there has been a groundswell 
of local organizations along with national and international reform movements.
107
 
Furthermore, as an example, Benford, like Hoffman, diagnoses that the problems are 
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systemic, a by-product of political economy and sports culture.
108
 Hoffman does not 
suggest working with these other groups, though it is conceivable that Bonhoeffer 
might hold that such cooperation between the groups can exist, if it is rooted in the 
gospel.
109
 Regardless, the contribution to social change that Hoffman proposes 
remains an activity of the penultimate. Herein lays the problem.  
     Although I believe Bonhoeffer would concur that Hoffman‘s diagnosis and his 
accompanying strategies can introduce significant inroads for ―preparing the way‖ 
and changing the social living conditions that occlude people from believing in God, 
Bonhoeffer distinguishes that they are important precisely because of the ultimate, 
and not the other way around. Underdeveloped for Hoffman is the other side of the 
paradox: the ultimate and what it means in illuminating athletes‘ moral identity and 
their helplessness to extricate themselves from this theologico-ethical problem. If 
sports are forms of culture constructed through social interaction with participation 
―grounded in the decisions made by people in connection with their identities and 
relationships,‖
110
 then who people are makes all the difference regarding what they 
do and what kind of moral community they will enact. Moreover, if evangelicals 
have failed to the extent that Hoffman describes, then for him to weight the 
preponderance of his redemptive strategies on a community that has perverted the 
gospel in sport appears to be inane.
111
 I do not mean that the church should not be the 
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primary agency for removing the obstructions and even for changing social 
conditions in sport since the Christ-reality as centered in the church is paramount in 
Bonhoeffer‘s ethics as formation, but these athletes need to hear the gospel too. 
Thus, the church does provide the language and practices for how to live, but it is the 
gospel itself that redescribes sportive reality and relationships.  
     Hoffman might respond that he heralds the selfsame gospel, yet he does not 
develop the gospel and how it acutely retrains the self and community for those in 
and around sport. Hoffman tries to rehabilitate communal practices for the purpose of 
redeeming sport; however, the problem for evangelical Christians in sport lies with a 
radical misunderstanding and misuse of the gospel and how it relates to sport. This is 
the problem that Hoffman and Mathisen recount repeatedly. The gospel of Jesus 
Christ has been acquired by the narrative and habits of modern sport. Therefore, to 
address the penultimate conditions in sport without equally emphasizing preaching 
and relating the gospel to the identity of these athletes leads sooner or later to the 
demise of the penultimate.
112
 Proclaiming the gospel is the essential mission of the 
church. The church is present, renewed, and extended where the final word of 
justification is spoken and performed.
113
 Of course, for a Christian ethic as proposed 
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by Bonhoeffer and explained thoroughly in this thesis, gospel proclamation is not an 
either-or; however, because ―the penultimate and ultimate are closely bound to one 
another. . . the task is to strengthen the penultimate through a stronger proclamation 
of the ultimate and to protect the ultimate by persevering the penultimate.‖
114
 The 
gospel or justification as the final word exposes the root problem both theologically, 
sociologically, and historically for modern muscular Christianity.  
     Mathisen concludes in his book, which in many ways served as justification for 
this thesis, that evangelical muscular Christians are committed fundamentally to 
evangelizing and saving souls ―with less interest in conceptualizing an a priori 
theological basis for their activity.‖
115
 My argument from Bonhoeffer for a Christian 
ethic of sport contends that justification as the final word is that basis. Hoffman 
further claims that, ultimately, how Christians reflect on and deliberate about the 
complex moral matters in sport depends on their consciences. Unfortunately, as 
Hoffman himself points out, these consciences are malformed, so to turn to the moral 
subject without a clearly articulated, objective final word compromises following 
Christ in sport.
116
 A Christian ethic must confess Jesus Christ if it is to properly 
illumine a sportsperson‘s moral standing and identity. Bonhoeffer warns, ―Only from 
the perspective of the ultimate can we recognize what being human is.‖
117
 
O‘Donovan adds that, in order for a theological ethic to evaluate and interpret 
critically cultural (sport) phenomena, it must do so from the vantage point ―where 
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true knowledge of the moral order is given, under the authority of the gospel.‖
118
 We 
hear this glorious gospel when it is embodied and preached in and through cultural 
activities, such as sport.  
     If the value or goodness of the penultimate is understood in terms of its 
relationship to and participation in the ultimate, then the unnatural life closes or cuts 
itself off from the ultimate when this relationship is forgotten,
119
 thus powerfully 
molding and disciplining our loves toward an alternative end. Let us return to 
Augustine for a closer analysis of the practice of sport itself, an analysis that affirms 
Hoffman‘s, but goes beyond it theologically.  
Augustinian Critique of Misdirected Loves in Sport 
     In this section of this final chapter, I want to draw out Augustine‘s concept of 
ordered and disordered loves as it relates specifically to the moral problem of 
idolatry in sport. As we saw with Paul Weiss‘s proposal, people are attracted to and 
value sport, which, for the Christian tradition, is another way of saying that their 
loves move or pull them toward the plurality of goods that pullulate in this cultural 
practice. Within the matrix of modern sport, there are desires that we should 
cultivate, while at the same time, we should be cultivating appropriate 
dissatisfactions for the latter reveal misdirected longings, cupiditas—idolatry.
120
  
     In particular, one of the most significant features of modern sport that shapes and 
disciplines its telos are the owners, sponsors, nations, promoters, and bureaucratic 
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institutions that either supervise, organize, or fund sports.
121
 For a Christian ethic,
122
 
this social and political context is important for several reasons.  
     To begin, Christian moral reasoning must understand that this phenomenon is 
connected to a wider network of interrelated beliefs and values that give meaning to 
and interpret what is good and desirable in sport. What and how we love as creatures 
characterizes not only individuals but also the entire history of the human drama.
123
   
     Further, a corollary of the first, sports are played, embedded in, and connected to 
other spheres of social life: family, economy, media, politics, education, 
entertainment, etc.
124
 Thus, a Christian ethic for sport must be on guard against a 
narrow construal of sport ethics because the moral matters within sport also include 
wider ethical discussions and socio-cultural contexts.
125
  
     Also, if all of life is lived in light of God as the highest good and hence the proper 
aim of our loves, then worldly concerns, i.e., ―always already are theological: care 
for the world already is a mode of comportment which has as one of its purposes the 
satisfactions of theological longings, however normally misconstrued these longings 
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(and their ‗satisfactions‘) may be.‖
126
 Christian moral reflection and deliberation 
must give heed to the reality that this slice of the City of Man often has competing, 
ultimate loves that revalue and transvalue the goods of sport and life. This evaluation 
of loves is a more focused point that follows from number one.  
     Finally, modern muscular Christianity has historically held a functionalist 
interpretation of sport: it engaged and read sport naively without giving weight to the 
different ideologies, practices, and contexts that affect the meaning, purpose, and 
ethical direction of sport.
127
 Therefore, building on my last section on Bonhoeffer, 
where I examined this problem more from the angle of the moral subject‘s personal 
identity, I endeavor to describe what happens with our loves when a penultimate 
concern is raised to ultimacy.
128
 For a Christian ethic, this area needs much further 
development, but I intend to at least raise the stakes for how Christians understand 
sport as a social practice. I will not suggest or prescribe how we ought to practice 
sport since my aim is to describe this problem theologically. In short, I will use an 
Augustinian basic structure of love, in principle form, to read provisionally what is 
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The Business and Politics of Idols: The Inordinate Love of Power and Money
130
 
     For those who enter sport with blind optimism or idyllic visions of playful leisure 
when the winner was the best ―gentleman‖ competing as an amateur, it only takes an 
elementary reading of the history of sport and one entry through a modern stadium‘s 
turnstile to conclude with deep suspicion that sport might be an ―opiate of the 
masses.‖ Although conflict and critical theories overstate the role of money and 
power in shaping such realities as sport,
131
 they do illumine the tendency (perhaps 
systemic defect) for businesses and political entities to make money and power the 
terminal value, the end that sport serves. Sport ethicist Robert Simon rightly 
considers that an instrumental valuation of sport aptly describes how external values 
functionally conscript sport to serve their goals.
132
 So, Simon interprets these social 
norms as arising from the (dominant) values preferred as best by a particular 
institution and society. 
   Certainly, there is some appeal to valuing sport instrumentally when the use-value 
is for such aspects of our well-being as physical fitness and health. When sport is 
promoted toward these useful and acceptable ends, we can find plenty of instances in 
which people have been bettered. Physical education programs can serve this value 
in many schools. However, even these ends can be politicized, abused, and misused. 
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In addition, this abuse stretches us to consider the role that social location holds for 
the values that we validate. Our moral experiences are not transacted in a 
sociological vacuum. Though at times use-value does yield good consequences, there 
exist some undercurrents rife with disordered love, idolatry. Let us examine how this 
happens in sport with big business and politics. 
     One of the chief problems lies with the starting point. Whether they are useful or 
socially preferred, external goods, such as money or political power tend to supplant 
the value of sport while dehumanizing sportspersons along the way. As for 
supplanting the goods native to sport, Alasdair MacIntyre locates this corrupting 
influence with the institutions whose external goods override the goods internal to 
the practices of sport.
133
  
    For example,
134
 in the 1970s and 1980s, the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR/DDR) used its athletes for political purposes by systematically administering 
illicit drugs (secretly doped anabolic steroids) to athletes with neither their 
knowledge (although in some instances they did know) nor the consent of their 
families.
135
 The medal count at the end of the 1976 Olympics had East Germany 
successfully in third place overall with a total of 90 medals, but we now know that 
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many of these young athletes suffered physically, and some incurred acute damage to 
their bodies. Over 30 years, about 800 athletes experienced serious ailments ranging 
from ―infertility among women, embarrassing hair growth, breast cancer, heart 
problems and testicular cancer.‖
136
 For example, the dosage ingested by sprinters 
Bärbel Wöckel and Marita Koch was nearly double that given to Olympic sprinter 
Ben Johnson.
137
 This inhumane treatment was the by-product of an attempt by the 
institutions in power to prove their political ideal or norm through sport.
138
 Günter 
Erbach, the former State Secretary for Sport under the GDR, commented, ―The social 
function of competitive sport, particularly top-level elite sport, was seen as a means 
of strengthening and presenting the political system of socialism and the state 
through the highest levels of sporting achievement.‖
139
 Hoberman argues that such 
sportive nationalism is a part of the political culture of nations that intentionally 
manage sport policy. For example, Congress passed the American Sports Act in 
1978, which was geared toward promoting American success through international 
sport events, and the Canadian government sought to develop elite athletes for the 
express purpose of national unity only to be reminded by the Ben Johnson‘s drug 
scandal in 1988 that this strategy can easily go awry.
140
 In his brief analysis of sport 
and religion, Jürgen Moltmann adds, ―The superiority of a country‘s sportsmen and 
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sportswomen is to prove the superiority of its [nation‘s] political system.‖
141
 When 
nationalism happens, a country or culture (or even a college, university, or a team, in 
differing degrees) equates meaning and purpose with superiority and ascendancy.  
Instead of maintaining the ontological distinction between God and creation, the 
metaphysical line is drawn between nations or some other competing organizations, 
thus demonizing the other and seeking salvation from the threat of another rival or 
country through a political ideology.
142
 The GDR‘s purpose was to undermine ―West 
Germany‘s claim to be the sole representative of the German nation,‖ to gain 
―international recognition for the GDR,‖ and to increase ―the country‘s influence in 
the politics of sports as well as in world politics.‖
143
 Furthermore, in these kinds of 
instances, since the state is sovereign and its survival is envisaged as absolute, trust 
must be given to its ideology for promoting liberty, prosperity, and peace. This trust 
can come with a heavy price tag. How is this idolatrous? How does an Augustinian 
framework interpret this as disordered love? 
     Because the state (GDR) is autonomous, the athletes in these kinds of sport 
programs forfeit their freedom. Of course, some of this forfeiture is necessary for any 
calling or cultural pursuit by virtue of the opportunity costs or sacrifices that a 
sportsperson does make. But this domination is heteronomy in that the state 
privileges itself to know what is best by controlling athletes‘ future success and 
livelihood (i.e., the top athletes were afforded jobs, military deferments, and new 
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accommodations), which is witnessed to by the selection and testing that began at 
young ages in these sport programs.
144
 Who does not want to guarantee a path to 
success for self and family, all for the praise and honor of nation or state? These 
athletes were socialized to accept a vision of what appeared good and necessary for 
the good life. This vision of what is good is problematic.  
     In the first place, the object of their desire is not directed to the true end of life 
(God), which means their desires are cut off from their true source and end and 
cultivated wrongly within this system of sport.
145
 There are no critical reflections on 
ends and values. To possess and to be oriented toward success (for the sake of 
political status) in this way is inappropriate to human fulfillment. According to 
Augustine,
146
 this kind of person is unhappy because, even though it appears that 
these athletes have what they want, it is in fact not good for them, bringing personal 
hurt instead. They were duped and cheated, for they received what is not desirable.  
     The harm came to the GDR athletes not only because drugs were administered to 
them but also because the state expected too much from them as their means to the 
ultimate good. This expectation abuses their finitude.
147
 Paradoxically, although it at 
first might appear to be an overly serious account of sport, it turns out that the GDR 
also trivialized sport and its practitioners by not respecting the goodness and worth of 
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humans according to their God-given nature. Essentially, the GDR did not love its 
athletes enough. The GDR‘s love was improper to who the athletes were; thus, it 
failed in how it expressed its love toward its own athletes. Therefore, instead of 
making God its goal and axiological centre and then properly relating, respecting, 
and enjoying sportive and human goods in God, the GDR instrumentalized these 
athletes toward its socially constructed value of power. The GDR played the desires 




     In addition, the GDR‘s commitments reflect a direction of love that aims for glory 
from human beings and praise from its own people and the wider political 
community. The GDR‘s love determined that it glorify human achievements, worldly 
success via athletic performances. It invested sport with ultimate meaning, molding 
people into ―socialist personae,‖ strengthening its native people‘s identification with 
these sport heroes and the system itself.
149
  
     By constructing a perception that West Germany (and others) was its rival, the 
GDR created an outsider that posed an external threat; thus, it had something to 
defeat and prove itself against. The GDR pressed sport and the goods it offers into 
the service of its goals of legitimacy and peace. Sage comments that the ideological 
work of sportive nationalism is to maintain and create social stability, and the 
mechanism of sport is used (innocuously) to inculcate people to accept and to bolster 
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current social arrangements.
150
 Similarly, Augustine signals that this kind of social 
arrangement was true for the Roman republic because it used fear, law, and desirable 
goods to achieve its quest and desire for peace.
151
 Moreover, for Augustine,
152
 such 
things as public games and theatre were wielded by the powers of the state as 
―hidden persuaders‖ to communicate, arouse, and rehearse visions of the good life.
153
  
     In an effort to keep this vision alive, when the GDR selected an athlete to 
compete, it demanded a level of service beyond what is normal for most young 
children and teenagers--they often were separated from their parents, sent to attend 
special sport universities or schools, and made to train for hours to assure ascendancy 
for the nation. Co-dependency resulted because the state was sovereign neither in its 
power nor in its knowledge of its rivals. Thus, its fragility required that it pay 
constant attention to its athletes to ensure that they out-perform others (the state 
needed the athletes). In turn, the athletes faced the looming fear that they would be 
cut, dismissed, or lose privileges if they failed to achieve the state‘s expectations and 
instead brought shame to family and nation (the athletes needed the state). The two 
groups meet at the point of idolatry, inordinate love. In order to maintain this 
relationship, the athletes were compelled to objectify what the state wanted, and the 
state was under a similar compulsion if it wanted to maintain and control the freedom 
and peace supposedly propagated by its ideology. In his profoundly simple 
theological account of idolatry, Luke Johnson claims that this is idolatry‘s course: 
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―The objects of our worship require our constant attention if they are to remain gods, 
because they have no necessity of their own… The essential sign of an idolatrous 
spirit, therefore, is compulsion, which is simply a clinical term for enslavement.‖
154
  
     A telling biblical account of the kind of manipulation and bondage that 
compulsion foments is found in 1 Kings 18. In their attempt to get their god to 
answer by fire, the prophets of Baal called out frantically for hours, only to resort to 
extreme behavior, mutilating and harming their own bodies (1 Kings 18:28). Like a 
modern day parallel to this story, the German Democratic Republic under no less a 
real power inflicted harm and pain on these athletes for the sake of their god, 
boosting itself above others (ontological), perverting reality (ideological), 
diminishing freedom and using athletes (ethical and teleological), and engendering 
trust (doxological). As ―diplomats in tracksuits,‖
155
 the athletes were in essence the 
scapegoats to deliver the GDR from the perceived evil or enemy identified with other 
nations‘ ideology. Lying deep within the GDR‘s institution of sport (Physical Culture 
and Sport) was a constellation of powers—social, political, and economic—that 
dominated sportspersons through this mechanism of the ruling party (SED) (die 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands).
156
 Sport is a discipline in this system 
where athletes conform to what the system desires: good athletes for the sake of 
national interests. Thus, ―sport functioned as part of the system of domination in 
which the will of the party [SED] was imposed entirely.‖
157
 Augustine names this 
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kind of disciplining of desire and seeking of power libido dominandi and locates its 
roots in the City of Man.
158
 Rowan Williams specifies that  
Preoccupation with achievement brings in its wake a preoccupation with power 
and pre-eminence: the whole point of the quest for glory lies in the urge to gain 
advantage over another. In contrast, the love and longing for goodness which 




When this variety of idolatry occurs, it requires the strange world of scripture to 
absorb this phenomenon as a pattern of this world (Romans 12:1-2),
160
 thus exposing 
it for what it is—demonic. On one level, a powerful institution deprived these 
athletes of their freedom and dignity, but on an ultimate level, this power exercises 
demonic force and attraction on this whole unredeemed sphere.
161
 Although this 
concept borders on the paranormal for our technocratic modern world, the Bible 
magnifies this scene as a deceitful partnership involving misplaced worship and 
allegiance from all. Ironically and prophetically, Karl Barth associated these 
problems and perversities in the created order, specifically sport, with the work of 
―the lordless powers‖—those alienated forces, both human and demonic, that wreak 
havoc on man‘s abilities and activities.
162
 Barth asserted, ―Today what is called sport 
seems to have become the playground of a particular earth-spirit.‖
163
 In this case, the 
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deviance perpetrated by those in power is a kind of idolatry. However, because this 
face of idolatry is so complex, it points to forces that are neither human nor simply 
demonic, but as Walter Wink suggests, the kind of idolatrous powers that an 
institution or system can embody as a life of its own.
164
 That is, this idolatrous power 
is a spiritual force emanating from a real institution, such as the GDR, that values a 
way of life antithetical to God by making its interests the summum bonum,
165
 a power 
consistent with the kingdom of darkness and the prince of that domain.  
     Because the GDR fixated on this nonmoral good (i.e., political superiority), it 
contravened the human rights of these contestants and the goods internal to sport. 
Utilitarianism (the greatest good for the greatest number of people)—the apparent 
method of moral reasoning—―cannot accommodate the distinction between goods 
internal to and goods external to a practice,‖ thus violating the moral worth of these 
innocent athletes and degrading the practice of sport.
166
 What is more, this 
justification transvalued the morally horrible (inhumane treatment) for a greater good 
because it was believed to produce more benefit. As an implication, utilitarianism in 
this context was unable to perceive the depth of the moral outrage because it failed to 
assign moral blame or even to account for the denigration of the moral worth of these 
sportspersons. Robert M. Adams raises a similar point regarding how often ethical 
theories fail to account for the morally repulsive or horrible.
167
 Of course, not all 
moral problems in general nor in sport fall into this category, but abuses of power, 
such as this and some forms of violence in sports today, exact a toll on those theories 
                                                 
164
 Walter Wink, The Powers That Be (New York: Augsburg Fortress, 1998), 22-36. 
165
 Wink, The Powers That Be, 28-29.  
166
 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 198.  
167
 Robert M. Adams, ―Moral Horror and the Sacred,‖ Journal of Religious Ethics 23 (1995): 201-203. 
   330
that neglect to elucidate the gravity of these deeds. Idolatry plumbs the depths of 
these kinds of problems at a basement level that few others can.   
     Sport sociologist D. Stanley Eitzen locates deviance ―in the structural conditions 
of society and in the organization found therein.‖
168
 However, as part of its larger 
story, the Christian interpretation unmasks these kinds of moral problems by 
incorporating other dimensions of reality, such as the spiritual (certainly manifested 
in social institutions), which includes humans, the demonic, and ideologies. The 
GDR‘s ideology was a skewed conception of reality that arose from a basic religious 
orientation that was thoroughly humanistic. These athletes competed and labored 
within this belief system, which was a network of idols from within and without. 
Eitzen limits his analysis to the system and even calls other options, such as original 
sin, genetics, and evil psyches, shallow explanations.
169
 Indeed, Eitzen gets at many 
features of the problem as understood through a sociological critical lens, one which 
a Christian should culturally understand and employ. However, to limit our analysis 
to Eitzen‘s level is a false choice, for there are other dimensions of reality in a 
Christian worldview that cannot be reduced to economics and power–dimensions 
that enable us to more fully understand the ethics of this cultural discourse. Alasdair 
McFadyen explicates this point as the radical nature of sin, for ―there is an 
underlying, systemic and structural distortion of the conditions of human sociality, of 
the most basic patterns of disposition which constitute our personal identities, and 
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which underlie our actions.‖
170
 We enter this world—encountering and assuming a 
number of selves or roles (i.e., citizen, child, family member, etc.)—under these 
radical conditions that are due to moral corruption, which constrains our freedoms 
and is intensified with our own choices to sin. Furthermore, even if one were to grant 
that social conditions explain these moral degradations, to make social conditions the 
source of evil is problematic. We must ask, where does this come from? 
Notwithstanding the other important issues of personhood, freedom, and moral 
responsibility (beyond the scope of this chapter), the effects of sin and idolatry run 
like a jagged edge that distorts and pollutes all relationships that we as humans have 
with God, others, ourselves, nature, and things. As fallen humans and against modern 
sentiments, this excessive or inordinate love (idolatry) is a result of both nature and 
nurture. 
     As an analogue, Morgan concludes that this same pernicious system rears its head 
with the commodification of sport. Commodification occurs when the valuing of 
sport shifts from the goods of sport (internal practices) to the market value 
determined by the business side of sport.
171
 With their utilitarian, cost-benefit grid, 
businesses neglect to attend to these kinds of goods because sport, like any other 
commodity, is ―something to be marketed, packaged, and sold… The consequence of 
the process of commodification is that the multifarious forms of human activity lose 
their unique and distinct qualities to the principles of the market.‖
172
 Again, 
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degradation results because these external, use-value goods do not adequately take 
into account how their use (toward the service of money and power) is morally 
connected to the meaning of sport and the moral identity of the sporting participants. 
Consequently, this idolatrous feature proves both the ignorance (toward God‘s 
prescriptions) and moral callousness of businesses that capitulate to market forces, 
for supply and demand do not care about these moral problems unless businesses 
perceive (egoistically) that moral degradation might jeopardize the maximization 
(read greed!) of their exchange-value (profit and power).
173
 When big donors, 
sponsors, shareholders, or alumni hear about some moral impropriety (especially 
when it is reported by the media), universities, sport governing bodies, and the 
professional leagues often rally to censure such behavior because this moral problem 
effects public image, power bases, and profitability. In other words, the ethic of this 
variety of idolatry, strictly speaking, is incompetent to account for ethics in sport 
because its norms and values are non-sport-specific. Ironically, with an idolatrous 
twist, businesses tacitly work from the assumption that enough residual value 
remains in sport that institutions and businesses would even care for their purposes 
and preferences to be expressed or marketed through this medium.
174
 Perhaps, too 
crass of an example, but the parasitic nature of idolatry (evil) can only exist when the 
substance or structure of something is good; this is a goodness that people are prone 
to misuse or inordinately misdirect.
175
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     Moltmann identifies this problem as ―the estrangement of sport from its own 
particular experience of life.‖
176
 This horizontal estrangement bears the mark of a 
deeper estrangement from God; it characterizes our restless condition as human 
beings who desperately need a center and source for meaning and purpose. 
Therefore, when money, power, and prestige as external goods command and 
dominant this discourse, they exact a crippling effect. Christopher Lasch attests to 
this crippling effect with the trivialization of sport by invasive (and often sensational) 
media-driven and corporate tactics—exploding scoreboards, television time-outs, 
half-time shows bordering on burlesque—that serve to intensify the desire for 
consumption, the cult of the spectacle.
177
 Maybe Tertullian and Augustine were not 
too polemical after all, for this kind of behavior witnesses to the panem et circenses 
of Rome, but with a power even more global than the Caesars‘. The patrons of sport 
today who wield imperialist power belong to the market forces of capitalism (e.g., 
Nike, ESPN, and the NFL), thus permeating and influencing all nations with respect 
to sport.  
    In summary, the symptoms that result from this variety of idolatry as illustrated 
with the GDR express in a Christian ethic what Augustine knew as the disordered 
love of people who immorally pursue their own perceived happiness and destroy the 
order of this sphere of life. As a critical choice, this option depicts a kind of character 
that enters the wide gate (Matt. 6:13-14), serves mammon (Matt, 6:24), hates and 
despises God‘s wisdom (Prov. 1:28-33) and chooses death and destruction (Deut. 
30:11-20). As members of the sport community, sportspersons from the GDR were 
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discriminated against because who and what was selected was ordered by greed and 
irrelevant consequences--consequences ruled by an idolatrous master. Whenever 
idolatry occurs, morally harmful actions are justified irrespective of the norms of 
sport or the value of human life. If sport as a form of play is a substantive good of 
our humanity that expresses freedom and joy, then when it is valued more for    
the sake of one‘s country, or in honour of socialism, or as a supreme 
achievement of capitalistic meritocracy—these are alienations, misuses and 
obliterations of the fundamental human dimension of sport, which is therefore 




     Theologically, a Christian ethic interprets this value exchange as a teleological 
confusion between the use and enjoyment of a good like sport.
179
 According to 
Augustine, there are two classes of things: those (goods) we are meant to enjoy, 
which make us happy, and those (goods) we are meant to use, which ―assist‖ our 
path to happiness.
180
 Since God is the only good we value for its own sake, then all 
others goods ―must hold a subordinate position.‖
181
 Enjoyment (frui) is the ―attitude 
we entertain towards things we value for themselves, and ‗use‘ (uti), the attitude we 
entertain towards things we value for the sake of something else.‖
182
 The aim of our 
desires dynamically sets in motion what we love and how we love, manifesting 
whether we are enjoying God and referring properly all others loves to him.
183
 Thus, 
a Christian ethic resists this idolatrous exchange so that sport as a penultimate good 
is lovingly related to and enjoyed in God, which is a splendid experience. 
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     In summary, this chapter thus far has been about two important themes in relation 
to how Christians think about and inhabit sport itself: integration and disintegration. 
According to Bonhoeffer‘s paradigm, a Christian ethic for sport properly integrates 
the church‘s commitment to the ultimate amid the penultimate of sport. This problem 
of integration has been a perennial problem for modern muscular Christianity and for 
evangelicals in general. However, even if the final word discharges a person‘s moral 
identity, the forces at work within and without can frustrate and morally debilitate a 
person‘s most promising end and good. With Augustine, I reflected on disordered 
loves, a form of idolatry, which threatens to undo or disintegrate the natural life, the 
penultimate activity of sport. Finally, in this last section, I want to continue with 
Christian reflection by providing another paradigm that complements Bonhoeffer and 
Augustine, so as to ground moral reflection and to integrate how sport can be related 
to the ultimate.  
     John Paul II proposes that 1 Corinthians 9:24-27 includes sport among the human 
values and offers a paradigm
184
 to recognize ―the fundamental validity of sport, 
considering it not just as a term of comparison to illustrate higher ethical and 
aesthetic ideal, but also in its intrinsic reality as a factor in the formation of man as a 
part of his culture and his civilization.‖
185
 My use of this athletic image is not meant 
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to encapsulate all the other theoretical constructs that this thesis has employed for 
how Christians think theologically about sport; rather, it is another paradigm for 
interpreting and engaging ethically the complex lived experience of sport itself. In 
fact, this metaphor is unable to stand as the organizing image for a theological ethic.   
     First, this metaphor is not a root metaphor for interpreting all sportive actions. As 
I have described in this thesis, sport consists of a number of markers, namely, the 
play and aesthetic elements, which St. Paul‘s metaphor simply does not illumine. If 
this metaphor served primarily to help theologically interpret and imagine sport in 
the Christian life, it would be reductionistic, neglecting equally important dimensions 
of sport and the human actor herself. St. Paul‘s use of this metaphor is specific to his 
Corinthian correspondence and his co-text. It does not exhaust this complex human 
activity. Furthermore, the practice of sport can inculcate and realize a number of 
virtues, yet St. Paul only focuses on self-control. Although self-control is especially 
important in modern sport, sport demands other virtues as well, such as trust and 
honesty.  
     Second, the nature of any metaphor is for comparison, not necessarily for a 
wholesale adoption or justification of the actual thing or image used in the 
comparison. For example, St. Paul‘s use of the soldier analogy should not be 
construed as necessarily justifying a Christian ethic on war. Instead, I describe below 
how this metaphor imaginatively links Scripture to the phenomenon of sport and 
what it implies for the actual practice of sport.  
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     Third, if this metaphor is divorced from the other aspects of my theological 
foundation for sport--namely, human dignity, sign, gift, and Christocratic structure of 
reality--I fear that it again opens a Christian ethic to the charge of idealism that has 
undermined Christians‘ past attempts to integrate their Christian faith and sport. This 
metaphor as a standalone image illumines the spiritual life itself, but actions are 
performed for the sake of a higher goal or end while not telling us about the 
uselessness or autotelic element of sport as play. In other words, to participate in 
sport does not only involve moral or spiritual excellence, however important that 
may be, but it also entails a plurality of excellences and goods that are both internal 
and external to the practice of sport itself. In this form of life, a Christian ethic must 
be on guard against making some goods so important that in earnest zeal it overlooks 
the freedom and richness of the trivial nature of play itself.  
     For this thesis, the use of the biblical paradigm is important especially since, as 
Mathisen argues, modern muscular Christianity is guilty of folk theologizing when 
they interpret St. Paul‘s sporting metaphors. The charge is that these texts have been 
used primarily from the perspective of sports subculture.
186
 I intend to follow John 
Paul II‘s interpretation and moral reasoning in order to demonstrate how 1 
Corinthian 9:24-27 can be used in Christian ethics as a paradigm for moral reflection 
on sport. Though this final section of the thesis gives further warrant for how to think 
theologically about sport, more work is necessary to create a fuller Christian ethic of 
sport.  
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St. Paul’s Sport Metaphor: Paradigmatic for Moral Realities in Sport 
     John Paul II biblically explicates the value of sport by appealing to St. Paul‘s own 
use of an athletic metaphor in 1 Corinthians 9:24-27 to infer that sport is a human 
value.
187
 Curran instructs that John Paul II‘s use of Scripture in general is consistent 
with Vatican II and its call for a renewal of moral theology nourished by the primary 
source of scripture.
188
 Specifically in his moral teachings on sport, John Paul II does 
not develop any kind of critical exegesis but bases his ethic on meditative and 
homiletical reflection on and exposition of scripture, which insists on paradigmatic 
moral realities.
189
 Following John Paul II‘s meditative method, I will draw out some 
important theological principles from this paradigm‘s meaning for Christian 
sportspersons today. John Paul II theologically reads this passage, not unlike any 
other theology,
190
 as an important metaphor for moral discernment concerning how 
to live virtuously in sport and life.  
     A brief explanation of this passage serves the reader before addressing John Paul 
II‘s use of it. Alois Koch observes that this passage has been a favorite of the last 
popes in the twentieth century, with Pope Pius XII referring to it as the ―Sport 
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Epistle.‖
191
 As a human value, according to John Paul II, sport gave St. Paul a point 
of contact to dialogue about the gospel in the Hellenistic culture and to compare the 
athletic life to the ―higher ethical and aesthetic ideal.‖
192
 The athletic metaphor 
signifies themes and values of St. Paul‘s contemporary culture.
193
 This athletic 
imagery or the agōn motif is a classic topos surviving from Hellenistic literature.
194
 
St. Paul‘s readers would undoubtedly have been familiar with this theme since the 
Greek world attended the Games at Isthmus every second year.
195
 Moreover, the 
point of similarity between this imagery and the Christian life only holds if there is 
some explicit connection, something the two things share in common, between the 
human value of sport and the Christian life; however, that does not mean that all 
aspects of the analogy are transferred. If we fail to understand this incomplete 
transfer, we fail to understand the nature of a metaphor in the first place. Nor, as 
stated above, does this sport metaphor mean that this image can function as a root 
metaphor for interpreting all human actions in sport. This motif especially fits the 
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Corinthian ethos because they had an inordinate, competitive concern for the 
individual to attain a privileged status.
196
 However, against their competitive striving 
and self-adulation, St. Paul adopts the symbolism of this metaphor to admonish all 
Corinthian believers, not merely the individual believer, ―to accept the full 
commitment of following Christ.‖ This commitment is compared to the total 
commitment of an athlete who trains for the games.
197
 Garland makes it clear that by 
no means does St. Paul‘s metaphor compare the Christian life in toto to competitive 
sport in the sense of outdoing or outperforming others to the point that some endure 
the shame of defeat,
198
 for that is contrary to the very essence of Christianity. Nor 
should the reader reduce the Christian life to the lone athlete training and struggling 
by herself in order to obtain some first-place prize; there were no team sports in the 
original games, so this aspect of the metaphor does not transfer. The root of the 
argument, according to Garland, ―is that simply entering a race and running does not 
automatically qualify one as a winner.‖
199
 The Christian life, like sport, requires a 
certain kind of effort, a virtuous striving, that participation itself does not 
guarantee.
200
 Hence, St. Paul goes on to develop this metaphor (verses 25-27), 
paying particular attention to self-control as a virtue, along with the proper goal or 
aim needed in the Christian life in order for all Christians to eschatologically realize 
the real reward or objective. Both Collins and Horsley note that St. Paul‘s 
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eschatological perspective serves as a subversive twist to the agōn motif with the 
contrast in verse 25 between ―a perishable victory wreath and an imperishable 
one....‖
201
 This contrast invokes and invites for reflection the qualitative difference 
between sports and the Christian life.
202
 The latter point, a shift from the natural to 
the supernatural, brings us directly back to John Paul II, who finds in this agōn motif 
―the elements for outlining not only anthropology but an ethic and also a theology of 
sport which highlights all its value.‖
203
 Let us look at how this paradigm 
theologically informs his sport ethic.  
     To begin, John Paul II begins with the human value of sport because, as I argued 
in chapter three, the truth about the human person is central to his personalism and is 
a main problem of contemporary human beings.
204
 Thus, the human value of sport is 
inseparably linked to the human person, from which such cultural aspirations and 
activities arise. If this is true, then for John Paul II ―the fundamental validity of 
sport‖ is based on God‘s plan set forth for his image-bearers in creation. Although it 
may be contested to what degree St. Paul actually endorses sport through his use of 
the agōn motif, John Paul II nevertheless fuses the sportive activity of the human 
person in general with the creation, incarnation, and redemption horizon. According 
to Genesis, man was given the mission to creatively make and develop culture, which 
witnesses to his own humanity as made by God.
205
 Again, sport is an aspect of this 
cultural commission, an aspect that John Paul II interprets as valid in St. Paul‘s literal 
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use of the sport metaphor. In other words, it is a metaphor that signifies a 
fundamental good because of the positive value that Catholic theology affirms about 
any cultural reality belonging to human beings. John Paul II believes that St. Paul 
builds from the teaching of Jesus, whose incarnation and redemption affirm the real 
meaning of what it means to be human, a human in any sphere of life.
206
 
Participating in play, games, and sport is part of what it means to be human. 
Therefore, according to John Paul II, in this Corinthian context, St. Paul is witnessing 
to the intrinsic reality of human development and fulfillment that the gospel affirms 
and directs properly to man‘s true end. John Paul II declares that St. Paul  
established the Christian attitude towards this [sport] as towards the other  
expressions of man‘s natural faculties such as science, learning, work, art, love, 
and social and political commitment. Not an attitude of rejection or flight, but 





We observe the Catholic Church‘s ―openness‖ because sport comes from our 
―natural‖ abilities, as gifts intrinsic to how God made human beings. 
     Further, St. Paul‘s use of the agōn motif in verse 25-27 emphasizes self-control 
(enkrateuetai). In this passage, St. Paul‘s thoughts center on the broad spiritual virtue 
of self-control that he elsewhere identifies in a catalogue of other virtues as a 
significant trait of a mature Christian (Gal.5.22-23).
208
 Most insist that the sense of 
this virtue as adopted by St. Paul for this aspect of the agōn motif is ―to exercise self-
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discipline‖
209
 or self-denial; it ―refers to ‗vigorous control of appetite and 
passion.‘‖
210
 Hence, John Paul II claims that St. Paul‘s symbolism places the 
emphasis on ―the interior and spiritual significance of sport: ‗Every athlete exercises 
self-control in all things‘ (1 Cor 9:25).
211
 This recognizes the healthy dose of 
balance, self-discipline, sobriety, and therefore, in a word, of virtue, which is implied 
in the practice of sport.‖
212
 John Paul II, not unlike St. Paul and others in Hellenic 
literature, interprets the realization of self-control with the practice of sport. He 
further infers that St. Paul‘s use of self-denial instills the necessity not only to train 
athletic muscles but also to train the spirit through the exercise of the cardinal and 
theological virtues.
213
 How does he reach this conclusion in light of his philosophy of 
human action? 
     John Paul II‘s conception of sport praxis fits St. Paul‘s image of an athlete 
deliberately exercising her free choice with the effect of self-control. As noted above 
in Laborem exercens, John Paul II distinguishes two primary aspects when referring 
to human praxis. In this Corinthian passage, he associates self-control as a virtue that 
forms the sportsperson and that thus is linked to the intransitive dimension of human 
action. When construed and practiced correctly, which St. Paul assumes lest an 
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athlete be disqualified, sport is a practice that affords the development and 
fulfillment of virtues, an immanent activity of the human person. For John Paul II, 
sport is an activity that can ennoble humans individually.
214
  
     John Paul II goes on to explicate that the virtues discovered and expressed in sport 
correspond to the moral order itself. This is important because the goods or values 
internal to sport have an ―onto-logic‖ to them.
215
 How a person plays sport is not 
determined solely by the practice since that determination could easily justify some 
kind of relativism, but by whether the goods realized in the practice correspond to an 
order already given in the purposes of the moral order. John Paul II summarizes that 
To be a good sportsman, one must have honesty with oneself and with others, 
loyalty, moral strength (over and above physical strength), perseverance, a spirit 
of collaboration and sociability, generosity, broadness of outlook and attitude, 
and ability to live in harmony with others and to share: all these requirements 




     Just as John Paul II addresses the category of human praxis in economic and 
social relations, so does he apply it to the sport discourse. The nature of sport praxis, 
according to his Thomistic conception of human action, affords an athlete the 
opportunity to form himself through his actions, which remain in the subject:
217
 ―The 
priority of the human being as the subject of activity has fundamental significance 
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for the constitution of culture through human praxis.‖
218
 Because the activity of sport 
arises from the fact that a human being already exists (operari sequitur esse), St. 
Paul‘s appeal to this cultural activity makes sense to John Paul II. What remains in 
the subject, the I-act, are virtues, such as self-control. In Acting Person, Karol 
Wojtyla draws on these kinds of ―man-acts‖ (―I act‖) as the kinds that constitute the 
essential experience of efficacy.
219
 Efficacy is the experience that the actor realizes 
dynamically as the agent who self-causes her actions versus passively experiencing 
something that happens within herself.
220
 This kind of action is an ethical experience 
in that the good actions that comprise the virtue of self-control are owned by the 
agent who causes these acts. Karol Wojtyla comments that we truthfully accept these 
actions as our own because they are moral in nature and thus fall in the domain of 
moral responsibility. Therefore, when John Paul II indexes self-control from St. Paul, 
it is precisely an ethical experience that he has in mind. The moral agent, like the 
image of the athlete, can freely choose to master her appetites and passions, whether 
they are realized inwardly or spiritually as self-control.  
     Closely following the last point, sport can be an effective ―school of human 
formation and personal in [sic] maturity.‖
221
 Since virtues like self-control, tenacity, 
and sacrifice train the will,
222
 this school as a practice has educative significance.
223
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When acting-sportspersons perform certain acts of self-discipline—acts in which the 
decision to do X is caused by the good of the desired object,
224
 (which in this passage 
is for the sake of the gospel)—this immanent activity leaves its marks and fruit in the 
human person. Pfitzner elaborates that the ―apostle [Paul] also knew that grace calls 
and equips its recipients for hard work! The image of the striving athlete implies 
intense effort and application of all one‘s energies, but Paul‘s main focus is always 
on the goal of Christian striving.‖
225
 John Paul II imagines that, when sport is 
practiced accordingly, it ―has in itself an important moral and educative significance: 
it is a training ground of virtue, a school of inner balance and outer control, an 
introduction to more true and lasting conquests.‖
226
 Thus, he construes sport as a 
―human and social phenomenon that has such importance and influence on people‘s 
way of acting and thinking today.‖
227
  
     The logic of sport is governed by its telos. I believe that John Paul II discerns that 
St. Paul‘s use of this metaphor imaginatively situates the Corinthian church (and the 
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implied reader) in this symbolic world to reread their own lives.
228
 John Paul II 
deduces that the sacrifice or self-control in order to achieve certain results (1 Cor 
9:25) is not merely a logic of sport, but it is also the logic of life and the gospel, for 
―without sacrifices, important results are not obtained, or even genuine 
satisfaction.‖
229
 Just as sport is directed toward a desired end and affects the actions 
chosen by sportspersons as they play it, so too the logic of the gospel directs 
Christians toward their intended end of eternal life. Again, the point of similarity 
means that the two share this in common. Therefore, St. Paul values this similarity, 
and yet he does not leave it merely at this level of comparison. John Paul II asserts 
that  
It was appropriate, then, for Paul to refer to athletic contests in order to spur the 
Christians of that city to push themselves to the utmost in the "race" of life. In 
the stadium races, he says, everyone runs, even if only one is the winner: you too 
run. . . . With this metaphor of healthy athletic competition, he highlights the 





John Paul II follows the whole discourse (8:1-11:1) eschatologically, with his 
homiletical attention given to the eternal goal (imperishable). St. Paul specifies that 
the gospel itself is the telos that frames how he practices evangelism (1 Cor 9:23) and 
how the Corinthian church should handle the problem of eating meat that had been 
offered to idols (1 Cor 8). St. Paul chooses to exercise his freedom for the sake of the 
gospel, which when accomplished, glorifies God in all areas of life, particularly the 
mundane (1 Cor 10: 31-33). St. Paul makes an a fortiori argument with this 
comparison between the two different goals of both endeavors. That is, if 
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sportspersons strive with this kind of exacting discipline toward a fading, temporal 
crown, how much more should Christians maintain self-control for the sake of a 
higher, enduring goal--an imperishable crown?
231
 This goal has some immediate 
implications for how a Christian ethic construes sport.  
     First, the eternal goal for a Christian ethic invests this end with an eschatological 
element because the natural ends of earthly activities such as sport are not sufficient 
by themselves.
232
 If sport points to horizontal ends, the Christian gospel 
transformatively deepens and directs the Christian sportsperson to her ultimate 
fulfillment and relationship with God, a vertical end.
233
 What is objectified and 
externalized in sportive action (human praxis) is transitive, passing away and dying, 
while what is formed in the human person is intransitive and rises to another level in 
the hierarchy of values.
234
 Thus, the sport narrative is subordinate to the scope and 
weight of this gospel metanarrative.
235
 The ultimate or supernatural determines and 
judges what the flourishing of this narrative, belonging to the natural life, is to be.
236
 
Therefore, this end relativizes and resolves any conflict.  
     Second, because of this a fortiori argument, a Christian sportsperson‘s moral 
responsibility is not simply to respect the game (fair play) but also to maintain her 
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higher responsibilities. A Christian in sport has a higher, more binding responsibility 
to the gospel. John Paul II claims that this goal of eternal life means the more 
excellent way of love (1 Cor 12:31), which requires Christians to serve the growth of 
God‘s kingdom in a sportsperson‘s life and in the world.
237
 St. Paul‘s own example 
of sacrifice and self-control (1 Cor 9:12) was to ―endure all things,‖ and he later 
instructs his Corinthian audience that this sacrifice and self-control indeed is love (1 
Cor 13:5, 7).
238
 Therefore, the exercise of self-control for the sake of the gospel 
exhibits a form of Christian love. For a Christian ethic and sports, John Paul II 
concludes that our aim is to build a culture of love in sport over against a civilization 
that gives higher priority to goods of production and consumption, which are purely 
utilitarian and hedonistic considerations.
239
  
     Third, self-control in sport is not practiced for the sake of self or sports. A gospel-
directed life in sport is an other-directed life, as evidenced by St. Paul‘s own example 
in ministry (1 Cor 9:15-23). A Christian ethic does not stop with a personal ethic in 
sport because striving in sport pertains to the free course of the gospel.
240
 Following 
St. Paul‘s example and aim, then this means that the ennobling power of the gospel is 
not merely a training ground for individual virtues, but rather, the gospel is a ―getting 
on together‖ that is possible only in a network of mutual relations.
241
 More broadly, 
if this is a school of virtue, sport, as a shared activity in the interpersonal sense, can 
and should promote mutual fellowship.   
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     Fourth, more precisely, the imperishable wreath or crown (1 Cor 9:26) is the 
eschatological blessing of salvation, the consummation of the gospel. This 
otherworldly focus, which Christians participate in now, is a life of virtue and fidelity 
to Christ that determines how Christians relate in sport and life. Furthermore, since 
for a Christian ethic, virtue is eschatological rather than merely teleological, 
ultimately this goal is not something realized by our own efforts, as if the efforts in 
sport or life bring about an incomplete telos.
242
 John Paul II reckons that this 
‗imperishable crown‘ is a gift received from God,
243
 while at the same time, as St. 
Paul recognized, it is also something aimed for in light of the promised resurrection 
(1 Cor 9:24-26; 1 Cor 15; Phil 3:8-21). This telos puts sports back on its heels 
because this is an activity that should not be taken too seriously but rather should be 
viewed as a splendid occasion to enjoy freely and responsibly the goods of this 
cultural activity.  
     In summary, John Paul II believes that St. Paul valued sport for its intrinsic reality 
to form persons and for how Christians then and now ought to conduct themselves, 
including Christians in sport. This focal image of the athlete orders his acceptance of 
sport as a human value—especially against the modern demands of life and work that 
often preclude or dampen the time for sport and leisure—for an athlete can choose to 
become somebody. When these kinds of goods are made manifest in the kingdom of 
sport, they serve as concrete examples for how Christians redemptively participate 
with Christ in his kingly office over sport for the primacy and enhancement of the 
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good of persons.
244
 According to John Paul II, when sport is practiced this way, it 
―acquires an ethical and formative value, and is a valid school of virtue for life,‖
245
 
thus opening up and directing souls to the transcendent dimension of faith. He 
exhorted his audiences regularly to see this redemptive mission not only for 
themselves personally, but also at the collective level, so that ―it may become a 
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     In this thesis, I have formulated a modest Christian ethic of sport as a way 
forward for speaking theologically to this area of public life for which Christians in 
North America have lacked a theologically informed rationale and critique.  
     Augustine substantiated the fact that, since God is a good creator, all created and 
cultural goods ultimately derive their value from God. If sport is valued in such a 
way that we love others and the goods of the game toward God, then this love is 
morally praiseworthy, but if we love it as an ultimate end, then it is morally 
blameworthy; it is idolatry. Furthermore, Augustine‘s view that our bodies are 
structurally good opened a way to more completely realize other goods intimately 
connected to this particular aspect of human activity. That is, if sport operates in the 
Christian tradition as a form of play and human excellence (basic goods) among 
other goods specific to this practice, then it is a determinative feature of our 
humanity as embodied selves who play and excel. These embodied goods specific to 
sport are important because the value of sports inheres in the activity itself as a 
capability and function of our God-created humanity.   
     John Paul II, contrary to Paul Weiss, contributed to a Christian ethic by furthering 
Augustine‘s thought specific to the goodness of embodied life in sport. John Paul II‘s 
theology of sport identified a direct relationship between who we are as embodied 
humans and what sport is as a practice for realizing a plurality of goods or 
excellences unique to our personhood. John Paul II‘s personalist anthropology 
specifies our human fulfillment and dignity in Christ. As Christians, our sportive 
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actions have other persons as their goal and criterion; therefore, this is a mutual quest 
to exalt the dignity and fundamental value of the whole person in sport. A Christian 
ethic attends throughout to the value of an athlete, a sportsperson, for this value then 
gives rise to the moral requirements and relates to the ends (excellences), habits, and 
actions that either affirm or retard this personalistic value. As long as sport has other 
human beings as its object, a sportsperson is bound by this personalistic norm to treat 
persons for who they really and fully are.  
     I have argued that, in particular, if this value is true about human persons, then a 
Christian anthropology must consider and defend the meaning of the body not as a 
mere object of nature for human power and athletic achievement, but as a primordial 
wonder, which as a gift and sign must be received and respected as integral to human 
dignity. For a Christian ethic, the sportive contest is established and oriented equally, 
if not primarily, around gift and love, not around the self-mastery of the body as a 
task.  
     With Bonhoeffer‘s ethical vision, I have repaired a moral and theological 
problem, namely dualism and instrumentalism, that has precluded evangelicals in 
North America from properly valuing sport as a penultimate good. Bonhoeffer‘s 
Christological basis embeds the question of what is good in a wholly other reality, 
that is, the reality of Christ as incarnate, judge, and redeemer. This reality redescribes 
all of reality; therefore, Christians in sport are to participate in this concrete form 
because it reveals that Christ is the center of life and existence. This way of being in 
the world negates any division of reality that modern muscular Christianity 
perpetuated; it affirms the Lordship of Christ over the entire cosmos rather than 
giving certain spheres, such as sport, autonomy and neutrality.  
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     In conclusion to my thesis, I have considered the importance of an eschatological 
paradigm for how Christians construe sport. I presented Bonhoeffer‘s ultimate and 
penultimate distinction as an eschatological paradigm that properly situates and 
integrates how a Christian values sport in the midst of the natural life.  This 
eschatological paradigm is important in order for a Christian sportsperson to be free 
to enact the gospel responsibly and enjoyably in this cultural activity. However, I 
argued from Augustine that this teleological paradigm must equally regard the social 
context that educates our desires or loves either toward or away from God.  For a 
Christian ethic, the ultimate holds normative value and rank so that all sportive 
actions and attitudes are directed to the true end and highest good.  John Paul II 
complemented this paradigm, for I argued that his use of St. Paul‘s sport metaphor in 
1 Corinthians 9:24-27 is a moral paradigm for how we integrate our faith in sport.  
John Paul II‘s conclusion enveloped this whole thesis because his framework capably 
repaired the folk theologizing endemic to modern muscular Christianity as a way for 
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